From discussing mobile phone use while driving to the challenges of giving advice to older adults at risk of falls, this episode covers ChatGPT’s responses to a wide range of safety topics - identifying biases, inconsistencies, and areas where ChatGPT aligns or falls short of expert advice. The broader implications of relying on ChatGPT for safety advice are examined carefully, especially in workplace settings. While ChatGPT often mirrors general lay understanding, it can overlook critical organizational responsibilities, potentially leading to oversimplified or erroneous advice. This episode underscores the importance of using AI-generated content cautiously, particularly in crafting workplace policies or addressing complex safety topics. By engaging with multiple evidence-based sources and consulting experts, organizations can better navigate the limitations of AI tools. Discussion Points:Drew and David discuss their own recent experience with generative AIThe multiple 15 authors are all experts, discussing the methods usedExamining the nine different question scenarios‘Mobile phone use while driving’ resultsCrowd/crush safety adviceAdvice for preventing falls in older adultsAnalyzing ChatGPT response formatsExercising outdoors near traffic with asthmaQuestioning ChatGPT about how to engage a distressed person who may commit suicideSafety working ‘under high pressure’ and job demands, burnout preventionLack of nuance in ChatGPTThe safety of sharing personal data on fitness apps, how can it be shared safely?Is it safe to operate heavy machinery when fatigued? Testing several ways to ask this question - sleepy, tired, fatiguedConclusions and takeawaysThe answer to our episode’s question: “AI is not currently a suitable source for writing safety guidelines or advice”Like and follow, send us your comments and suggestions! Quotes:“This is one of the first papers that I've seen that actually gives us sort of fair test of ChatGPT for a realistic safety application.” - Drew“I quite like the idea that they chose questions which may be something that a lay person or even a generalist safety practitioner might ask ChatGPT, and then they had an expert in that area to analyze the quality of the answer that was given.” - David“I really liked the way that this paper published the transcripts of all of those interactions with ChatGPT. So exactly what question the expert asked it, and exactly the transcript of what ChatGPT provided.”- David“In case anyone is wondering about the evidence based advice, if you think there is a nearby terrorist attack, chat GPT's answer is consistent with the latest empirical evidence, which is run. There they go on to say that the rest of the items are essentially the standard advice that police and emergency services give.” - Drew“[ChatGPT] seems to prioritize based on how frequently something appears rather than some sort of logical ordering or consideration of what would make sense.” - Drew“As a supplement to an expert, it's a good way of maybe finding things that you might not have considered. But as a sole source of advice or a sole source of hazard identification or a sole position on safety, it's not where it needs to be…” - DavidResources:The Article - The Risks Of Using ChatGPT to Obtain Common Safety-Related Information and AdviceDisasterCast Episode 54: Stadium DisastersThe Safety of Work PodcastThe Safety of Work on LinkedInFeedback@safetyofwork

We challenge the notion that high injury rates are punished by market forces, as we dig into this article that posits the opposite: that safety should be a performance driver. Our analysis dives deep into the credibility and methodologies of the article, emphasizing the critical role of peer review and the broader body of knowledge.We'll also scrutinize the use of data as rhetoric versus evidence, focusing on the transparency and rigor of research methods when interviewing executives about safety practices. Is safety merely seen as a compliance issue or a strategic investment? We dissect the methodologies, including participant selection and question framing, to uncover potential biases. Finally, we critique a proposed five-step process aimed at transforming safety into a competitive advantage. From aligning on the meaning of safety to incentivizing employees, we expose significant gaps in academic rigor and alignment with established safety literature. This conversation serves as a powerful critique of superficial analyses by those outside the safety science domain, offering listeners critical insights into the complexity of safety management and its potential alignment with organizational goals.  Discussion Points:Re-examining the role of safety as a value driver for businessComparing contrasting research findings and cautioning about evaluating researchData as rhetoric in safetyTransparency and methodology are crucial in research, especially when interviewing executives about workplace safetyExecutives' perspectives on safety are questioned, research methods are critiquedClarifying claims and performance in business The five-step process for competitive advantage A study on the effectiveness of safety training methods Safety management is complex and requires evidence-based strategies, not superficial analysis or reliance on compliance trainingStrategic value of workplace safetySafety's impact on business success is uncertain, but exploring its alignment with organizational goals is importantTakeaways The answer to our episode’s question: “the short answer is we still don't know!” Like and follow, send us your comments and suggestions! Quotes:“The trouble is, then we don't know whether what they're referring to is published research that might be somewhere else that we can look for for the details, or work that they did specifically for this article, or other work that they've done that was just never published.” - Drew“We've got to be really careful…this is using data as rhetoric, not using data as data.” - Drew“I wouldn't be surprised that most people see safety as both a cost and as an outcome.”- Drew“So you've got two-thirds of these companies that don't even have any safety metric, like not even an injury metric or anything that they monitor.” - David“So we kind of assume business performance means financial performance, but that in itself is never clarified.” - DavidResources:The Article: Safety Should Be a Performance DriverEpisode 121: Is Safety Good for Business?The Safety of Work PodcastThe Safety of Work on LinkedInFeedback@safetyofwork

From the perceived control in everyday activities like driving, to the dread associated with nuclear accidents, we discuss how emotional responses can sometimes skew our rational assessments of risk. Finally, we explore the ethical and practical challenges of balancing emotional and analytical approaches in risk communication, especially in high-stakes scenarios like terrorism and public safety. The conversation touches on real-world examples, such as the aftermath of the September 11 attacks and the controversial discussions around gun ownership. We emphasize the importance of framing and narrative in conveying risk information effectively, ensuring that it resonates with and is clearly understood by diverse audiences.  Discussion Points:Understanding risk perception, Paul Slovic's work and how it has shaped safety practices and decisions in everyday life“Affect heuristic” in decision making, influenced by emotions and past experiences, leading to inconsistencies in risk perception.Feeling in-control vs. “scary concepts”, risks are perceived differently due to emotions, control, and misunderstandings of probabilities, as seen in driving Risks are assessed differently based on probabilities, outcomes, framing, and context, influencing decision-makingOther studies, looking at how people see risk, assessing your personal fear or risk from causes of death from cancer to stroke to car accidents to shark attacks vs. your own bathroomBalance between emotional and analytical risk evaluationMath and statistical examples of how risk is presented and perceivedPost 9/11 terrorist fears vs. statistics Ethical considerations in communication, and challenges in conveying risk informationTakeaways The answer to our episode’s question: “the short answer is both” Like and follow, send us your comments and suggestions! Quotes:“Risk is analysis where we bring logic, reason, and science or data or facts, and bring it to bear on hazard management.” - David“There may not be a perfect representation of any risk.” - Drew“If that's the important bit, then blow it up to the entire slide and get rid of the diagram and just show us the important bit.”- Drew“It's probably a bit unfair on humans to say that using feeling and emotion isn't a rational thing to do.” - David“The authors are almost saying here that for some types of risks and situations, risk as a feeling is great.” - David Resources:The Paper: Risk as Analysis and Risk as Feelings: Some thoughts about Affect, Reason, Risk and RationalityThe Safety of Work PodcastThe Safety of Work on LinkedInFeedback@safetyofwork

The discussion provides an in-depth examination of the principles of multimedia, modality, and redundancy, all of which are crucial for optimizing learning and information retention. The episode also offers a wealth of practical strategies for interactive design and meticulous preparation, aimed at enhancing audience engagement and comprehension. These strategies include the use of visual aids, storytelling techniques, and audience participation elements to create a more dynamic and immersive experience. By adopting these methods, presenters can not only convey their message more effectively but also make the learning process more enjoyable and impactful for their audience. The Paper’s AbstractActive training techniques are effective because they engage learners in tasks that promote deep thought, discussion, problem-solving, social interaction, and hands-on learning. Passive training is less effective because learners are relegated to merely listening and watching as an instructor does all of the mental, social, and physical work. Bullet-point lectures may be poorly suited for meaningful training because they usually adopt a model of passive learning and they tend to combine spoken words and displayed text in ways that may actually decrease comprehension. PowerPoint can serve as a tool to promote active learning if we eliminate lengthy bullet lists and use instructional images to guide group discussions, problem-solving activities, and hands-on experiences. Discussion Points:Background on the author Mitch Ricketts and the paperActive vs. passive learningConstructive and interactive learningBalancing text and images using multimedia, modality, and redundancy principlesUse of questions on slides to prompt discussion and interactionImportance of managing cognitive load for audience engagementClear, concise content and the value of signaling in presentationsThe significance of preparation and creating separate presentations for different needsStrategies for creating effective slides focused on visuals over textMoving away from bullet points to use impactful images and labelsTakeaways - What you SHOULD do on your slidesThe answer to our episode’s question is, the short answer here is the title of the paper- "No more bullet points." Quotes:“This is what you might call an applied literature review. It's someone taking the literature and interpreting that literature for a particular purpose.” - Drew“There's a lot of research that says that a lot of high school and university teachers rely on fairly outdated and disproven theories about these different modes of learning.” - Drew“If that's the important bit, then blow it up to the entire slide and get rid of the diagram and just show us the important bit.”- Drew“if you're a learner and you see a giant pair of goggles on a PowerPoint slide with just the word “goggles”, then all you're going to be doing now is just listening to what the presenter is saying. And hopefully they're saying something about goggles.” - David“Slides aren't there to look interesting and slides aren't there to carry the weight of the content. Think of them as visual support.” - Drew Resources:The Paper: No More Bullet PointsThe Safety of Work PodcastThe Safety of Work on LinkedInFeedback@safetyofwork

We examine whether a safe work environment truly enhances productivity and engagement or if it stifles business efficiency. Historical incidents like the Union Carbide disaster and BP's Deepwater Horizon blowout are analyzed to question if neglecting safety can still lead to profitability. Finally, we break down the misconception that good safety practices automatically translate to business profitability. We highlight the tangible benefits such as enhanced publicity, stronger client relationships, and improved employee satisfaction, and stress the importance of complex discussions about the actual costs vs. benefits of safety practices.The Paper’s AbstractThis research addresses the fundamental question of whether providing a 15 safe workplace improves or hinders organizational survival, because there are conflicting predictions on the relationship between worker safety and organizational performance. The results, based on a unique longitudinal database covering over 100,000 organizations across 25 years in the U.S. state of Oregon, indicate that in general organizations that provide a safe workplace have significantly lower odds and 20 length of survival. Additionally, the organizations that would in general have better survival odds, benefit most from not providing a safe workplace. This suggests that relying on the market does not engender workplace safety.Discussion Points:Is safety “good for business”? Examining the relationship between safety and business viabilityBhopal and the costs, Occidental - you can still make money without safetyThe backgrounds and qualifications of the paper’s authorsWorkplace safety can both benefit and hinder organizational survival due to productivity prioritization and potential risksWorkplace safety and business performance are complexly related, with a study showing a decrease in survival odds and length due to safety prioritizationSafety compliance at the lowest minimal cost may hinder productivity and divert attention from safety, leading to increased risksSafety is not inherently good for business; instead, it can bring tangible benefits like publicity, client relationships, and employee satisfactionStrict regulations and upfront investments in safety are necessary for fostering a safer work environment and ensuring business successTakeaways - Stop claiming safety is “good for business”The answer to our episode’s question is, “So the short answer is on average, no. At least according to this study, businesses are more likely to survive in the short term and long term if they're hurting more people more seriously.”Quotes:“The sorts of things that you do to improve safety are the sorts of things that I thought should also improve productivity and reliability in the long run.” - David“Which is science, right? That's what it's about. We think we're right until we get a new piece of information and realize that maybe we weren't as right as we thought we were.” - David“Even though there is a reasonably high volume of research out there, it's really hard to look very directly at the question.”- Drew“So we know from this data that it's not true that providing a safe workplace makes you more competitive.” - DrewResources:The Paper: The Tension Between Worker Safety and Organization SurvivalThe Safety of Work PodcastThe Safety of Work on LinkedInFeedback@safetyofwork

David and Drew share insights into Dr. Provan’s PhD research journey, exploring the scarce guidance and fragmented views within academic research on safety practices. They discuss the challenges of painting a clear picture of the day-to-day responsibilities of safety professionals and how this prompted an in-depth investigation into the profession. As we peel back the layers of existing literature, we touch on the difficulty and complexity of condensing a vast array of theories and studies into a cohesive academic narrative.The varied titles and the global patchwork of research that span numerous fields are explored, and although David’s search through databases and beyond revealed a trove of about 100 relevant articles, more insights may remain hidden. The discussion culminates with a look at the strategies employed by safety professionals to wield influence, foster trust, and align safety objectives with organizational goals. David's firsthand experiences and academic findings paint a vivid picture of the complex identity and influence that safety professionals must navigate in their pivotal roles.The Paper’s AbstractSafety professionals have been working within organizations since the early 1900s. During the past 25 years, societal pressure and political intervention concerning the management of safety risks in organizations has driven dramatic change in safety professional practice. What are the factors that influence the role of safety professionals? This paper reviews more than 100 publications. Thematic analysis identified 25 factors in three categories: institutional, relational, and individual. The review highlights a dearth of empirical research into the practice and role of safety professionals, which may result in some ineffectiveness. Practical implications and an empirical research agenda regarding safety professional practice are proposed.Discussion Points:Safety professionals - are they a “necessary evil”?The role and perception of safety professionals, scarcity and fragmentation of literature, and challenges in condensing research. Safety positions have many varying titles globally.Institutional, organizational, and individual factors, regulatory environments, and professional associationsSafety professionals face challenges when reporting to line managers, limiting their ability to challenge leadership and prioritize protection over workers.Balancing safety independence and bureaucracyA construction industry study - testing bureaucracyAlliance vs. Influence - Safety professionals act as the conscience of the organization, using constructive challenge and alliances to advocate for safety and align goals with broader objectives.Influence and trust in safety management - relational legitimacy, influence tactics, and symbolic enablers to promote best practices and trust within organizations.Practical takeaways from the paperThe answer to our episode’s question is, “This is still an area of safety science that is a prime candidate for more PhD and postdoc research.” Quotes:“I went into this going, what has been published on the safety profession? And to do that, went to a couple of the key databases and used very deliberate keyword searches…” - David“That was probably one of the first challenges- is that this role gets called so many different things in one country, let alone globally.” - David“The included pieces were all in peer-reviewed publications, but there's a range of quality to those publications.”- David“This connection between the bureaucratic activities of safety professionals and the value that the people who are exposed to the risk see in having a safety team was one of the most stark research findings in the literature.” - David“Don't learn how to do your job from a TED Talk regardless of how inspirational a new view that talk is.” - DrewResources:The Paper: Bureaucracy, Influence, and BeliefsThe Safety of Work PodcastThe Safety of Work on LinkedInFeedback@safetyofwork

Today’s paper, “Multiple Systemic Contributors versus Root Cause: Learning from a NASA Near Miss”  by Katherine E. Walker et al, examines an incident wherein a NASA astronaut nearly drowned (asphyxiated) during an Extravehicular Activity (EVA 23) on the International Space Station due to spacesuit leakage. The paper introduces us to an innovative and efficient technique developed during Walker’s PhD research. In this discussion, we reflect on the foundational elements of safety science and how organizations are tirelessly working to unearth better methods for analyzing and learning from safety incidents. We unpack the intricate findings of the investigation committee and discuss how root cause analysis can sometimes lead to the unintended consequence of adding more pressure within a system. A holistic understanding of how systems and individuals manage and adapt to these pressures may provide more meaningful insights for preventing future issues.Wrapping up, our conversation turns to the merits of the SCAD technique, which champions the analysis of accidents as extensions of normal work. By examining the systemic organizational pressures that shape everyday work adaptations, we can better comprehend how deviations due to constant pressures may lead to incidents. We also critique current accident analysis techniques and emphasize the importance of design improvement recommendations. Discussion Points:History and current state of accident investigationSystemic solutions in safetyTraditional root cause analysis challenged by new perspectivesNASA's 2013 EVA 23 space walk incident examinedOrganizational pressures and their impact on safetySCAD technique for accident analysis efficiencyShift from tracing causes to understanding work adaptationsEmphasis on normal work analysis for accident preventionCritique of NASA's administrative processes in safetyCognitive biases and challenges in accident investigationsContinuous evolution of safety practices Practical takeaways -how do you go beyond the immediate events to find broader systems and broader learnings?Canging language away from causes to talk about pressures and contributorsThe answer to our episode’s question is, “Yeah, it probably helps, but still doesn't fix the problem that we're facing with trying to get useful system changes out of investigations.”Quotes:“We've been doing formal investigations of accidents since the late 1700s early 1800s. Everyone, if they don't do anything else for safety, still gets involved in investigating if there's an incident that happens.” - Drew“If you didn't have this emphasis on maximising crew time they would have been much more cautious about EVA 23” - Drew“Saying that there's work pressure is not actually an explanation for accidents, because work pressure is normal, work pressure always exists.” - Drew“One of the things that is absent from this technique through and they call it an accident analysis method is there is no commentary in the paper at all about how to design improvements and recommendations.” - DavidResources:The Paper: NASA Near MissThe Safety of Work PodcastThe Safety of Work on LinkedInFeedback@safetyofwork

Using the Waterfall incident as a striking focal point, we dissect the investigation and its aftermath, we share personal reflections on the implementation of safety recommendations and the nuances of assessing systems designed to protect us. From the mechanics of dead man's systems to the critical evaluation of managerial decisions, our dialogue exposes the delicate balance of enforcing safety while maintaining the practicality of operations. Our aim is to contribute to the ongoing conversation about creating safer work environments across industries, recognizing the need for both technological advancements and refined human judgment.  Discussion Points:Drew loves a paper with a great nameThe circumstances surrounding the Waterfall rail accidentHow the “dead man system” works on certain trainsRecommended changes from investigation committeesIn the field of safety, we seem more certain about our theoriesExploration of narratives and facts in accident investigationsDead man's system and Waterfall derailment's investigationPost-accident list of operator failuresSafety theories and organizational fault correlation critiquedEvolution of railway safetyDiscussion on managerial decisions amidst imperfect knowledgeThe importance of context in incident investigationsSafety management systems and human judgmentInsights on enhancing organizational safetyTheoretical conclusionsPractical takeawaysThe answer to our episode’s question is, “yes, keep it in mind as a digital tool” Quotes:“I find that some of the most interesting things in safety don't actually come from people with traditional safety or even traditional safety backgrounds.”- Drew“Because this is a possible risk scenario, on these trains, we have what's called a ‘dead man system.” - David“Every time you have an accident, it must have objective physical causes, and those physical causes have to come from objective organisational failures, and I think that's a fairly fair representation of how we think about accidents in safety.” - Drew“They focused on the dead man pedal because they couldn't find anything wrong with the design of the switch, so they assumed that it must have been the pedal that was the problem” - DrewResources:The Paper: Blaming Dead MenThe Safety of Work PodcastThe Safety of Work on LinkedInFeedback@safetyofwork

Using the paper, “Digital Twins in Safety Analysis, Risk Assessment and Emergency Management.” by Zio and Miqueles, published in the technical safety journal, Reliability Engineering and System Safety, we examine intricate simulations that predict traffic flows to emergency management tools that plan safe evacuation routes, and we delve into how these virtual counterparts of physical systems are redefining risk assessments and scenario planning.As we navigate the world of operational safety, we discuss the diverse array of models—from geometric to sophisticated hybrid simulations—and their groundbreaking applications in forecasting fire spread and optimizing evacuation procedures. These digital twins aren't just theoretical concepts; they're powerful, real-time lifesavers in emergency situations, emblematic of the future of safety science.  Discussion Points:What are digital twins and how are they used?Use of digital twins is de rigueur in traffic flow, fire engineering, water flow structureIdentifying all recent papers written on digital twinsVirtual simulations offer advanced risk assessment capabilitiesOverview of tasks and functions identified, industries - construction, naval engineering, manufacturingTechnical discussion on digital twin creation and maintenanceSix key challenges of digital twinningSmart paint innovation improves virtual model accuracyCybersecurity risksReal-time operational safety monitoringDigital twins promise improved safety and operational efficiencyEmergency management potentially bolstered by real-time simulationsPractical takeawaysIndustry practice may surpass academic digital twin findingsThe answer to our episode’s question is, “yes, keep it in mind as a digital tool” Quotes:"Ideally, a digital twin is a complete virtual copy of a product or service that is an electronic simulation that is completely accurate compared to that real product or service.”- Drew“One of the first documented digital twins was in the aerospace industry -  NASA [used it] during the Apollo 13 program.” - David“this idea of having a complete digital picture of the thing that you're building is becoming fairly common, so that  lends itself very much towards using it for things like digital twins.” - Drew“we may never quite know exactly how different the digital twin is from the physical object itself. That’s the challenge.” - David Resources:The PaperThe Safety of Work PodcastThe Safety of Work on LinkedInFeedback@safetyofwork

Ben's expertise guides us through an analysis of audit reports and accident investigations, laying bare the counterfactual reasoning that often skews post-incident narratives. It's an eye-opening examination that calls for a reimagined approach to audits, one that aligns with the genuine complexities of organizational culture and safety. Together, we confront the silent failure of safety audits and management systems, debating the need for a fundamental shift in how these are designed and conducted to truly protect workers. Join us for this critical dialogue that challenges preconceptions and seeks to reforge the link between safety audits and the real work of keeping people safe. Discussion Points:Ben’s background and papers authoredThe reality of safety auditsSafety plans - often perceived as comfort, not changeDocumentation versus actual safety"Audit masquerade" reveals gaps between theory and practiceExamination of 327 audit corrective actions and their efficacyAdministrative intentions vs. practical safetyThe weak connection between audits and physical safety improvements Concerns about evaluating work practices Audits can ‘fail silently’, giving false security assurancePractical steps for ensuring audit effectivenessA critical examination of safety management systemsKey takeawaysBen’s answer to our episode’s question is, “Possibly, but it depends.” Quotes:"Some audits were very poorly calibrated to actually exploring and eliciting work - day-to-day work and operational risk.." - Ben“you've got to pick and choose what to pay attention to. So unless something is really standing out as needing attention, then it can be hard to be curious and to notice these weak signals.” - David“I'm proud to work in safety. I'm proud to call myself a sector professional. What really drove me to understand these systems was my love for safety, and I had just become so disillusioned with the amount of safety work I had to do. It wasn't helping.” - Ben“Audits, like most activities, are very socio-political. There's a lot of vested power and conflicting interests.” - Ben Resources:Paper: Audit masquerade: How audits provide comfort rather than treatment for serious safety problemsPaper: How audits fail according to accident investigations: A counterfactual logic analysisBen Hutchinson LinkedInThe Safety of Work PodcastThe Safety of Work on LinkedInFeedback@safetyofwork

Safety isn't one-size-fits-all, especially for subcontractors who navigate multiple sites with varying rules and equipment. This episode peels back the layers on the practical safety management challenges subcontractors endure, revealing how transient work complicates the integration of safety protocols. We scrutinize the institutional oversights and fragmented safety systems that often overlook the needs of these critical yet vulnerable players in the industry. Our conversation isn't just about identifying problems; it's an urgent call to action for better practices and a safer future for all involved in subcontracting work. Discussion Points:The vagaries of subcontracting workBackground on the paper being discussedFindings presented in the paperInstitutional safety vs. the subcontractor’s workExpertise in the work does not equal expertise in safetyCommunication and safety work activitiesInstitutional safety mechanismsDangerous environments and lack of safety knowledge in that environmentSubcontractors in the mining industry and the many layers and risksSafety rules are perceived differently by subcontractorsFinancial and other burdens to following safety protocols for subcontractorsKey takeawaysThe answer to our episode’s question –the short answer in some of it is that there are lots of filtered and missing communication towards contractors' gaps in situational specific expertise that don't get identified and just our broad safety management systems and arrangements that don't work well for the subcontractor context. Quotes:"Subcontracting itself is also a fairly undefined term. You can range from anything from large, labour -higher organisations to what we typically think in Australia of a small business with maybe one to four or five employees." - Drew “All of the normal protections we put in place for safety just don't work as well when there are contract boundaries in place.” - Drew“the subcontractor may be called in because they've got expertise in a particular type of work, but they're in an environment where they don't have expertise.” - Drew Resources:Link to the PaperThe Safety of Work PodcastThe Safety of Work on LinkedInFeedback@safetyofwork

Lastly, we delve into the role of leadership in addressing psychosocial hazards, the importance of standardized guidance for remote work, and the challenges faced by line managers in managing remote workers. We wrap up the episode by providing a toolkit for managers to effectively navigate the challenges of remote work, and highlight the need for tailored safety strategies for different work arrangements.  Discussion Points:Different work-from-home arrangementsSafety needs of work from homeChallenges of remote worker representationUnderstanding and managing psychosocial risksLeadership and managing technical risksRemote work challenges and physical presencePractical takeaways and general discussionSafety strategies for different work arrangementsThe answer to our episode’s question – the short answer is that there definitely isn't a short answer. But this paper comes from a larger project and I know that the people who did the work have gathered together a list of existing resources and toolboxes and, they've even created a few prototype tools and training packagesQuotes:"There's a risk that we're missing important contributions from workers with different needs, neurodiverse workers, workers with mental health issues, workers with particular reasons for working at home and we’re not going to be able to comment on the framework and how it might affect them." - Drew “When organizations' number of incident reports go up and up and up and we struggle to understand, is that a sign of worsening safety or is that a sign of better reporting?” - David“They do highlight just how inconsistent organisations approaches are and perhaps the need for just some sort of standardised guidance on what is an organisation responsible for when you ask to work from home, or when they ask you to work from home.” - Drew“I think a lot of people's response to work from home is let's try to subtly discourage it because we're uncomfortable with it, at the same time as we recognise that it's probably inevitable.” - Drew Resources:Link to the PaperThe Safety of Work PodcastThe Safety of Work on LinkedInFeedback@safetyofwork

The conversation stems from a review of a noteworthy paper from the Academy of Management Review Journal titled "The Paradox of Stretch Goals: Organizations in Pursuit of the Seemingly Impossible," which offers invaluable insights into the world of goal setting in senior management. Discussion Points:The concept of seemingly impossible goals in organizationsControversial nature and impact of ‘zero harm’The role of stretch goals in promoting innovationPotential negative effects of setting stretch goalsPsychological effects of ambitious organizational targetsParadoxical outcomes of setting seemingly impossible goalsThe role of emotions in achieving stretch goalsFactors that contribute to the success of stretch goalsReal-world examples of successful stretch goal implementationCautions against blind imitation of successful stretch goal strategiesThe concept of zero harm in safety initiativesNeed for long-term research on zero harm effectivenessThe answer to our episode’s question – they're good when the organization is currently doing well enough, but stretch goals are not good when the organization is struggling and trying to turn a corner using that stretch goal. Quotes:"The basic idea [of ‘zero harm’] is that companies should adopt a visionary goal of having zero accidents. Often that comes along with commitment statements by managers, sometimes by workers as well that everyone is committed to the vision of having no accidents." - Drew “I think organizations are in this loop, where I know maybe I can't achieve zero, but I can't say anything other than zero because that wouldn't be moral or responsible, because I'd be saying it's okay to hurt people. So I set zero because it's the best thing for me to do.” - David“The “stretch goal” was credited with the introduction of hybrid cars. You've got to have a whole new way of managing your car to get that seemingly impossible goal of doubling your efficiency.”-  Drew Resources:Link to the PaperThe Safety of Work PodcastThe Safety of Work on LinkedInFeedback@safetyofwork

You’ll hear David and Drew delve into the often overlooked role of bias in accident investigations. They explore the potential pitfalls of data collection, particularly confirmation bias, and discuss the impacts of other biases such as anchoring bias and hindsight bias. Findings from the paper are examined, revealing insights into confirmation bias and its prevalence in interviews. Strategies for enhancing the quality of incident investigations are also discussed, emphasizing the need to shift focus from blaming individuals to investigating organizational causes. The episode concludes with the introduction of Safety Exchange, a platform for global safety community collaboration. Discussion Points:Exploring the role of bias in accident investigationsConfirmation bias in data collection can validate initial assumptionsReview of a study examining confirmation bias among industry practitionersAnchoring bias and hindsight bias on safety strategiesRecognizing and confronting personal biases Counterfactuals in steering conversations towards preconceived solutionsStrategies to enhance the quality of incident investigationsShifting focus from blaming individuals to investigating organizational causesSafety Exchange - a platform for global safety communityThe challenges organizations face when conducting good quality investigationsStandardization, trust, and managing time and production constraintsConfirmation bias in shaping investigation outcomesTechniques to avoid bias in accident investigations and improve their qualitySafety Exchange - a safe place for open discussionSix key questionsThe answer to our episode’s question – Very, and we all are as human beings. It does mean that we should probably worry more about the data collection phase of our investigations more than the causal analysis methodology and taxonomy that we concern ourselves with Quotes:"If we actually don't understand how to get a good data collection process, then it really doesn't matter what happens after that." - David "The trick is recognizing our biases and separating ourselves from prior experiences to view each incident with fresh eyes." - Drew"I have heard people in the industry say this to me, that there's no new problems in safety, we've seen them all before." - David"In talking with people in the industry around this topic, incident investigation and incident investigation quality, 80% of the conversation is around that causal classification taxonomy." - David Resources:Link to the PaperThe Safety of Work PodcastThe Safety of Work on LinkedInFeedback@safetyofwork

The research paper discussed is by Anita Tucker and Sarah Singer, titled "The Effectiveness of Management by Walking Around: A Randomised Field Study," published in Production and Operations Management.  Discussion Points:Understanding senior leadership safety visits and management walkaroundsBest practices for safety management programsHow management walkarounds influence staff perceptionResearch findings comparing intervention and control groupsConsequences of management inactionEffective implementation of changes Role of senior managers in prioritizing problemsImpact of patchy implementationHow leadership visits affect staff perceptionInvestigating management inaction Effective implementation and consultationKey Takeaways:The same general initiative can have very different effectiveness depending on how it's implemented and who's implementing itWhen we do any sort of consultation effort, whether it's forums, walkarounds, reporting systems, or learning teams, what do we judge those on? Do we judge them on their success at consulting or do we judge them on their success at generating actions that get taken?The answer to our episode’s question – Your answer here at the end of our notes is sometimes yes, sometimes no. It depends on the resulting actions. Quotes:"I've definitely lived and breathed this sort of a program a lot during my career." - David"The effectiveness of management walkarounds depends on the resulting actions." - David"The worst thing you can do is spend lots of time deciding what is a high-value problem." - Drew"Having the senior manager allocated really means that something serious has been done about it." - Drew"The individual who walks around with the leader and talks about safety with the leader, thinks a lot better about the organization." - David Resources:Link to the PaperThe Safety of Work PodcastThe Safety of Work on LinkedInFeedback@safetyofwork

The paper reviewed in this episode is from the Journal of Applied Psychology entitled, “A meta-analysis of personality and workplace safety: Addressing unanswered questions” by Beus, J. M., Dhanani, L. Y., & McCord, M. A. (2015). Discussion Points:Overview of the intersection between psychology and workplace safetyHow personality tests may predict safety performanceAccident proneness theory to modern behaviorismResearch on personality and safety performancePersonality traits influencing work behaviorsThe influence of institutional logicPersonality tests for safety performanceThe need for further research and standardized measurement methodsExamining statistical evidence linking personality to safety performancePersonality traits and their impact on work behaviorAnalysis of research findings on personality and safety performanceThe practical implications of the research findingsThe intriguing yet complex relationship between personality and safetyTakeaways:While not total bunk, we definitely don't understand the impact of personality on safety nearly enough to use it as a tool to predict who will or won't make a safe employeeThere are lots of different ways that we could use personality to get some insights and to make some contributionsWe need people using those measurements to find out more about the relationship between personality and behavior in different situations in different contexts with different choices under different organizational influences.The answer to our episode’s question – Maybe. It depends. Sometimes, in some places not yet. I don't want to say no, but it's not yes yet either. Quotes:I have to admit, before I read this, I thought that the entire idea of personality testing for safety was total bunk. Coming out of it, I'm still not convinced, but it's much more mixed or nuanced than I was expecting.  - DrewIf there was a systemic trend where some people were genuinely more accident prone, we would expect to see much sharper differences between the number of times one person had an accident and all people who didn't have accidents. - DrewI think anything that lumps people into four or five categories downplays the uniqueness of each individual. - DavidThere are good professionals in HR, there's good science in HR, but there is a huge amount of pseudo-science around recruiting practices and every country has its own pseudoscience. - Drew Resources:Link to the Paper The Safety of Work PodcastThe Safety of Work on LinkedInFeedback@safetyofwork

Show Notes -  The Safety of Work - Ep. 109 Do safety performance indicators mean the same thing to different stakeholdersDr. Drew Rae and Dr. David Provan The abstract reads:Indicators are used by most organizations to track their safety performance. Research attention has been drawn to what makes for a good indicator (specific, proactive, etc.) and the sometimes perverse and unexpected consequences of their introduction. While previous research has demonstrated some of the complexity, uncertainties and debates that surround safety indicators in the scientific community, to date, little attention has been paid to how a safety indicator can act as a boundary object that bridges different social worlds despite being the social groups’ diverse conceptualization. We examine how a safety performance indicator is interpreted and negotiated by different social groups in the context of public procurement of critical services, specifically fixed-wing ambulance services. The different uses that the procurer and service providers have for performance data are investigated, to analyze how a safety performance indicator can act as a boundary object, and with what consequences. Moving beyond the functionality of indicators to explore the meanings ascribed by different actors, allows for greater understanding of how indicators function in and between social groups and organizations, and how safety is more fundamentally conceived and enacted. In some cases, safety has become a proxy for other risks (reputation and financial). Focusing on the symbolic equivocality of outcome indicators and even more tightly defined safety performance indicators ultimately allows a richer understanding of the priorities of each actor within a supply chain and indicates that the imposition of oversimplified indicators may disrupt important work in ways that could be detrimental to safety performance. Discussion Points:What we turn into numbers in an organizationBackground of how this paper came aboutFour main groups - procurement, incoming operator, outgoing operator, pilotsAvailability is key for air ambulancesIncentivizing availabilityOutgoing operators/providers feel they lost the contract unfairlyThe point of view of the incoming operators/providers Military pilots fill in between providersUsing numbers to show how good/bad the service isPilots - caught in the middleContracts always require a trade-offBoundary objects- what does availability mean to different people?Maximizing core deliverables safelyProblems with measuring availabilityPressure within the systemPutting a number on performance Takeaways:Choice of a certain metric that isn’t what you need leads to perverse behaviorPlacing indicators on things can make other things invisibleFinancial penalties tied to indicators can be counteractiveThe answer to our episode’s question – Yes, metrics on the boundaries can communicate in different directions Quotes:“The way in which we turn things into numbers reveals a lot about the logic that is driving the way that we act and give meaning to our actions.” - Drew“You’ve got these different measures of the service that are vastly different, depending on what you’re counting, and what you’re looking for..” - David“The paper never draws a final conclusion - was the service good, was the service bad?” - Drew“The pilots are always in this sort of weird, negotiated situation, where ‘doing the right thing’ could be in either direction.” - Drew“If someone’s promising something better, bigger, faster and cheaper, make sure you take the effort to understand how that company is going to do that….” - David  Resources:Link to the Paper The Safety of Work PodcastThe Safety of Work on LinkedInFeedback@safetyofwork

This report details the full findings of the world’s largest four-day working week trial to date, comprising 61 companies and around 2,900 workers, that took place in the UK from June to December 2022. The design of the trial involved two months of preparation for participants, with workshops, coaching, mentoring and peer support, drawing on the experience of companies who had already moved to a shorter working week, as well as leading research and consultancy organisations. The report results draw on administrative data from companies, survey data from employees, alongside a range of interviews conducted over the pilot period, providing measurement points at the beginning, middle, and end of the trial. Discussion Points:Background on the five-day workweekWe’ll set out to prove or review two central claims:Reduce hours worked, and maintain same productivityReduced hours will provide benefits to the employeesDigging in to the Autonomy organization and the researchers and authorsSays “trial” but it’s more like a pilot program61 companies, June to December 2022Issues with methodology - companies will change in 6 months coming out of Covid- a controlled trial would have been betterThe pilot only includes white collar jobs - no physical, operational, high-hazard businessesThe revenue numbersAnalysing the staff numbers- how many filled out the survey? What positions did the respondents hold in the company?Who experienced positive vs. negative changes in individual resultsInterviews from the “shop floor” was actually CEOs and office staffEliminating wasted time from the five-day weekWhat different companies preferred employees to do with their ‘extra time’Assumption 1: there is a business use case benefit- not trueAssumption 2: benefits for staff - mixed resultsTakeaways:Don’t use averagesFinding shared goals can be good for everyoneBe aware of burden-shiftingThe answer to our episode’s question – It’s a promising idea, but results are mixed, and it requires more controlled trial research Quotes:“It’s important to note that this is a pre-Covid idea, this isn’t a response to Covid.” - Dr. Drew“...there's a reason why we like to do controlled trials. That reason is that things change in any company over six months.” - Drew“ …a lot of the qualitative data sample is very tiny. Only a third of the companies got spoken to, and only one senior representative who was already motivated to participate in the trial, would like to think that anything that their company does is successful.” - David“I'm pretty sure if you picked any company, you're taking into account things like government subsidies for Covid, grants, and things like that. Everyone had very different business in 2021-2022.” - Drew“We're not trying to accelerate the pace of work, we're trying to remove all of the unnecessary work.” - Drew“I think people who plan the battle don't battle the plan. I like collaborative decision-making in general, but I really like it in relation to goal setting and how to achieve those goals.” - David Resources:Link to the Pilot StudyAutonomyThe Harwood Experiment EpisodeThe Safety of Work PodcastThe Safety of Work on LinkedInFeedback@safetyofwork

Summary: The purpose of the Australian Work Health and Safety (WHS) Strategy 2023–2033 (the Strategy) is to outline a national vision for WHS — Safe and healthy work for all — and set the platform for delivering on key WHS improvements. To do this, the Strategy articulates a primary goal supported by national targets, and the enablers, actions and system-wide shifts required to achieve this goal over the next ten years. This Strategy guides the work of Safe Work Australia and its Members, including representatives of governments, employers and workers – but should also contribute to the work and understanding of all in the WHS system including  researchers, experts and practitioners who play a role in owning, contributing to and realising the national vision. Discussion Points:Background on Safe Work Australia The strategy includes six goals for reducing:Worker fatalities caused by traumatic injuries by 30%          The frequency rate of serious claims resulting in one or more weeks off work by 20%       The frequency rate of claims resulting in permanent impairment by 15%    The overall incidence of work-related injury or illness among workers to below 3.5%         The frequency rate of work-related respiratory disease by 20% No new cases of accelerated silicosis by 2033The strategy is a great opportunity to set a direction for research and educationFive actions covered by the strategy:Information and raising awarenessNational CoordinationData and intelligence gatheringHealth and safety leadershipCompliance and enforcementWhen regulators fund research - they demand tangible results quicklyMany safety documents and corporate safety systems never reach the most vulnerable workers, who don’t have ‘regular’ long-term jobsStandardization can increase unnecessary workWhen and where do organizations access safety information?Data - AI use for the futureStrategy lacks milestones within the ten-year spanEnforcement - we don’t have evidence-based data on the effectsTakeaways:The idea of a national strategy? Good.Balancing safety with innovation, evidenceAnswering our episode question: Need research into specific workforces, what is the evidence behind specific industry issues.  “Lots of research is needed!” Quotes:“The fact is, that in Australia, traumatic injury fatalities - which are the main ones that they are counting - are really quite rare, even if you add the entire country together.” - Drew“I really see no point in these targets. They are not tangible, they’re not achievable, they’re not even measurable, with the exception of respiratory disease…” - Drew“These documents are not only an opportunity to set out a strategic direction for research and policy, and industry activity, but also an opportunity to educate.” - David“When regulators fund research, they tend to demand solutions. They want research that’s going to produce tangible results very quickly.” - Drew“I would have loved a concrete target for improving education and training- that is something that is really easy to quantify.” - Drew Resources:Link to the strategy documentThe Safety of Work PodcastThe Safety of Work on LinkedInFeedback@safetyofwork

Baron's work focuses primarily on judgment and decision-making, a multi-disciplinary area that applies psychology to problems of ethical decisions and resource allocation in economics, law, business, and public policy.  The paper’s summary:Recent efforts to teach thinking could be unproductive without a theory of what needs to be taught and why. Analysis of where thinking goes wrong suggests that emphasis is needed on 'actively open-minded thinking'. including the effort to search for reasons why an initial conclusion might be wrong, and on reflection about rules of inference, such as heuristics used for making decisions and judgments. Such instruction has two functions. First. it helps students to think on their own. Second. it helps them to understand the nature of expert knowledge, and, more generally, the nature of academic disciplines. The second function, largely neglected in discussions of thinking instruction. can serve as the basis for thinking instruction in the disciplines. Students should learn how knowledge is obtained through actively open-minded thinking. Such learning will also teach students to recognize false claims to systematic knowledge. Discussion Points:Critical thinking and Chat AI Teaching knowledge vs. critical thinkingSection One: Introduction- critical thinking is a stated goal of many teaching institutionsSection Two: The Current Rationale/What is thinking? Reading about thinking is quite difficult!Baron’s “Myside Bias” is today’s confirmation or selection biasReflective learning- does it help with learning?Section Three: Abuses - misapplying thinking in schools and businessBreaking down learning into sub-sectionsSection Four: The growth of knowledge - beginning in Medieval timesSection Five: The basis of expertise - what is an ‘expert’? Every field has its own self-critiquesDrew’s brain is hurting just getting through this discussionSection Six: What the educated person should knowStudying accidents in safety science - student assignmentsTakeaways:Good thinking means being able to make good decisions re: expertsPrecision is required around what is necessary for learningWell-informed self-criticism is necessary Answering our episode question: Can we teach critical thinking? It was never answered in this paper, but it gave us a lot to think about Quotes:“It’s a real stereotype that old high schools were all about rote learning. I don’t think that was ever the case. The best teachers have always tried to inspire their students to do more than just learn the material.” - Drew“Part of the point he’s making is, is that not everyone who holds themself out to be an expert IS an expert…that’s when we have to have good thinking tools .. who IS an expert and how do we know who to trust?” - Drew“Baron also says that even good thinking processes won’t necessarily help much when specific knowledge is lacking…” - David‘The smarter students are, the better they are at using knowledge about cognitive biases to criticize other people’s beliefs, rather than to help themselves think more critically.” - Drew“Different fields advance by different sorts of criticism..to understand expertise a field you need to understand how that field does its internal critique.” - Drew Resources:Link to the paperThe Safety of Work PodcastThe Safety of Work on LinkedInFeedback@safetyofwork

You’ll hear a little about Schein’s early career at Harvard and MIT, including his Ph.D. work – a paper on the experience of POWs during wartime contrasted against the indoctrination of individuals joining an organization for employment. Some of Schein’s 30-year-old concepts that are now common practice and theory in organizations, such as “psychological safety” Discussion Points:A brief overview of Schein’s career, at Harvard and MIT’s School of Management and his fascinating Ph.D. on POWs during the Korean WarA bit about the book, Humble InquiryDigging into the paperThree types of learning:Knowledge acquisition and insight learningHabits and skillsEmotional conditioning and learned anxietyPractical examples and the metaphor of Pavlov’s dogCountering Anxiety I with Anxiety IIThree processes of ‘unfreezing’ an organization or individual to change:DisconfirmationCreation of guilt or anxietyPsychological safetyMistakes in organizations and how they respondThere are so many useful nuggets in this paperSchein’s solutions: Steering committees/change teams/groups to lead the organizations and manage each other’s anxietyTakeaways:How an organization deals with mistakes will determine how change happensAssessing levels of fear and anxietyKnow what stands in your way if you want progressAnswering our episode question: How can organizations learn faster? 1) Don't make people afraid to enter the green room. 2) Or make them more afraid to stand on the black platform. Quotes:“...a lot of people credit [Schein] with being the granddaddy of organizational culture.” - Drew“[Schein] says .. in order to learn skills, you've got to be willing to be temporarily incompetent, which is great if you're learning soccer and not so good if you're learning to run a nuclear power plant.” - Drew“Schein says quite clearly that punishment is very effective in eliminating certain kinds of behavior, but it's also very effective in inducing anxiety when in the presence of the person or the environment that taught you that lesson.” - Drew“We've said before that we think sometimes in safety, we're about three or four decades behind some of the other fields, and this might be another example of that.” - David“Though curiosity and innovation are values that are praised in our society, within organizations and particularly large organizations, they're not actually rewarded.” - Drew Resources:Link to the paperHumble Inquiry by Edgar ScheinThe Safety of Work PodcastThe Safety of Work on LinkedInFeedback@safetyofwork

You’ll hear some dismaying statistics around the validity of research papers in general, some comments regarding the peer review process, and then we’ll dissect each of six questions that should be asked BEFORE you design your research. The paper’s abstract reads:In this article, we define questionable measurement practices (QMPs) as decisions researchers make that raise doubts about the validity of the measures, and ultimately the validity of study conclusions. Doubts arise for a host of reasons, including a lack of transparency, ignorance, negligence, or misrepresentation of the evidence. We describe the scope of the problem and focus on how transparency is a part of the solution. A lack of measurement transparency makes it impossible to evaluate potential threats to internal, external, statistical-conclusion, and construct validity. We demonstrate that psychology is plagued by a measurement schmeasurement attitude: QMPs are common, hide a stunning source of researcher degrees of freedom, and pose a serious threat to cumulative psychological science, but are largely ignored. We address these challenges by providing a set of questions that researchers and consumers of scientific research can consider to identify and avoid QMPs. Transparent answers to these measurement questions promote rigorous research, allow for thorough evaluations of a study’s inferences, and are necessary for meaningful replication studies. Discussion Points:The appeal of the foundational question, “are we measuring what we think we’re measuring?”Citations of studies - 40-93% of studies lack evidence that the measurement is validPsychological research and its lack of defining what measures are used, and the validity of their measurement, etc.The peer review process - it helps, but can’t stop bad research being publishedWhy care about this issue? Lack of validity- the research answer may be the oppositeDesigning research - like choosing different paths through a gardenThe six main questions to avoid questionable measurement practices (QMPs)What is your construct? Why/how did you select your measure?What measure to operationalize the construct?How did you quantify your measure?Did you modify the scale? How and why?Did you create a measure on the fly? Takeaways:Expand your methods section in research papersAsk these questions before you design your researchAs research consumers, we can’t take results at face valueAnswering our episode question: How can we get better? Transparency is the starting point. Resources:Link to the paperThe Safety of Work PodcastThe Safety of Work on LinkedInFeedback@safetyofwork

In concert with the paper, we’ll focus on two major separate but related Boeing 737 accidents: Lyon Air #610 in October 2018 - The plane took off from Jakarta and crashed 13 mins later, with one of the highest death tolls ever for a 737 crash - 189 souls.Ethiopian Airlines #30 in March 2019 - This plane took off from Addis Ababba and crashed minutes into takeoff, killing 157. The paper’s abstract reads:Following other contributions about the MAX accidents to this journal, this paper explores the role of betrayal and moral injury in safety engineering related to the U.S. federal regulator’s role in approving the Boeing 737MAX—a plane involved in two crashes that together killed 346 people. It discusses the tension between humility and hubris when engineers are faced with complex systems that create ambiguity, uncertain judgements, and equivocal test results from unstructured situations. It considers the relationship between moral injury, principled outrage and rebuke when the technology ends up involved in disasters. It examines the corporate backdrop against which calls for enhanced employee voice are typically made, and argues that when engineers need to rely on various protections and moral inducements to ‘speak up,’ then the ethical essence of engineering—skepticism, testing, checking, and questioning—has already failed. Discussion Points:Two separate but related air disastersThe Angle of Attack Sensor MCAS (Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System) on the Boeing 737Criticality rankingsThe article - Joe Jacobsen, an engineer/whistleblower who came forwardThe claim is that engineers need more moral courage/convictions and training in ethicsDefining moral injury Engineers - the Challenger accident, the Hyatt collapseDisaster literacy – check out the old Disastercast podcastHumility and hubrisRegulatory bodies and their issuesSolutions and remediesRisk assessmentsOther examples outside of BoeingTakeaways:Profit vs. risk, technical debtDon’t romanticize ethicsInternal emails can be your downfallRewards, accountability, incentivesLook into the engineering resourcesAnswering our episode question: In this paper, it's a sign that things are bad. Quotes:“When you develop a new system for an aircraft, one of the first safety things you do is you classify them according to their criticality.” - Drew“Just like we tend to blame accidents on human error, there’s a tendency to push ethics down to that front line.” - Drew“There’s this lasting psychological/biological behavioral, social or even spiritual impact of either perpetrating, or failing to prevent, or bearing witness to, these acts that transgress our deeply held moral beliefs and expectations.” - David“Engineers are sort of taught to think in these binaries, instead of complex tradeoffs, particularly when it comes to ethics.” - Drew“Whenever you have this whistleblower protection, you’re admitting that whistleblowers are vulnerable.” - Drew“Engineers see themselves as belonging to a company, not to a profession, when they’re working.” - Drew Resources:Link to the paperThe Safety of Work PodcastThe Safety of Work on LinkedInFeedback@safetyofwork

The paper’s abstract reads:Healthcare systems are under stress as never before. An aging population, increasing complexity and comorbidities, continual innovation, the ambition to allow unfettered access to care, and the demands on professionals contrast sharply with the limited capacity of healthcare systems and the realities of financial austerity. This tension inevitably brings new and potentially serious hazards for patients and means that the overall quality of care frequently falls short of the standard expected by both patients and professionals. The early ambition of achieving consistently safe and high-quality care for all has not been realised and patients continue to be placed at risk. In this paper, we ask what strategies we might adopt to protect patients when healthcare systems and organisations are under stress and simply cannot provide the standard of care they aspire to. Discussion Points:Extrapolating out from the healthcare focus to other businessesThis paper was published pre-pandemicAdaptations during times of extreme stress or lack of resources - team responses will varyPeople under pressure adapt, and sometimes the new conditions become the new normalGuided adaptability to maintain safetySubstandard care in French hospitals in the studyThe dynamic adjustment for times of crisis vs. long-term solutionsShort-term adaptations can impede development of long-term solutionsFour basic principles in the paper:Giving up hope of returning to normalWe can never eliminate all risks and threatsPrincipal focus should be on expected problemsManagement of risk requires engagement and action at all managerial levelsGriffith university’s rules on asking for an extension…expected surprisesMiddle management liaising between frontlines and executivesManaging operations in “degraded mode” and minimum equipment listsAbsolute safety - we can’t aim for 100% - we need to write in what “second best” coversTakeaways:Most industries are facing more pressure today than in the past, focus on the current risksAll industries have constant risks and tradeoffs - how to address at each levelUnderstand how pressures are being faced by teams, what adaptations are acceptable for short and long term?For expected conditions and hazards, what does “second best” look like?Research is needed around “degraded operations”Answering our episode question: The wrong answer is to only rely on the highest standards which may not be achievable in degraded operations Quotes:“I think it’s a good reflection for professionals and organistions to say, “Oh, okay - what if the current state of stress is the ‘new normal’ or what if things become more stressed? Is what we’re doing now the right thing to be doing?” - David“There is also the moral injury when people who are in a ‘caring’ profession and they can’t provide the standard of care that they believe to be right standard.” - Drew“None of these authors share how often these improvised solutions have been successful or unsuccessful, and these short-term fixes often impede the development of longer-term solutions.” - David“We tend to set safety up almost as a standard of perfection that we don’t expect people to achieve all the time, but we expect those deviations to be rare and correctable.” - Drew Resources:The Safety of Work PodcastThe Safety of Work on LinkedInFeedback@safetyofwork

The paper’s abstract reads:This paper reflects on the credibility of nuclear risk assessment in the wake of the 2011 Fukushima meltdown. In democratic states, policymaking around nuclear energy has long been premised on an understanding that experts can objectively and accurately calculate the probability of catastrophic accidents. Yet the Fukushima disaster lends credence to the substantial body of social science research that suggests such calculations are fundamentally unworkable. Nevertheless, the credibility of these assessments appears to have survived the disaster, just as it has resisted the evidence of previous nuclear accidents. This paper looks at why. It argues that public narratives of the Fukushima disaster invariably frame it in ways that allow risk-assessment experts to “disown” it. It concludes that although these narratives are both rhetorically compelling and highly consequential to the governance of nuclear power, they are not entirely credible. Discussion Points:Following up on a topic in episode 100 - nuclear safety and risk assessmentThe narrative around planes, trains, cars and nuclear - risks vs. safetyPlanning for disaster when you’ve promised there’s never going to be a nuclear disasterThe 1975 WASH-1400 StudiesJapanese disasters in the last 100 yearsFour tenets of Downer’s paper:The risk assessments themselves did not fail Relevance Defense: The failure of one assessment is not relevant to the other assessmentsCompliance Defense: The assessments were sound, but people did not behave the way they were supposed to/did not obey the rulesRedemption Defense: The assessments were flawed, but we fixed themTheories such as: Fukushima did happen - but not an actual ‘accident/meltdown’ - it basically withstood a tsunami when the country was flattenedResidents of Fukushima - they were told the plant was ‘safe’The relevance defense, Chernobyl, and 3 Mile IslandBoeing disasters, their risk assessments, and blameAt the time of Fukushima, Japanese regulation and engineering was regarded as superiorThis was not a Japanese reactor! It’s a U.S. designThe compliance defense, human errorThe redemption defense, regulatory bodies taking all Fukushima elements into accountDowner quotes Peanuts comics in the paper - lessons - Lucy can’t be trusted!This paper is not about what’s wrong with risk assessments- it’s about how we defend what we doTakeaways:Uncertainty is always present in risk assessmentsYou can never identify all failure modesThree things always missing: anticipating mistakes, anticipating how complex tech is always changing, anticipating all of the little plastic connectors that can breakAssumptions - be wary, check all the what-if scenariosJust because a regulator declares something safe, doesn’t mean it isAnswering our episode question: You must question risk assessments CONSTANTLY Quotes:“It’s a little bit surprising we don’t scrutinize the ‘control’ every time it fails.” - Drew“In the case of nuclear power, we’re in this awkward situation where, in order to prepare emergency plans, we have to contradict ourselves.” - Drew“If systems have got billions of potential ’billion to one’ accidents then it’s only expected that we’re going to see accidents from time to time.” - David“As the world gets more and more complex, then our parameters for these assessments need to become equally as complex.” - David“The mistakes that people make in these [risk assessments] are really quite consistent.” - Drew Resources:Disowning Fukushima Paper by John DownerWASH-1400 StudiesThe Safety of Work PodcastThe Safety of Work on LinkedInFeedback@safetyofwork

The book explains Perrow’s theory that catastrophic accidents are inevitable in tightly coupled and complex systems. His theory predicts that failures will occur in multiple and unforeseen ways that are virtually impossible to predict. Charles B. Perrow (1925 – 2019) was an emeritus professor of sociology at Yale University and visiting professor at Stanford University. He authored several books and many articles on organizations and their impact on society. One of his most cited works is Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay, first published in 1972. Discussion Points:David and Drew reminisce about the podcast and achieving 100 episodesOutsiders from sociology, management, and engineering entered the field in the 70s and 80sPerrow was not a safety scientist, as he positioned himself against the academic establishmentPerrow’s strong bias against nuclear power weakens his writingThe 1979 near-disaster at Three Mile Island - Perrow was asked to write a report, which became the book, “Normal Accidents…”The main tenets of Perrow’s core arguments:Start with a ‘complex high-risk technology’ - aircraft, nuclear, etcTwo or more values start the accident“Interactive Complexity”787 Boeing failures - failed system + unexpected operator response lead to disasterThere will always be separate individual failures, but can we predict or prevent the ‘perfect storm’ of mulitple failures at once?Better technology is not the answerPerrow predicted complex high-risk technology to be a major part of future accidentsPerrow believed nuclear power/nuclear weapons should be abandoned - risks outweigh benefitsThree reasons people may see his theories as wrong:If you believe the risk assessments of nuclear are correct, then my theories are wrongIf they are contrary to public opinion and valuesIf safety requires more safe and error-free organizationsIf there is a safer way to run the systems outside all of the aboveThe modern takeaway is a tradeoff between adding more controls, and increased complexityThe hierarchy of designers vs operatorsWe don’t think nearly enough about the role of power- who decides vs. who actually takes the risks?There should be incentives to reduce complexity of systems and the uncertainty it createsTo answer this show’s question - not entirely, and we are constantly asking why  Quotes:“Perrow definitely wouldn’t consider himself a safety scientist, because he deliberately positioned himself against the academic establishment in safety.” - Drew“For an author whom I agree with an awful lot about, I absolutely HATE the way all of his writing is colored by…a bias against nuclear power.” - Drew[Perrow] has got a real skepticism of technological power.” - Drew"Small failures abound in big systems.” - David“So technology is both potentially a risk control, and a hazard itself, in [Perrow’s] simple language.” - David Resources:The Book – Normal accidents: Living with high-risk technologiesThe Safety of Work PodcastThe Safety of Work on LinkedInFeedback@safetyofwork

The paper’s abstract reads: The failure of 27 wildland firefighters to follow orders to drop their heavy tools so they could move faster and outrun an exploding fire led to their death within sight of safe areas. Possible explanations for this puzzling behavior are developed using guidelines proposed by James D. Thompson, the first editor of the Administrative Science Quarterly. These explanations are then used to show that scholars of organizations are in analogous threatened positions, and they too seem to be keeping their heavy tools and falling behind. ASQ's 40th anniversary provides a pretext to reexamine this potentially dysfunctional tendency and to modify it by reaffirming an updated version of Thompson's original guidelines. The Mann Gulch fire was a wildfire in Montana where 15 smokejumpers approached the fire to begin fighting it, and unexpected high winds caused the fire to suddenly expand. This "blow-up" of the fire covered 3,000 acres (1,200 ha) in ten minutes, claiming the lives of 13 firefighters, including 12 of the smokejumpers. Only three of the smokejumpers survived. The South Canyon Fire was a 1994 wildfire that took the lives of 14 wildland firefighters on Storm King Mountain, near Glenwood Springs, Colorado, on July 6, 1994. It is often also referred to as the "Storm King" fire. Discussion Points:Some details of the Mann Gulch fire deaths due to refusal to drop their tools Weich lays out ten reasons why these firefighters may have refused to drop their tools:Couldn't hear the orderLack of explanation for order - unusual, counterintuitiveYou don’t trust the leaderControl- if you lose your tools, lose capability, not a firefighterSkill at dropping tools - ie survivor who leaned a shovel against a tree instead of droppingSkill with replacement activity - it’s an unfamiliar situationFailure - to drop your tools, as a firefighter,  is to failSocial dynamics - why would I do it if others are notConsequences - if people believe it won’t make a difference, they won’t drop.These men should have been shown the difference it would makeIdentity- being a firefighter, without tools they are throwing away their identity.  This was also shortly after WWII, where you are a coward if you throw away your weapons, and would be alienated from your groupThomson had four principles necessary for research in his publication: Administrative science should focus on relationships - you can’t understand without structures and people and variables. Abstract concepts - not on single concrete ideas, but theories that apply to the fieldDevelopment of operational definitions that bridge concepts and raw experience - not vague fluffy things with confirmation bias - sadly, we still don’t have all the definitions todayValue of the problem - what do they mean? What is the service researchers are trying to provide? How Weick applies these principles to the ten reasons, then looks at what it means for researchersWeick’s list of ten- they are multiple, interdependent reasons – they can all be true at the same timeThompsons list of four, relating them to Weick’s ten, in today’s organizationsWhat are the heavy tools that we should get rid of? Weick links heaviest tools with identityDrew’s thought - getting rid of risk assessments would let us move faster, but people won’t drop them, relating to the ten reasons aboveTakeaways: 1) Emotional vs. cognitive  (did I hear that, do I know what to do) emotional (trust, failure, etc.) in individuals and teams2) Understanding group dynamics/first person/others to follow - the pilot diversion story, Piper Alpha oil rig jumpers, first firefighter who drops tools. Next week is episode 100 - we’ve got a plan! Quotes:“Our attachment to our tools is not a simple, rational thing.” - Drew“It’s really hard to recognize that you’re well past that point where success is not an option at all.” - Drew“These firefighters were several years since they’d been in a really raging, high-risk fire situation…” - David“I encourage anyone to read Weick’s papers, they’re always well-written.” - David“Well, I think according to Weick, the moment you begin to think that dropping your tools is impossible and unthinkable, that might be the moment you actually have to start wondering why you’re not dropping your tools.” - Drew“The heavier the tool is, the harder it is to drop.” - Drew Resources:Karl Weick - Drop Your Tools PaperThe Safety of Work PodcastThe Safety of Work on LinkedInFeedback@safetyofwork

In 1939, Alfred Marrow, the managing director of the Harwood Manufacturing Corporation factory in Virginia, invited Kurt Lewin (a German-American psychologist, known as one of the modern pioneers of social, organizational, and applied psychology in the U.S.to come to the textile factory to discuss significant problems with productivity and turnover of employees. The Harwood study is considered the first experiment of group decision-making and self-management in industry and the first example of applied organizational psychology. The Harwood Experiment was part of Lewin's continuing exploration of participatory action research. In this episode David and Drew discuss the main areas covered by this research: Group decision-makingSelf-managementLeadership trainingChanging people’s thoughts about stereotypesOvercoming resistance to change It turns out that yes, Lewin identified many areas of the work environment that could be improved and changed with the participation of management and members of the workforce communicating with each other about their needs and wants.This was novel stuff in 1939, but proved to be extremely insightful and organizations now utilize many of this experiment’s tenets 80 years later.  Discussion Points:Similarities in this study compared to the Chicago Western Electric “Hawthorne experiments”Organizational science – Lewin’s approachHow Lewin came to be invited to the Virginia factory and the problems they needed to solveAutocratic vs. democratic - studies of school children’s performanceThe setup of the experiment - 30 minute discussions several times a week with four cohortsThe criticisms and nitpicks around the study participantsGroup decision makingSelf-management and field theoryHarwood leaders were appointed for tech knowledge, not people skillsThe experiment held “clinics” where leaders could bring up their issues to discussChanging stereotypes - the factory refused to hire women over 30 - but experimented by hiring a group for this studyPresenting data does not work to change beliefs, but stories and discussions doResistance to change - changing workers’ tasks without consulting them on the changes created bitterness and lack of confidenceThe illusion of choice lowers resistanceThe four cohorts:Control group - received changes as they normally would - just ‘being told’Group received more detail about the changes, members asked to represeet the group with managementGroup c and d participated in voting for the changes, their productivity was the only one that increased– 15%This was an atypical factory/workforce to begin with, that already had a somewhat participatory approachTakeaways:Involvement in the discussion of change vs. no involvementSelf-management - setting own goals Leadership needs more than technical competenceStereotypes - give people space to express views, they may join the group majority in voting the other wayResistance to change - if people can contribute and participate, confidence is increasedFocus on group modifications, not individualsMore collaborative, less autocraticDoing this kind of research is not that difficult, you don’t need university-trained researchers, just people with a good mind for research ideas/methods Quotes:“The experiments themselves were a series of applied research studies done in a single manufacturing facility in the U.S., starting in 1939.” - David“Lewin’s principal for these studies was…’no research without action, and no action without research,’ and that’s where the idea of action research came from…each study is going to lead to a change in the plant.” - Drew“It became clear that the same job was done very differently by different people.” - David“This is just a lesson we need to learn over and over and over again in our organizations, which is that you don’t get very far by telling your workers what to do without listening to them.” - Drew“With 80 years of hindsight it's really hard to untangle the different explanations for what was actually going on here.” - Drew“Their theory was that when you include workers in the design of new methods…it increases their confidence…it works by making them feel like they’re experts…they feel more confident in the change.” - Drew  Resources:The Practical Theorist: Life and Work of Kurt Lewin by Alfred MarrowThe Safety of Work PodcastThe Safety of Work on LinkedInFeedback@safetyofwork

This was very in-depth research within a single organization, and the survey questions it used were well-structured.  With 48 interviews to pull from, it definitely generated enough solid data to inform the paper’s results and make it a valuable study.We’ll be discussing the pros and cons of linking safety performance to monetary bonuses, which can often lead to misreporting, recategorizing, or other “perverse” behaviors regarding safety reporting and metrics, in order to capture that year-end dollar amount, especially among mid-level and senior management. Discussion Points:Do these bonuses work as intended?Oftentimes profit sharing within a company only targets senior management teams, at the expense of the front-line employeesIf safety and other measures are tied monetarily to bonuses, organizations need to spend more than a few minutes determining what is being measuredBonuses – do they really support safety? They don’t prevent accidents“What gets measured gets managed” OR “What gets measured gets manipulated”Supervisors and front-line survey respondents did not understand how metrics were used for bonuses87% replied that the safety measures had limited or negative effectNearly half said the bonus structure tied to safety showed that the organization felt safety was a priorityNothing negative was recorded by the respondents in senior management- did they believe this is a useful tool?Most organizations have only 5% or less performance tied to safetyDavid keeps giving examples in the hopes that Drew will agree that at least one of them is a good ideaDrew has “too much faith in humanity” around reporting and measuring safety in these organizationsTry this type of survey in your own organization and see what you find Quotes:“I’m really mixed, because I sort of agree on principle, but I disagree on any practical form.” - Drew“I think there’s a challenge between the ideals here and the practicalities.” - David“I think sometimes we can really put pretty high stakes on pretty poorly thought out things, we oversimplify what we’re going to measure and reward.” - Drew“If you look at the general literature on performance bonuses, you see that they cause trouble across the board…they don’t achieve their purposes…they cause senior executives to do behaviors that are quite perverse.” - Drew“I don’t like the way they’ve written up the analysis I think that there’s some lost opportunity due to a misguided desire to be too statistically methodical about something that doesn’t lend itself to the statistical analysis.” - Drew“If you are rewarding anything, then my view is that you’ve got to have safety alongside that if you want to signal an importance there.” - David Resources:Link to the PaperThe Safety of Work PodcastThe Safety of Work on LinkedInFeedback@safetyofwork

Just because concepts, theories, and opinions are useful and make people feel comfortable, doesn’t mean they are correct.  No one so far has come up with an answer in the field of safety that proves, “this is the way we should do it,” and in the work of safety, we must constantly evaluate and update our practices, rules, and recommendations. This of course means we can never feel completely comfortable – and humans don’t like that feeling.  We’ll dig into why we should be careful about feeling a sense of “clarity” and mental ease when we think that we understand things completely- because what happens if someone is deliberately making us feel that a problem is “solved”...? The paper we’re discussing deals with a number of interesting psychological constructs and theories. The abstract reads: The feeling of clarity can be dangerously seductive. It is the feeling associated with understanding things. And we use that feeling, in the rough-and-tumble of daily life, as a signal that we have investigated a matter sufficiently. The sense of clarity functions as a thought-terminating heuristic. In that case, our use of clarity creates significant cognitive vulnerability, which hostile forces can try to exploit. If an epistemic manipulator can imbue a belief system with an exaggerated sense of clarity, then they can induce us to terminate our inquiries too early — before we spot the flaws in the system. How might the sense of clarity be faked? Let’s first consider the object of imitation: genuine understanding. Genuine understanding grants cognitive facility. When we understand something, we categorize its aspects more easily; we see more connections between its disparate elements; we can generate new explanations; and we can communicate our understanding. In order to encourage us to accept a system of thought, then, an epistemic manipulator will want the system to provide its users with an exaggerated sensation of cognitive facility. The system should provide its users with the feeling that they can easily and powerfully create categorizations, generate explanations, and communicate their understanding. And manipulators have a significant advantage in imbuing their systems with a pleasurable sense of clarity, since they are freed from the burdens of accuracy and reliability. I offer two case studies of seductively clear systems: conspiracy theories; and the standardized, quantified value systems of bureaucracies.  Discussion Points:This has been our longest break from the podcastDavid traveled to the USUncertainty can make us risk-averseOrganizations strive for more certainty in the workplaceScimago for evaluating research papersA well-written paper, but not peer-evaluated by psychologistsFocus on conspiracy theories and bureaucracyThe Studio C comedy sketch - bank robbers meet a philosopherAcademic evaluations - white men vs. minorities/womenPuzzles and pleasure spikesClarity as a thought terminatorEpistemic intimidation and epistemic seductionCognitive Fluency, Insight, and Cognitive FacilityAlthough fascinating, there is no evidence to support the paper’s claimsEcho chambers and thought bubblesRush Limbaugh and Fox News - buying into the belief systemNumbers, graphs, charts, grades, tables – all make us feel comfort and controlTakeaways:Just because it’s useful, doesn’t mean it’s correctThe world is not supposed to make sense, it’s important to live with some cognitive discomfortBe cautious about feeling safe and comfortableConstant evaluation of safety practices must be the norm Resources:Link to the PaperThe Safety of Work PodcastThe Safety of Work on LinkedInFeedback@safetyofwork

Assessing the Influence of “Take 5” Pre-Task Risk Assessments on Safety” by Jop Havinga, Mohammed Ibrahim Shire,  and our own Andrew Rae.  The paper was just published in “Safety,” - an international, peer-reviewed, open-access journal of industrial and human health safety published quarterly online by MDPI. The paper’s abstract reads: This paper describes and analyses a particular safety practice, the written pre-task risk assessment commonly referred to as a “Take 5”. The paper draws on data from a trial at a major infrastructure construction project. We conducted interviews and field observations during alternating periods of enforced Take 5 usage, optional Take 5 usage, and banned Take 5 usage. These data, along with evidence from other field studies, were analysed using the method of Functional Interrogation. We found no evidence to support any of the purported mechanisms by which Take 5 might be effective in reducing the risk of workplace accidents. Take 5 does not improve the planning of work, enhance worker heedfulness while conducting work, educate workers about hazards, or assist with organisational awareness and management of hazards. Whilst some workers believe that Take 5 may sometimes be effective, this belief is subject to the “Not for Me” effect, where Take 5 is always believed to be helpful for someone else, at some other time. The adoption and use of Take 5 is most likely to be an adaptive response by individuals and organisations to existing structural pressures. Take 5 provides a social defence, creating an auditable trail of safety work that may reduce anxiety in the present, and deflect blame in the future. Take 5 also serves a signalling function, allowing workers and companies to appear diligent about safety.  Discussion Points:Drew, how are you feeling with just a week of comments and reactions coming in?If people are complaining that the study is not big enough, great! That means people are interestedIntroduction of Jop Havinga, and his top-level framing of the studyWhy do we do the ‘on-off’ style of research?We saw no difference in results when cards were mandatory, or optional, or bannedPerplexingly, some cards are filled out before getting to the job, and some after the job is complete, when there is no need for the cardOne way cards may be helpful is simply creating a mindfulness and heedfulness about proceduresThe “Not for Me” effect– people believe the cards may be good for others, but not necessary for selvesResearch criticisms like, “how can you actually tell people are paying attention or not?”The Take 5 cards serve as a protective layer for management and workers looking to avoid blameMain takeaway:  Stop using Take 5s in accident investigations, as they provide no real data, and they may even be detrimental– as in “safety clutter”Send us your suggestions for future episodes, we are actively looking! Quotes:“You always get taken by surprise when people find other ways to criticize [the research.] I think my favorite criticism is people who immediately hit back by trying to attack the integrity of the research.” - Dr. Drew“So this link between behavioral psychology and safety science is sometimes very weak, it’s sometimes just a general idea of applying incentives.” - Dr. Drew “When someone says, ‘we introduced Take 5’s and we reduced our number of accidents by 50%,’ that is nonsense. There is no [one] safety intervention in the world where you could have that level of change and be able to see it.” - Dr. Drew“It’s really hard to argue that these Take 5s lead to actual better planning of the work they’re conducting.” - Dr. Jop Havinga“What we saw is just a total disconnect – the behavior happens without the Take 5s, the Take 5s happen without the behavior. The two NEVER actually happened at the same time.” - Dr. Drew “Considering that Take 5 cards are very generic, they will rarely contain anything new for somebody.” - Dr. Jop Havinga“Often the people who are furthest removed from the work are most satisfied with Take 5s and most reluctant to get rid of them.” - Dr. Drew  Resources:Link to the PaperThe Safety of Work PodcastThe Safety of Work on LinkedInFeedback@safetyofwork

The authors’ goal was to produce a scoring protocol for safety-focused leadership engagements that reflects the consensus of a panel of industry experts. Therefore, the authors adopted a multiphased focus group research protocol to address three fundamental questions:  1. What are the characteristics of a high-quality leadership engagement? 2. What is the relative importance of these characteristics? 3. What is the reliability of the scorecard to assess the quality of leadership engagement? Just like the last episode’s paper, the research has merit, even though it was published in a trade journal and not an academic one.  The researchers interviewed 11 safety experts and identified 37 safety protocols to rank. This is a good starting point, but it would be better to also find out what these activities look like when they’re “done well,” and what success looks like when the safety measures, protocols, or attributes “work well.”  The Paper’s Main Research Takeaways:Safety-focused leadership engagements are important because, if performed well, they can convey company priorities, demonstrate care and reinforce positive safety culture.A team of 11 safety experts representing the four construction industry sectors identified and prioritized the attributes of an effective leadership engagement.A scorecard was created to assess the quality of a leadership engagement, and the scorecard was shown to be reliable in independent validation. Discussion Points:Dr. Drew and Dr. David’s initial thoughts on the paperThoughts on quality vs. quantityHow do the researchers define “leadership safety engagements”The three key phases:Phase 1: Identification of key attributes of excellent engagementsPhase 2: Determining the relative importance of potential predictorsPhase 3: Reliability checkThe 15 key indicators–some are just common sense, some are relatively creepyThe end product, the checklist, is actually quite usefulThe next phase should be evaluating results – do employees actually feel engaged with this approach?Our key takeaways:It is possible to design a process that may not actually be validThe 37 items identified– a good start, but what about asking the people involved: what does it look like when “done well”No matter what, purposeful safety engagement is very importantAsk what the actual leaders and employees think!We look forward to the results in the next phase of this researchSend us your suggestions for future episodes, we are actively looking! Quotes:“If the measure itself drives a change to the practice, then I think that is helpful as well.” - Dr. David“I think just the exercise of trying to find those quality metrics gets us to think harder about what are we really trying to achieve by this activity.” - Dr. Drew“So I love the fact that they’ve said okay, we’re talking specifically about people who aren’t normally on-site, who are coming on-site, and the purpose is specifically a conversation about safety engagement. So it’s not to do an audit or some other activity.” - Dr. Drew“The goal of this research was to produce a scoring protocol for safety-focused leadership engagements, that reflects the common consensus of a panel of industry experts.” - Dr. David“We’ve been moving towards genuine physical disconnections between people doing work and the people trying to lead, and so it makes sense that over the next little while, companies are going to make very deliberate conscious efforts to reconnect, and to re-engage.” - Dr. Drew“I suspect people are going to be begging for tools like this in the next couple of years.” - Dr. Drew“At least the researchers have put a tentative idea out there now, which can be directly tested in the next phase, hopefully, of their research, or someone else’s research.” - Dr. Drew Resources:Link to the Research PaperThe Safety of Work PodcastThe Safety of Work on [email protected]

We will discuss the pros and cons of “Golden Safety Rules” and a punitive safety culture vs. a critical risk management approach, and analyze the limitations of the methods used in this research.The paper’s abstract introduction reads: Golden safety rules (GSR) have been in existence for decades across multiple industry sectors – championed by oil and gas – and there is a belief that they have been effective in keeping workers safe. As safety programs advance in the oil and gas sector, can we be sure that GSR have a continued role? ERM surveyed companies across mining, power, rail, construction, manufacturing, chemicals and oil and gas, to examine the latest thinking about GSR challenges and successes. As we embarked on the survey, the level of interest was palpable; from power to mining it was apparent that companies were in the process of reviewing and overhauling their use of GSR. The paper will present key insights from the survey around the questions we postulated. Are GSR associated with a punitive safety culture, and have they outlived their usefulness as company safety cultures mature? Is the role of GSR being displaced as critical control management reaches new pinnacles? Do we comply with our GSR, and how do we know? Do our GSR continue to address the major hazards that our personnel are most at risk from? How do we apply our GSR with contractors, and to what extent do our contractors benefit from that? The paper concludes with some observations of how developments outside of the oil and gas sector provide meaningful considerations for the content and application of GSR for oil and gas companies. Discussion Points:There isn’t a lot of good research out there on Golden RulesMost of the research is statistics on accidents or incidentsMost Golden Rules are conceived without frontline or worker inputGolden Rules are viewed as either guidelines for actions, or a resource for actionsSome scenarios where workers should not/could not follow absolute rules– David’s example of the seatbelt story in the AU outbackIf rules cannot be followed, the work should be redesignedDiscussion of the paper from the APPEA Trade JournalAnswering seven questions:Are life-saving rules associated with punitive safety cultures?Have life-saving rules outlived their usefulness?Has the role of life-saving rules been replaced by more mature risk management programs?Do we actually comply with life-saving rules?How do we know there is compliance with life-saving rules?Do life-saving rules continue to address major hazards?How do we apply life-saving rules to our contractors?There were 15 companies involved in the research and a one hour interview with a management team member for each companyOur conclusions for each of the questions askedKey takeaways -If we’ve got rules that define key roles, they may continue to be relevantThere are a lot of factors that influence the effectiveness of the rules programIt’s difficult, if not impossible, to divorce a life-saving rule program from the development of a punitive safety cultureCritical control management needs to be developed in partnership with your workforceSo the answer to this episode’s question is – this paper cannot answer itSend us your suggestions for future episodes, we are actively looking! Quotes:“People tend to think of rules as constraining.  They’re like laws that you stick within that you don’t step outside of.” Dr. Drew“Often the type of things that are published in trade associations are much closer to the real-world concerns of people at work, and a lot of people working for consultancies are very academically-minded.” - Dr. Drew“One way to get a name in safety is to be good at safety, another way to get a name in safety is to tell everyone how good you are at safety.” Dr. Drew“They’re not just talking to people who love Golden Rules [in this paper].  We’ve got some companies that never even wanted them, some companies that tried them and don’t like them, some companies that love them. So that’s a fantastic sample when it comes to, ‘do we have a diverse range of opinions.’” - Dr. Drew“In many organizations that have done life-saving rules, they saw this critical risk management framework as an evolution, an improvement, in what they’re doing.” Dr. David“I think that’s the danger of trying to make things too simple is it becomes either too generic or too vague, or just not applicable to so many circumstances.” Dr. Drew Resources:Link to the Golden Safety Rules Paper by Fraser and ColganThe Safety of Work PodcastThe Safety of Work on [email protected]

The paper results center on a survey sent to a multitude of French industries, and although the sampling is from only one country, 15 years ago, the findings are very illustrative of common issues among safety professionals within their organizations.  David used this paper as a reference for his PhD thesis, and we are going to dig into each section to discuss. The paper’s abstract introduction reads: What are the training needs of company preventionists? An apparently straightforward question, but one that will very quickly run into a number of difficulties. The first involves the extreme variability of situations and functions concealed behind the term preventionist and which stretch way beyond the term’s polysemous nature. Moreover, analysis of the literature reveals that very few research papers have endeavoured to analyse the activities associated with prevention practices, especially those of preventionists. This is a fact, even though prevention-related issues and preventionist responsibilities are becoming increasingly important. Discussion Points:The paper, reported from French industries, focuses heavily on safety in areas like occupational therapies, ergonomics, pesticides, hygiene, etc.The downside of any “survey” result is that we can only capture what the respondents “say” or self-report about their experiencesMost of the survey participants were not originally trained as safety professionalsThere are three subgroups within the survey:High school grads with little safety trainingPost high school with two-year tech training program paths to safety workUniversity-educated levels including engineers and managersThere were six main positions isolated within this study:Prevention Specialists - hold a degree in safety, high status in safety managementField Preventionists - lesser status, operations level, closer to front linesPrevention Managers - executive status, senior management, engineers/project managersPreventionist Proxies - may be establishing safety programs, in opposition to the organization, chaotic positionsBasic Coordinators - mainly focused on training othersUnstructured - no established safety procedures, may have been thrown into this roleSo many of the respondents felt isolated and frustrated within the organizations– which continues to be true in the safety professionThere is evidence in this paper and others that a large portion of safety professionals “hate their bosses” and feel ‘great distress’ in their positionsOnly 2.5% felt comfortable negotiating safety with managementTakeaways:Safety professionals come from widely diverse backgroundsTraining and education are imperativeThese are complex jobs that often are not on siteRole clarity is very low, leading to frustration and job dissatisfactionSend us your suggestions for future episodes, we are actively looking! Quotes:“I think this study was quite a coordinated effort across the French industry that involved a lot of different professional associations.” - David“It might be interesting for our readers/listeners to sort of think about which of these six groups do you fit into and how well do you reckon that is a description of what you do.” - Drew“I thought it was worth highlighting just how much these different [job] categories are determined by the organization, not by the background or skill of the safety practitioner.” - Drew“[I read a paper that stated:] There is a significant proportion of safety professionals that hate their bosses …and it was one of the top five professions that hate their bosses and managers.” - David“You don’t have to go too far in the safety profession to find frustrated professionals.” - David“There’s a lot to think on and reflect on…it’s one sample in one country 15 years ago, but these are useful reflections as we get to the practical takeaways.” - David “The activity that I like safety professionals to do is to think about the really important parts of their role that add the most value to the safety of work, and then go and ask questions of their stakeholders of what they think are the most valuable parts of the role, …and work toward alignment.” - David“Getting that role clarity makes you feel that you’re doing better in your job.” - Drew Resources:Link to the Safety Science ArticleThe Safety of Work PodcastThe Safety of Work on [email protected]

We will go through each letter of the amusing and memorable acronym and give you our thoughts on ways to make sure each point is addressed, and different methodologies to consider when verifying or assuring that each element has been satisfied before you cite the source.Sarah Blakeslee writes (about her CRAAP guidelines): Sometimes a  person needs an acronym that sticks. Take CRAAP for instance. CRAAP is an acronym that most students don’t expect a librarian to be using, let alone using to lead a class. Little do they  know that librarians can be crude and/or rude, and do almost anything in order to penetrate their students’  deep memories and satisfy their instructional objectives.  So what is CRAAP and how does it relate to libraries? Here begins a long story about a short acronym… Discussion Points:The CRAAP guidelines were so named to make them memorableThe five CRAAP areas to consider when using sources for your work are:Currency- timeliness, how old is too old?Relevance- who is the audience, does the info answer your questionsAuthority- have you googled the author? What does that search show you?Accuracy- is it verifiable, supported by evidence, free of emotion?Purpose- is the point of view objective?  Or does it seem colored by political, religious, or cultural biases?Takeaways:You cannot fully evaluate a source without looking AT the sourceBe cautious about second-hand sources– is it the original article, or a press release about the article?Be cautious of broad categories, there are plenty of peer-reviewed, well-known university articles that aren’t credibleTo answer our title question, use the CRAAP guidelines as a basic guide to evaluating your sources, it is a useful toolSend us your suggestions for future episodes, we are actively looking! Quotes:“The first thing I found out is there’s pretty good evidence that teaching students using the [CRAAP] guidelines doesn’t work.” - Dr. Drew“It turns out that even with the [CRAAP] guidelines right in front of them, students make some pretty glaring mistakes when it comes to evaluating sources.” - Dr. Drew“Until I was in my mid-twenties, I never swore at all.” - Dr. Drew“When you’re talking about what someone else said [in your paper], go read what that person said, no matter how old it is.” - Dr. Drew“The thing to look out for in qualitative research is, how much are the participants being led by the researchers.” - Dr. Drew“So what I really want to know when I’m reading a qualitative study is not what the participant answered.  I want to know what the question was in the first place.” - Dr. Drew Resources:Link to the CRAAP TestThe Safety of Work PodcastThe Safety of Work on [email protected]

An excerpt from the paper’s abstract reads as follows: The proposition is based on theory about relationships between knowledge and power, complemented by organizational theory on standardization and accountability. We suggest that the increased reliance on self-regulation and international standards in safety management may be drivers for a shift in the distribution of power regarding safety, changing the conception of what is valid and useful knowledge. Case studies from two Norwegian transport sectors, the railway and the maritime sectors, are used to illustrate the proposition. In both sectors, we observe discourses based on generic approaches to safety management and an accompanying disempowerment of the practitioners and their perspectives. Join us as we delve into the paper and endeavor to answer the question it poses.We will discuss these highlights: Safety science may contribute to the marginalization of practical knowledgeHow “paper trails” and specialists marginalize and devalue experience-based knowledgeAn applied science needs to understand the effects it causes, also from a power-perspectiveSafety Science should reflect on how our results interact with existing system-specific knowledgeExamples from their case studies in maritime transport and railways Discussion Points:David has been traveling in the U.S. for much of January seeing colleaguesThis is one of David’s favorite papersDiscussion of the paper’s authors being academics, not scientistsHow does an organization create “good safety” and what does that look like?The rise of homogenous international standards of safetyCan safety professionals transfer their knowledge and work in other industriesThe two case studies in this paper: Norwegian railway and maritime systems/industriesThe separation between top-down system safety and local, front-line practitionersOur key takeaways from this paperSend us your suggestions for future episodes, we are actively looking! Quotes:“If you understand safety, then it really shouldn’t matter which industry you’re applying it on.” - Dr. Drew Rae“I can’t imagine, as a safety professional, how you’re impactful in the first 12 months [on a new job] until you actually understand what it is you’re trying to influence.” - Dr. David Provan“It feels to me this is what happened here, that they formed this view of what was going on and then actually traced back through their data to try to make sense of it.” - Dr. David Provan“I have to say I think they genuinely use these case studies to really effectively illustrate and support the argument that they’re making.” - Dr. Drew Rae“Once we start thinking too hard about a function, we start formalizing it and once we start formalizing it, it starts to become detached from operations and sort of flows from that operational side into the management side.” - Dr. Drew Rae“I don’t think it's being driven by the academics at all and clearly it’s in the sociology of the profession's literature all the way back to the 1950s and 60s.” - Dr. David Provan“We’re fighting amongst ourselves as a non-working community about whose [safety] model should be the one to then impose on the genuine front line practitioners.” - Dr. Drew Rae Resources:Link to Paper in JSSThe Safety of Work PodcastThe Safety of Work on [email protected]

Wastell, who has a BSc and Ph.D. from Durham University, is Emeritus Professor in Operations Management and Information Systems at Nottingham University in the UK. Professor Wastell began his academic career as a cognitive neuroscientist at Durham, studying the relationships between brain activity and psychological processes.  His areas of expertise include neuroscience and social policy: critical perspectives; psychophysiological design of complex human-machine systems; Information systems and public sector reform; design and innovation in the public services; management as design; and human factors design of safe systems in child protection.Join us as we delve into the statement (summarized so eloquently in Wastell’s well-crafted abstract): “Methodology, whilst masquerading as the epitome of rationality, may thus operate as an irrational ritual, the enactment of which provides designers with a feeling of security and efficiency at the expense of real engagement with the task at hand.” Discussion Points:How and when Dr. Rae became aware of this paperWhy this paper has many structural similarities to our paper, ”Safety work versus the safety of work” published in 2019Organizations’ reliance on top-heavy processes and rituals such as Gantt charts, milestones, gateways, checklists, etcThoughts and reaction to Section I: A Cautionary TaleSection II: Methodology: The Lionization of TechniqueSection III: Methodology as a Social DefenseThe three elements of social defense against anxiety:Basic assumption (fight or flight)Covert coalition (internal organization protection/family/mafia)Organizational ritual (the focus of this paper)Section IV: The Psychodynamics of Learning: Teddy Bears and Transitional ObjectsPaul Feyerabend and his “Against Method” bookOur key takeaways from this paper and our discussion Quotes:“Methodology may not actually drive outcomes.” - David Provan“A methodology can probably never give us, repeatably, exactly what we’re after.” - David Provan“We have this proliferation of solutions, but the mere fact that we have so many solutions to that problem suggests that none of the individual solutions actually solve it.” - Drew Rae“Wastell calls out this large lack of empirical evidence around the structured methods that organizations use, and concludes that they seem to have more qualities of ‘religious convictions’ than scientific truths.” - David Provan“I love the fact that he calls out the ‘journey’ metaphor, which we use all the time in safety.” - Drew Rae“You can have transitional objects that don’t serve any of the purposes that they are leading you to.” - Drew Rae“Turn up to seminars, and just read papers, that are totally outside of your own field.” - Drew Rae Resources:Wastell’s Paper: The Fetish of TechniquePaul Feyerabend (1924-1994)Book: Against Method by Paul FeyerabendOur Paper Safety Work vs. The Safety of WorkThe Safety of Work PodcastThe Safety of Work on [email protected]

While this paper was written over half a century ago, it is still relevant to us today - particularly in the Safety management industry where we are often responsible for offering solutions to problems, and implementing those solutions, requires decisions to be made by top management. This is another fascinating piece of work that will broaden your understanding of why organisations often struggle with solving problems that involve making decisions. Topics:Introduction to the research paper: A Garbage Can Model of Organisational ChoiceOrganised anarchies Phenomena explained by this paperExamples of the garbage can modelsStandards CommitteesEnforceable undertakings processHow to influence the processDeciding on who makes decisionsConclusion - most problems will get solvedPractical takeawaysNot to get discouraged when your problem isn’t solved in a particular meetingBeing mindful of where your decision-making energy is spentProblems vs Solutions vs Decision-making Have multiple solutions ready for problems that may come up - but don’t force them all the time. Quotes:“Decisions aren’t made inside people’s heads, decisions are made in meetings, so we’ve got to understand the interplay between people in looking at how decisions are made.” - Dr. Drew Rae“Incident investigations are a great example of choice opportunities.” -  Dr. Drew Rae“It’s probably a good reflection point for people to just think about how many decisions certain roles in the organization are being asked to be involved in.” - Dr. David Provan Resources:Griffith University Safety Science Innovation LabThe Safety of Work PodcastThe Safety of Work [email protected] Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice (Wikipedia Page)Administrative Science Quarterly

We will review each section of Leveson’s paper and discuss how she sets each section up by stating a general assumption and then proceeds to break that assumption down.We will discuss her analysis of:Safety vs. ReliabilityRetrospective vs. Prospective AnalysisThree Levels of Accident Causes:Proximal event chainConditions that allowed the eventSystemic factors that contributed to both the conditions and the event Discussion Points:Unlike some others, Leveson makes her work openly available on her websiteLeveson’s books, SafeWare: System Safety and Computers (1995) and Engineering a Safer World: Systems Thinking Applied to Safety (2011)Drew describes Leveson as a “prickly character” and once worked for her, and was eventually fired by herLeveson came to engineering with a psychology backgroundMany safety professionals express concern regarding how major accidents keep happening and bemoaning - ‘why we can’t learn enough to prevent them?’The first section of Leveson’s paper: Safety vs. Reliability - sometimes these concepts are at odds, sometimes they are the same thingHow cybernetics used to be ‘the thing’ but the theory of simple feedback loops fell apartSumming up this section: safety is not the sum of reliability componentsThe second section of the paper: Retrospective vs. Prospective Accident AnalysisMost safety experts rely on and agree that retrospective accident analysis is still the best way to learnExample - where technology changes slowly, ie airplanes, it’s acceptable to run a two-year investigation into accident causesExample - where technology changes quickly, ie the 1999 Mars Climate Orbiter crash vs. Polar Lander crash, there is no way to use retrospective analysis to change the next iteration in timeThe third section of the paper: Three Levels of AnalysisIts easiest to find the causes that led to the proximal event chain and the conditions that allowed the event, but identifying the systemic factors is more difficult because it’s not as easy to draw a causal link, it’s too indirectThe “5 Whys” method to analyzing an event or failurePractical takeaways from Leveson’s paper–STAMP (System-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes) using the accident causality model based on systems theoryInvestigations should focus on fixing the part of the system that changes slowestThe exact front line events of the accident often don’t matter that much in improving safetyClosing question: “What exactly is systems thinking?” It is the adoption of the Rasmussian causation model– that accidents arise from a change in risk over time, and analyzing what causes that change in risk Quotes:“Leveson says, ‘If we can get it right some of the time, why can’t we get it right all of the time?’” - Dr. David Provan“Leveson says, ‘the more complex your system gets, that sort of local autonomy becomes dangerous because the accidents don’t happen at that local level.’” - Dr. Drew Rae“In linear systems, if you try to model things as chains of events, you just end up in circles.’” - Dr. Drew Rae“‘Never buy the first model of a new series [of new cars], wait for the subsequent models where the engineers had a chance to iron out all the bugs of that first model!” - Dr. David Provan“Leveson says the reason systemic factors don’t show up in accident reports is just because its so hard to draw a causal link.’” - Dr. Drew Rae“A lot of what Leveson is doing is drawing on a deep well of cybernetics theory.” - Dr. Drew Rae Resources:Applying Systems Thinking Paper by LevesonNancy Leveson– Full List of PublicationsNancy Leveson of MITThe Safety of Work PodcastThe Safety of Work on [email protected]

We will discuss how other safety science researchers have designed theories that use Rasmussen’s concepts, the major takeaways from Rasmussen’s article, and how safety professionals can use these theories to analyze and improve systems in their own organizations today. Discussion Points:Rasmussen’s history of influence, and the parallels to (Paul) Erdős numbers in research paper publishingHow Rasmussen is the “grandfather” of safety scienceRasmussen’s impact across disciplines and organizational categories through the yearsThe basics of this paperWhy risk management models must never be staticHow other theorists and scientists take Rasmussen’s concepts and translate them into their own models and diagramsThe paper’s summary of the evolution of theoretical approaches up until ‘now’ (1997)Why accident models must use a holistic approach including technology AND peopleHow organizations are always going to have pressures of resources vs. required resultsEmployees vs. Management– both push for results with minimal acceptable effort, creating accident riskRasmussen identified we need different models that reflect the real worldTakeaways for our listeners from Rasmussen’s work Quotes:“That’s the forever challenge in safety, is people have great ideas, but what do you do with them?  Eventually, you’ve got to turn it into a method.” - Drew Rae“These accidental events are shaped by the activity of people.  Safety, therefore, depends on the control of people’s work processes.” - David Provan“There’s always going to be this natural migration of activity towards the boundaries of acceptable performance.” - David Provan“This is like the most honest look at work I think I’ve seen in any safety paper.” - Drew Rae“If you’re a safety professional, just how much time are you spending understanding all of these ins and outs and nuances of work, and people’s experience of work? …You actually need to find out from the insiders inside the system. ” - David Provan“‘You can’t just keep swatting at mosquitos, you actually have to drain the swamp.’ I think that’s the overarching conceptual framework that Rasmussen wanted us to have.” - David Provan Resources:Compute your Erdos NumberJens Rasmussen’s 1997 PaperDavid Woods LinkedInSidney Dekker WebsiteNancy Leveson of MITBlack Line/Blue Line ModelThe Safety of Work PodcastThe Safety of Work on [email protected]

Find out our thoughts on this paper and our key takeaways for the ever-changing world of workplace safety.  Topics:Introduction to the paper & the Author“Adding more rules is not going to make your system safer.”The principles of safety in the paperTypes of safety systems as broken down by the paperProblems in these “Ultrasafe systems”The Summary of developments of human errorThe psychology of making mistakesThe Efficiency trade-off element in safetySuggestions in Amalberti’s conclusionTakeaway messagesAnswering the question: Why does safety get harder as systems get safer? Quotes:“Systems are good - but they are bad because humans make mistakes” - Dr. Drew Rae“He doesn’t believe that zero is the optimal number of human errors” - Dr. Drew Rae“You can’t look at mistakes in isolation of the context”  - Dr. Drew Rae“The context and the system drive the behavior. - Dr. David Provan“It’s part of the human condition to accept mistakes. It is actually an important part of the way we learn and develop our understanding of things. - Dr. David Provan  Resources:Griffith University Safety Science Innovation LabThe Safety of Work PodcastThe Safety of Work [email protected] Paradoxes of Almost Totally Safe Transportation Systems by R. AmalbertiRisk Management in a Dynamic society: a Modeling problem - Jens RasmussenThe ETTO Principle: Efficiency-Thoroughness Trade-Off: Why Things That Go Right Sometimes Go Wrong - Book by Erik HollnagelEp.81 How does simulation training develop Safety II capabilities?Navigating safety: Necessary Compromises and Trade-Offs - Theory and Practice - Book by R. Amalberti

This paper by Daniel Katz was published in 1964 and, scarily still has some very relevant takeaways for today’s safety procedures  in organisations. We delve into this research and discover the ideas that Katz initiated all those years ago. The problem is that an organization cannot promote one of these concepts without negatively affecting the other. So how are organizations meant to manage this? We share some personal thoughts on whether or not the world of safety research has since found an answer to dealing with these two contradictory concepts.  Topics:Introduction to the paperIntroduction to the Author Daniel KatzThe history of the safety research industryThree basic behaviors required from employees in all organizationsPeople’s willingness to stay in an organizationManaging dependable role performanceSpontanious initiativeFavourable attitudeCreating this motivation in employees to follow rulesCultivating innovative behaviourHow this paper remains relevant in current safety researchNo answer to this question of balancing these two behaviours Quotes:Katz is really one of the founding fathers in the field of organizational psychology. - Dr. Drew RaeIt’s not just that you’re physically getting people to stay but getting them to stay and still be willing to be productive.  Dr. Drew Rae“When we promote autonomy, we need to think about what that does to reliable role performance.” - Dr. Drew RaeComplex situations, clearly need complex solutions. - Dr. David Provan Resources:Griffith University Safety Science Innovation LabThe Safety of Work [email protected] 2The motivational basis of organizational behavior (Paper)

This paper reveals some really interesting findings and it would be valuable for companies to take notice and possibly change the way they implement incident report recoMmendations.  Topics:Introduction to the paperThe general process of an investigationThe Hypothesis The differences between the reports and their languageThe results of the three reportsDifferences in the recommendations on each of the reportsThe different ways of interpreting the resultsPractical TakeawaysNot sharing lessons learned from incidents - let others learn it for themselves by sharing the report.Summary and answer to the question  Quotes:“All of the information in every report is factual, all of the information is about the same real incident that happened.” Drew Rae“These are plausibly three different reports that are written for that same incident but they’re in very different styles, they highlight different facts and they emphasize different things.” Drew Rae“Incident reports could be doing so much more for us in terms of broader safety in the organization.” David Provan“From the same basic facts, what you select to highlight in the report and what story you use to tell seems to be leading us toward a particular recommendation.” - Drew Rae Resources:Griffith University Safety Science Innovation LabThe Safety of Work [email protected] Report Interpretation PaperEpisode 18 - Do Powerpoint Slides count as a safety hazard?

It's Modelling the Micro-Foundations of the Audit Society: Organizations and the Logic of the Audit Trail by Michael Power. This paper gets us thinking about why organizations do audits in the first place seeing as it has been proven to often decrease the efficiency of the actual process being audited. We discuss the negatives as well as the positives of audits - which both help explain why audits continue to be such a big part of safety management in organizations. Topics:What kinds of audits are happeningWhy is the number of audits increasing?Why do we keep doing audits when they seemingly do not help productivity.Academia and publication metricsThe audit societyThe foundations of an audit trailThe process model of an audit trailThe problem with audit trails.Going from push to pull when audits are initiatedWhy is it easier for some organizations to adopt auditing processes than others?Displacement from goals to methodsAudits help different organizations line up their way of thinkingPractical takeaways Quotes:“We see that even though audits are supposed to increase efficiency, that in fact, they decrease efficiency through increased bureaucracy. - Drew Rae“The audit process needs to aggregate multiple pieces of data, and then it has to produce a performance account, so the audit actually needs to deliver a result.” - David Provan“We become less reflexive about what’s going on in terms of this value subversion - so we stop worrying about are we genuinely creating a safety culture in our business and we worry more about what’s the rating coming out of these audits in terms of the safety culture.” - Drew Rae“Audits themselves are not improving underlying performance.” - David Provan  Resources:Griffith University Safety Science Innovation LabThe Safety of Work [email protected] paper: Modelling the Microfoundations of the Audit Society 

The specific paper found some interesting results from these simulated situations - including that it was found that the debriefing, post-simulation, had a large impact on the amount of learning the participants felt they made. The doctors chat about whether the research was done properly and whether the findings could have been tested against alternative scenarios to better prove the theorized results. Topics:Individual and team skills needed to maintain safety.Safety-I vs Safety-IIIntroduction to the research paperMaritime Safety and human errorSingle-loop vs Double-loop learningSimulator programs help people learn and reflectResearch methodsResults discussionRecognizing errors and anomaliesShared knowledge to define limits of actionOperating the system with confidenceImportance of learning by doing and reflecting back afterwardComplexity and uncertainty as a factor in safety strategy.Practical Takeaways  Work simulation is an effective learning processHalf of the learning comes from the debriefRead this paper if doing simulation training Quotes:“Very few advocates of Safety-II would disagree that it’s important to keep trying to identify those predictable ways that a system can fail and put in place barriers and controls and responses to those predictable ways that a system can fail.” - Dr. David Provan“It limits claims that you can make about just how effective the program is. Unless you’ve got a comparison, you can’t really draw a conclusion that it’s effective.” - Dr. Drew Rae“A lot of these scenarios are just things like minor sensor failures or errors in the display which you can imagine in an automated system, those are the things that need human intervention.” - Dr. Drew Rae“Safety-I is necessary but not sufficient - you need to move on to the resilient solution ”  - Dr. Drew Rae“I don’t really think that situational complexity is what should guide your safety strategy. - Dr. Drew Rae Resources:Griffith University Safety Science Innovation LabThe Safety of Work [email protected] paperNorwegian University of Science and TechnologyEpisode 79 -  How do new employees learn about safety?Episode 19 - Virtual Reality and Safety training

The paper we reference today is our own research paper published in 2018 named; Safety clutter: the accumulation and persistence of ‘safety’ work that does not contribute to operational safety. So we have done ample research when it comes to this particular topic and we’re excited to share this knowledge with you. Hopefully you will take away from this episode a better understanding of where to start looking for (and clear out) clutter in your own workplace. Topics:What is safety clutter?The three C’s ContributionConfidenceConsensusThe paper - Safety clutter: the accumulation and persistence of ‘safety’ work that does not contribute to operational safetyTypes of duplication in safety tasksGeneralization of safety tasksSymbolic application of safety tasksAttempted simplificationLeast common denominatorOverspecificationThe causes of safety clutterWhy reduce safety clutter?Ways to deal with safety clutter Quotes:“Clutter by duplication - when you literally have two activities that perform the same function, then you know that at least one out of the two is going to be unnecessary. - Drew Rae“They ended up having to create a hazard on the work site for the manager who was doing the critical controls inspection to check that they had properly managed the hazard.” Drew Rae“I found a 28 page work page work instruction on how to spray weeds on a concrete pathway with a weedspray that was biodegradable and commercially available at any supermarket.” - David Provan“It’s harder to remove anything that is there for safety than it is to add something that’s there for safety.” - Drew Rae“Did you know that some of the things we do in this organization, specifically for safety, may make our organization less safe. - David Provan Resources:Griffith University Safety Science Innovation LabThe Safety of Work [email protected] paper

While there may be many reasons for this - this particular research paper looks at how younger workers are inducted into the workplace and how they learn about the safety practices and requirements that are expected. The findings are pretty fascinating - especially for people responsible for hiring new employees. TopicsIntroduction to the research paperTypes of questions researchers asked research subjectsLiterature reviewHow people learnLearning safe practicesIndustries researchedMetalworkElderly careRetailGeneral inferencesCommunity of practiceGradient towards unsafety Practical TakeawaysThere’s a direct link between employment practices and safetyTemporary workers are less likely to follow safety precautionsAwareness of safety and how it relates to labor-hireReflective practiceLook at what happens during a new employee’s first weekAre your formal and informal induction and onboarding processes aligned to your safety risk profile of the different roles within your organization  Quotes:“Learning isn’t about uploading knowledge, it’s about creating a sequence of experiences, and each person in the experience, they reflect on that experience, they learn from that, it leads them on to new experiences.” - Drew Rae“When we induct workers, it’s not just about knowledge transfer, it’s not just about uploading the knowledge they need, it’s about how do we get them to start taking part in discussions and decisions and arguments and thinking about the way work happens.” - Drew Rae“The one thing that we maybe can maintain is the formal standards that we communicate in the induction in the hope that creating some of that tension, creates discussion.” - David Provan“Onboarding a person into the workplace is an investment in the person, so people are maybe likely to invest more if there’s more return.”  - David Provan Resources:Griffith University Safety Science Innovation LabThe Safety of Work [email protected] Paper Discussed

The reason we are talking about this today, is because this tactic is often used in workplace safety videos and we ask whether or not it works for everyone, how well it works for workplace safety and whether its even ethical in the first place, regardless of its efficacy.  Topics:Deciding to discuss shock tactics/threat appeals in the podcastDo they have a place in organization safety management?Ethics behind using fear tacticsThe research paper introductionAbout the authorsHow does fear connect with persuasion?Too much fear-mongeringAdaptive vs maladaptive response to the message General problems with research in fear messagingPractical takeawaysSix things that determine how people respond to the message: The severity of the fear SusceptibilityRelevanceEfficacy The wear-out effectThe credibility of the message Quotes:“Just because something is effective, still doesn’t necessarily make it OK.”  - Dr. Drew Rae“The amount of fear doesn’t seem to determine which path someone goes down, it just determines the likelihood that they are going to hit one of these paths very strongly.” - Dr. Drew Rae “Communication which gives people an action that they can take right at the time they receive the communication is likely to be quite useful. Communication that just generally conveys a message about safety is not.” - Dr. Drew Rae Resources:Griffith University Safety Science Innovation LabThe Safety of Work [email protected] role of fear appeals in improving driver safety (Research Paper)

The findings of this research point to the importance of staff buy-in and a team-driven approach to safety. Topics:Introduction to research paper Seven features of safety in maternity unitsThe premise of the studyUnderstanding the process behind data collection for this studyThe Finding of the paperSix Features/themes of patient safetyRules & procedures vs social control mechanismsPatient feedbackRefining the Safety findingsCommitment to safety and improvementStaff improving working processesTechnical competence supported by formal training and informal learningTeamwork, cooperation, and positive working relationshipsReinforcing, safe, ethical behaviorsSystems and processes designed for safety -regularly reviewed and optimized.Effective coordination and the ability to mobilize quicklyGeneralization of processes isn’t always helpful Quotes:“The forces that create positive conditions for safety in frontline work may be at least partially invisible to those who create them.” - Dr. David Provan“Unlike last time, we’re now explicitly mentioning patients’ families, so last time it was ‘just do patient feedback’, now we’re talking about families being encouraged to share their experience.” - Dr. Drew Rae“These seven [Safety Findings] may or may not be relevant for other domains or contexts but the message in the paper is - go and find out for yourself what is relevant and important in your context.” - Dr. David Provan Resources:Griffith University Safety Science Innovation LabThe Safety of Work PodcastSeven features of safety in maternity units -Research PaperThe Safety Of Work - Episode [email protected] 75 - How Stop-Work Decisions are Made