Welcome to the Sound of Economics, the podcast series by Brugel, the Brussels-based economic think tank.I am Yuyun Zhang, host of our monthly podcast Zhonghua Mundus, that brings you recent updates about China's economy.
We're sitting in the Bruegel Library, which is also our podcast recording studio, and it's a full house today.Firstly, we have always my co-pilot in this project, Alicia Garcia Herrero, Bruegel Senior Fellow.Good to see you again, Alicia.
Very nice to see you today in person.Yes, indeed. We also have Theo Storrella, also from Bruegel, working on China's political economy.So nice to have you here, Theo.I think this is the first time that you ever appear on Bruegel's podcast.
I hope this will be the beginning of many times in the future.
Thanks so much.Great to be here, Yun.
And last but not the least, we are thrilled to have Maurice Rudolph, fellow from the Poltseid China Center of Yale Law School.And welcome to the Sound of Phenomena.
Today, we want to look at China's role in global governance.
While most people are familiar with the Belt and Road Initiative, China's foreign policy has expanded to a much wider scope focusing on the development, but also civilizational and security aspects.
Alicia and Theo, also Pauline Weil, have recently co-authored a paper on China's influence in the United Nations.
And in the first part of the paper, they compare which China's global narratives have become embedded UN discourse compared to Western narratives.
Theo, could you walk us through the main narratives China promotes at the UN, and how do these initiatives, like Belt and Road Initiative, reflect China's broader foreign policy goals?
Right, so China has had a flurry of global initiatives of late, but throughout its history at the United Nations, since it replaced Taiwan in 1971, it's had global initiatives that sort of underpin its view of international affairs.
Some of the more noteworthy ones might be the Belt and Road Initiative, but for this investigation, we expanded that to not just the Belt and Road, but also to the Shared Future for Mankind.
And then we also went into the global civilization and security initiatives.All of these are ways that China articulates its view of international affairs and sometimes puts tremendous funds at the disposal of these initiatives as well.
Right.Could you elaborate a bit on the civilization initiative?That's one of the most important ones, right?As you mentioned.
Sure.So just to go through them, we have the Global Civilization Initiative, the 全球发展倡议, which is the Global Development Initiative.And then we also have the 全球安全倡议, which is the Global Security Initiative.
So the first of the three was brought out in 2021, the Global Development Initiative actually at the United Nations.
The purpose of it was to basically secure the sustainable development goals of the United Nations and forward them and to perceive development as a human right.
The next one in 2022, the Global Security Initiative, was to design a more balanced security architecture among the global community.
And the last one, the Global Civilization Initiative, is really focused on understanding and acknowledging the diversity of ways of governing across the world, to make space for different ways of governing, and also to do that through people-to-people exchanges, which is its most important characteristic.
You also compared this with some of the initiatives that Western economists have brought up.What are your main findings there?Are Chinese initiatives winning over on the narrative side?
Right.So I would not talk in terms of winning and losing.I would just talk in terms of notoriety, which is what we were measuring in this study.
And what we found is that among Chinese initiatives, you have the Belt and Road Initiative that is more often cited than any other Chinese initiative to date.
And when you compare the citations of Chinese initiatives in United Nations documents, that's what we're measuring, to the citations of Western initiatives in United Nations documents, you find a glaring, glaring difference between the Belt and Road success and all other initiatives, Chinese or Western.
But when you go deeper, once you look into Western initiatives compared to the smaller Chinese ones, for example, the security initiatives, civilization, and development initiatives, they feature at about the same rates.
There's not actually a gigantic cleavage between them.And beyond that, we looked into the countries that these initiatives are linked with.
And what we found is that when you look paragraph by paragraph which countries are mentioned alongside which initiatives,
the Chinese initiatives are incredibly self-referential and mention China more than just about any other country, whereas in the Western initiatives, you find a lot more dispersion in the types of countries that are mentioned.
It could be partnership countries, it could be the initiators or the countries that launched them, but it's more diverse than what we found in Chinese initiatives.
So who are writing these documents?It's like the UN agencies, right?But then have you also looked into the personnel or the staff behind, like, why is the Chinese initiatives being referenced much more and then more self-referencing?
So that's a great question.
And while we were not able to classify these documents based on who was speaking, we were able to look very deeply into the context in which they were mentioned, both in terms of the topics discussed throughout each document using large language models in our study, but also to look at the patterns of voting coalitions, of global subregions, and also of income groups that are mentioned
throughout this document.
And what we find is a tremendous amount of coalition between China and its neighboring countries, for example, South Asia, but also when it comes to security initiatives, we find the BRICS group of countries to be mentioned more so than others, and also the P5, the permanent five countries of the United Nations to be mentioned quite a bit too.
But you make an important point.We were not able to distinguish quite who was speaking in each of these documents, and we were unable to make that link to what that might mean.
Thank you very much for that explanation, and I think it's already incredibly well what you have been doing here, because it's a huge database, and I managed to extract these points.
Because you talked about the voting patterns, this brings me naturally to the deeds part.
So, another way to assess the influence is through the deeds by looking at to which countries, regions and voting coalition align their UN General Assembly votes with China.Alicia, I'm turning to you here.What are your main findings there?
Could you share with our audience?
Sure.So, first of all, I think just to link these words, meaning the narratives to voting, I guess that the narratives are there in a way to influence the UN. in many, many ways, but certainly for voting.
So, you know, we actually wanted to see are these narratives increasing the alignment of UN members on the actual voting. And I think two things to reflect upon.
First is that, wow, we find that China, in a way, alignment with China, and that doesn't mean China's influence, it's just alignment, is very high across the board since 1971.So it's not yesterday, it's not, you know, Israel or you name it.
I mean, the things that we are now preoccupied with that.No, it's been the case since we started our sample, and that's when China joined the UN.
And the question is why, and we don't write the paper this way, but I think it's a reflection, and for the podcast I hope it's useful.There's two ways to look at it.First is China's increasing its economic power.
So there's a lot of literature, or at least some literature, showing that economic power, trade in particular, matters for UN voting.We don't find that, because if not, you should have seen an amazing increase in alignment with China.
The other one would be, what about if we just think that the UN is a very, well, democratic institution where every member has a vote, and there's many more countries which are in the development phase, like China, or at least like China before, we should say, but that relate to China, you know, that they feel, okay, this is a model of development, and we want to follow that model.
China has been very successful in that regard. And, you know, we can't prove that it's the latter, but we do have kind of calculations of alignment being much higher when the country is a low income economy compared to a middle or high income.
So there seems to be this idea, okay, China is an example of a model. are both aligned more with China than the U.S.And I think that kind of makes sense.But that doesn't really answer the question as to is China increasing its influence in the U.N.
Because it would look as if it isn't.It's just a question of similarity, you see, which is not influence.Influence is a causal relation.I influence you.You might not influence me.We can't really show that.
But I think we really need to also look at, is it too early?I mean, is China working on this as we speak with the narratives?Is it something we'll see in the future?And I think that's a big question.
And also the parallel world, meaning the UN as a platform, but many other platforms, yeah?Playing like, I would say, on many boards, on many chess boards.
And we know that there are other institutions out there where maybe China is having a more immediate or more immediate impact or more causal impact than we can see so far in our results.
Well, what I think is quite relevant here to point out is that for the Chinese side, when they are promoting, like China has a vision, they have laid out a vision that the global international legal order needs an update.
In order to achieve that, they are engaging in a multi-level strategy, a multi-level approach, as Alicia alluded to.
So what is quite interesting here is that it's happening at the bilateral level, it's happening within the UN, it's happening within those China plus X mechanisms.
We actually see a shift from Beijing to focus more on those regional China plus X mechanisms, because in the end to achieve its ambitions, the UN by itself is not in the best stage, because you have the veto at the UN Security Council.
So when it comes to binding UN resolutions that would constitute law,
If China is able to actually have an idea, and this becomes a convention, for instance, this would be something we could really measure that China is actually able to get one idea, one vision into law that would be binding once it's ratified by other member states of the United Nations.
And what is quite interesting is for the Chinese approach, and this affects any other country, be it in Europe or be it in the United States or wherever, that China uses this multi-level approach to actually discuss among, for instance, countries in the Middle East, questions of AI.
They have their own AI initiative.They have the same debates with countries from Latin America.They have the same debate or similar debates with states in Africa.
So, out of this, regional interactions as a next step, you could see that the UN could serve as a platform to engage in international standard setting.
But we are at a very early stage of this, because we don't have a lot of examples where you could say, okay, this is actually China's domestic idea to regulate AI, or this is China's vision for a future of space or outer space, and so on.
And we see then the UN member states come together and this turns into a UN resolution.I'm actually quite pessimistic that with the current geopolitical environment, the UN can actually fulfill this dysfunction.
We're more moving towards a fragmented world where China is able to utilize the UN.
But at the same point of time, being aware of this fragmentation, to have a legal standard that applies for everyone, because the United States will definitely veto it, and other countries would also veto it.
But still, you can build up a network, and you have a standard that would be regional, and maybe it will extend to the Middle East or to Africa in one area, but in another area it won't.
And this is something that reflects on anyone who wants to be like a global standard setter.This is a strategy what the Chinese side is applying and that people in any capitals should take note of.
Do you think that's a smart move?As you say, the world is increasingly fragmented.
Do you think by uniting at least the regional part of the members to have some France countries that will set the standard and then maybe move to a more international stage, do you think this is a good strategy?
Well, I think it is the only strategy that can work, because you know that it won't happen that all of the countries sit together and say, we have one global problem, and we will be able to come up with a global solution that is effective and that everybody can live with.
I think this is just unrealistic, given the current geopolitical environment.So what is the other alternative that you have?You can go bilateral.China is doing that.
But in addition to that, you cannot only go bilateral, you need to have some kind of a regional scope.And so it is the next best solution, because it's multilateral, but with a regional focus.
And if you can move beyond that to actually to the global level, this remains to be seen, but I'm not very optimistic at this point.But of course, it depends on the issue area.
When it's something very technical, then by all means, it will be possible, maybe on climate change at some point in the future as well.But what is relevant here is, and this is very new, that China has a position on these matters.
Like, China was in the past not someone who was driving the debates or who would have qualified personnel to push a debate.And whether they're the penholder or not, that's not that crucial.But they have a position.
And they have a consistent argument that they want to promote further.And this is something that in the post-World War II world, like in 1945, this was not the case, even though Taiwan was sending, like the Republic of China was
representing the Chinese state at this point.But when it comes to really shaping the Bretton Woods system, they were not the most dominant force.
But when it comes to the future topics that we're facing, like how to regulate outer space, how to regulate AI, how to deal with climate change, nuclear security, like all of those issues, you will have a Chinese position.
These are the incredibly important topics that we have to discuss because when it comes to digital economy, when it comes to outer space, there needs to be some standard setting.But it's true.Like you said, who is going to be the leading force?
Who's going to be the driver of these conversations? The United States traditionally has a strong presence in the U.N.However, we just witnessed the U.S.presidential elections.
As Donald Trump claimed victory, we are bracing ourselves for the upcoming changes.We're going to see a bigger void in the international stage, to say the very least.How do you think this would affect the U.S.role in the United Nations?
And how will this affect China?
So I would just remind our audience that the United States has culturally gone through a pendulum, not just between the parties, but throughout our history, we've also had a pendulum of engagement with the international world and also with isolationism.
I'm sure I don't need to remind people what happened with the League of Nations.
I would say that this is a pendulum swing, and that with that, you'll have opportunity for countries, not just China, but including China, to stake out a larger presence at the United Nations and at all kinds of important international organizations, including
the UN's many important agencies.
What that means is yet to be seen, but as Moritz just said, you can be sure that they have positions on a lot of issues where otherwise they may have stood back, and also that China is now more ready than ever to take up that mantle that the United States may or may not leave a little bit empty.
It is something that China has invested quite a bit on, while the United States may have in some periods leaned back from diplomacy, China has doubled down.
And so there's a human capital advantage there that's slowly accumulated, where China just has more trained people to do this work. And it shows.
Moritz can tell us a lot more about this, but I think that'll be a critical element of this, is just how many people, how many trained lawyers, international lawyers, are you able and willing to dedicate to this?
And then what are you able to do with that influence?China will have more.
I agree there's a pendulum swing.The question is whether it will swing back or not moving forward.But definitely, the difference between Trump won and Trump in 2025 is that the Chinese side is much more prepared.
They have invested much more into shaping international organizations from within.
And the big question is to what extent, if the United States were to withdraw more funding of, for instance, the WHO or UNESCO, as it did in the past, whether the Chinese side is actually willing and able to commit to more financially as well.
So we have to see this, because this is something that, in the past, China was very good at labeling its responsibility.But when it comes to the other dimension of responsibility, in terms of extra financial
contributions to the UN, which is facing significant financial shortages, this remains to be seen.
So I think we can anticipate that China will step up, will become more active, but the problem is, and I think we shouldn't expect that the whole UN would turn Chinese overnight, like this won't happen, because most of the debates, they would still be held in English.
And for the Chinese narratives to come through, they would go through this filter of actually having them being discussed.
Of course, you have the UN translations, but almost everybody would be just reading the English translation of them, with maybe the Russians as an exception and the Chinese as an exception.
But this is something that I consider as a big of an obstacle.
Because the inability maybe for the Chinese side to realize how the terminology actually from other countries, how we obsess about terminology, and at the same point of time in the Chinese debate there's no reflection about our obsession with the terminology.
Seriously, they don't get it.
I think this is one of the big challenges for China, if it really wants to have the UN become more Chinese in its essence, to understand how what they're saying in the format is actually being reflected by other member states.
And this might be a problem for China to actually get a lot of its visions put into practice, because maybe people just do not know what they really mean by them.
I'm reflecting on all of this, and I'm going to make a big statement.I'm sorry.And it's the following.I mean, I hear you, League of Nations, isolationism.I can't pronounce that word.It's very difficult.
But the point is, and then I hear you, you know, China trying, but maybe not achieving, because this is in a way a foreign reality, if I may put it this way. But then the question is, if the U.S.
doesn't like the world it lives in, meaning, you know, these big institutions that, in a way, it created, but doesn't really necessarily follow through, yeah, because of everybody else's influence, including China, to a large extent, then the question is, what if the U.S.
just gives up, but also China?Because, I mean, we are assuming that the U.S. kind of goes, or leaves the space and China takes it.But if it's so hard, and the US leaves the floor, China might leave the floor as well.
And I think this is a very important reflection, because what about us?We're here in Brussels.And it reminds me of the WTO, if you think about it, yeah, it's like all of these institutions that were,
It is not a given that because, you know, the hegemon decides it doesn't work for me.Somebody else has the strength, no matter how many lawyers, but it's about the belief that that's a shortcut.
It might be a long cut, not a shortcut, for the reason you mentioned, because it's just too complicated. And if you see it break, you may actually think, why not my way?Not halfway my way.
So, you know, this means that we Europeans, you know, which still believe in multilateralism, et cetera, might end up seeing, you know, a Trump administration where all of these institutions kind of, you know, one after the other, and maybe not even taking over because it's just too difficult.
And they might have other solutions.And I think this brings us to exactly what you said, the parallel world, these other institutions.I mean, there is no replica of WTO.There's no replica of the UN.
But there are replicas already of the World Bank, there are replicas, you know, if you want, even the IMF, you can think of, you know, swap lines being created all over the world with the RMB swap lines by the PPC.
I mean, there are no full replicas, but there are embryonic second best, maybe if you want, replicas.But I think this is important because we are thinking of a Sinocentric UN.Maybe it's totally different.
I don't know what's best for Europe, but I think Europe needs to get to think. Of these two scenarios, yeah, a Sinocentric UN or a not working UN, maybe not a non-UN. And I think in both cases, I don't think we're ready.
So we need to think this through as Europeans.I mean, where do we stand in these two realities?Yeah.
You did mention in the last paper, how should the new European Commission deal with China?And then we did talk about, you know, what's beyond WTO.So now I'm going to ask the question here, what's beyond United Nations?
Well, first, we see, of course, that there is a possibility of, well, China will try to fill the vacuum.But at the same point of time, you will still have non-China-based standards.So this is something that is just natural.
The interesting question for me there is, once you have like, I think we're moving towards a more fragmented global order where we have parallel standards. But there will be still some kind of interaction between the different standards that we have.
This will be, I think, the most interesting part.
Once we have one AI regulation standard or one data standard that China is promoting, maybe with some countries of the global south, there's a European standard, there's an American standard, there's some interaction between the domestic legislation that you have there.
But once you have a block, you will still have some kind of interaction between block A and block B, which will, to make it that you're still able to maneuver through this.
Like, I still have my passport, and I can go from country A to country B, but there are different rules applied if I'm in this one block or if I'm in the other block.So I think a lot of those practical technological questions
we will have some kind of facilitating mechanism that makes sense.For other stuff like outer space, this is something where it's more difficult.
When it comes to the question, where do you actually draw the line between outer space and the sovereignty of a state?
Like, with the balloon incidents, we had exactly this issue, where the American side said, well, this is our territory, and the Chinese side said, no, this is a little outside of it.But nobody knows where to draw this line.
And those are debates that, in the end, this will be decided by how many countries will be following this view, and by the practice, opinion and the practice. So in the end, this is just like a normal procedure.
At some point, we will have the standard.But I think we're moving into this direction.There won't be no legal order.It will be just messy.You will have different standards for some time.
And then you will have some kind of it will balance itself out somehow.But I think one of the big shifts is that for the Chinese side, you will have a Chinese domestic vision, and this will be more applied to the international level.
And some countries will join it, others won't.The whole world won't be just like China, but you will have a bigger influence of China across the board.
So then does this become an alliance game?And say China is developing its own standard and then trying to recruit friendly countries to join.At the same time, maybe the EU is also trying to do something of similar sort.
What I want to say is that we are not in the club membership strategy here in Europe.We are still in multilateralism. China is in the club membership strategy, but playing with multilateralism.They're playing two games.
If the world goes, as Moritz says, into fragmentation, we need members for our club.We really do. And therefore, I think what we need to think about is Global Gateway or any other initiative designed as a club.
I don't think we design things as a club.Not even Global Gateway is a club.Because for China's membership, I'm not saying that they oblige their members not to be in other club.I mean, think about Erdogan being invited to the Bricks.
I mean, you're welcome.But in a way, there is an intent that our club will grow, your club will shrink.There is this, in a way or another, in influence or in membership, we're not there because we believe in multilateralism.
So the question is, for how long can we do this?If the game is, as Moritz said, fragmentation,
I'm sorry to say, I know that this is scary, but I think we need to think at what point in time, and this might be the Trump presidency, you know, maybe we just get it, we just realize that we cannot be the only ones pushing for this.
But it is a very important issue because if we realize this is going nowhere, then the fight, I would call it, for partnerships starts like right away, I mean, like, you know, in a minute.
And I think we should at least be working on those partnerships that do not harm multilateralism.Australia or South Korea, Japan.
Beyond the G7, let's, you know, beyond the US, I think that is urgent, because it doesn't harm, it just, in a way, protects you or, you know, gives you a little bit of leverage in the light of that new world that Maurice is describing.
If I may, I think it's important to note how perceptions of international affairs differ from their intent.So I do believe that there's a lot of this idea in the West of multilateralism and not forming
clubs like we just described, but having read so many Chinese press conference releases, they constantly perceive the West's international affairs as creating blocks of confrontation, and really, in those words, block confrontation and needing China to respond to that.
Now, in one of China's foreign policy contradictions.Every country has foreign policy contradictions.
China affirms a multilateral approach to international relations, but then goes about forming blocks of its own, whether it be the Shanghai Cooperative Organization, its relationships with a lot of African countries, the broader BRI.
There are lots of examples of China really putting a lot of energy into creating these blocks
so that it can have a hub-and-spoke relationship or a more sort of disorganized relationship among countries of the world, whereas I think the West is still caught up in a lot of our previous blocks that may have been useful at a time, for example, the G7, the Paris Club.
There's many of these organizations that are losing their They're losing grip on global influence.The G7 is a great example of this.
But I think that difference between intent and perception or how moves in international affairs are received is important and it's huge in this context.
I think there is a lot of finger-pointing going on on who is destroying the global order.So for the American side, they say that the Chinese are not playing by the rules.The Chinese, they're saying, we are playing within the rules.
You just don't like us to actually have a say in reshaping the norms. But in the end, we have to face the reality when it comes to the efficiency of an organization to come up with solutions when we have a global problem.
And I think for the Chinese side, they say that they want to, of course, increase their role within the UN, and they are doing it.
But when it comes to, for instance, a question of solving a pandemic or responding to a pandemic, responding to climate change, responding to dealing with basic questions.What is actually the center of the human rights debate?
On any issue that we can discuss for the Chinese side or from other actors, it's much more difficult to get a consensus on very basic things.And that's okay.
The UN was built like this, that you have different views, but it still needs to get something done in practice.
We haven't seen the first day of the Trump administration yet, but I wouldn't be surprised if they would double down on their critique of this institution from the first Trump administration, and this could then have even stronger implications for the function of UN.
And then for the Chinese side, what does it mean?As all of you pointed out, China is engaging in a multilevel approach.They can say that they are supporting the UN.They are supporting the UN.
But at the same point of time, you have those regional China plus X mechanisms, and you have the bilateral level.
investment into becoming a global actor, and then being able to move between the regional and the bilateral and the multilateral UN level, that it's just this big wave coming from China, which is the new thing.
We just do not know yet to what extent this will be accommodated by the status quo powers.And this is something we'll see.I think the Donald Trump election will make this definitely much more intense.
But even then, you will have some kind of global interactions among states and standards.And this will still be going on.
But whether the UN is, for the Chinese, and I said this before, like just right now, more about gaining legitimacy by saying, we are actually playing within the system, by the rules.This is the UN.You set this up.
You just don't like us being better at your own game. I think this is something that we're seeing to some extent, because in the end, by giving the legitimacy on one side, you're not, by itself, changing the global order.
This is just one part of this, and I think the Chinese side, they know this, so they can approach this, have this multi-level approach.
I think this is very important.We recorded our event, and there was this question, what does China want about the UN?
Yeah, what does China want out of the UN?
And I think, you know, your legitimacy answer, which I didn't, but I felt, okay, it's maybe not enough.But now hearing you, and I want to clarify that, yes, absolutely.Because it's not that China doesn't want to change the global order.I'm convinced.
to change the global order, full stop.I mean, I'm sorry, but I think we have enough evidence to, and there's nothing wrong with it.I mean, it's like, others have changed the global order before.So it's not that I'm contending or anything.
But you're right, maybe they know it's not the UN.You see what I mean?Like, I think they may feel that the UN is a way to put them on a level that might make that possible, which doesn't mean they need to do it through the UN.
So I wanted to clarify that.I fully agree with that.One word, because I want to finish with a positive note on Europe, because, frankly speaking, it's hard.
But one thing that I was surprised when Theo ran all of these, you know, LLM models and all of this, wow, I mean, the most successful
initiative from the West that we could identify was this Global Compact for Migration, which comes from Switzerland and Mexico.It's not even a Western initiative.
Well, it's West Mexico in a way, but, you know, wow, taken by Germany, like pushed by Germany.
And, you know, I thought, wow, this is quite interesting, because it shows that when there is, like, put it this way, when something's really of relevance, yeah, It was very relevant for Mexico.It became very relevant for Germany.
This was at the time of the Syrian refugee crisis.Wow, it means you can actually make a difference without the money behind the BRI, without the means. just because there is a conjunction of interest between Global South and the West.
So can we replicate this?This is my question to Europe.Can Europe come up with ideas that really matter for the Global South, that are really relevant, and push them with a different sound, maybe than
Global Civilization Initiative, you name it, that really includes the global south in a different way.So, you know, I think it would be good if people actually looked at that initiative in detail and why it worked.
To just draw lessons, you know, and see whether we can do this again, whether we can have new ideas for the UN from Europe.Because the gap that Trump is going to leave is not only for China.
We should also, as Europeans, think, OK, what can we do in the light of that gap?What's our role in this institution?So I think our analysis shows that there could be a role.We just need to think of the right initiatives to do so.
Thank you very much all for this interesting conversation.I am Yu-Yun Zhang, and I'm with Alicia Garcia-Herrero and Theo Storella, essentially our China team here at Bruegel, and Moritz Rudolph from the Yale Law School.
For listeners, you can find all our research on China at bruegel.org and sign up for Zhonghua Mundus.
The paper that Theo and Alicia wrote about China's role in the UN just came out, and then we also had an event about this, so you can find all this in the show notes.Until next time, bye-bye.
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