Hello and welcome to episode 228 of Turkey Book Talk.I'm William Armstrong here in Istanbul.
In this episode we hear from Samim Ak Gönül, Director of the Department of Turkish Studies at the University of Strasbourg and the author of 100 Years of Greek-Turkish Relations, The Human Dimension of an Ongoing Conflict, published by Edinburgh University Press.
The Turkish-Greek relationship remains very complex with feelings oscillating between affection and hate for reasons going back centuries.
Greek historiography emphasizes the role of fighting against the Ottoman Turks in the country's independence war in the early 19th century, while Turkish historiography typically emphasizes, among other things, the role of fighting against
Greek forces in Turkey's own transition to independence after World War I. Despite this long history of conflict and mistrust, the two countries also do share a sense of cultural similarity and even affection.
And it's this complexity that Samim Akganul illustrates in his deep research investigating popular attitudes on the ground.We talk about that as well as what it potentially means politically in our conversation.
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for £6 per month or the equivalent in your currency.But now onto our conversation with Samim Akganul.
His book's research is based on interviews conducted over the course of two and a half decades between 1996 and 2022 with communities on both sides of the border.
So I started by asking what was the defining impression that he got from those conversations.
It is a long process.It's a long process in my academic life.It's a long process in my personal life also.I started interviewing people first in 1990s about the Turkish Muslim minority in Greece living in Western traits.
Then, at the end of the 1990s, I understood that trying to analyze a minority living in Greece, resulting from the Ottoman Empire and Ottoman society, wasn't possible without analyzing the other side, the other part of the minority, which is the Greek minority of Turkey.
And while interviewing people in Istanbul, in Athens, in Comotini, in Xanthi, in rules, in creeds, etc.I understood that there were some basic human dimensions related to the own experience of these people, of these individuals.
Actually, I could interview two and a half generations, two decades approximately.So yes, they had their personal impression, their personal lives, but also in addition, there was a kind of narrative, a national narrative, and they were impacted.
by this national narrative.And it was very interesting to see that sometimes, and even often I may say, these two were paradoxical, oppositional.
Their own experience wasn't exactly the same thing that the national education narrative, the popular press narrative, etc.It was interesting to see this cognitive dissonancy, if I may say.
And then, at the end of 1990s, at the middle of 2000, and at the end of 2010s, and the beginning of 2020s, I conducted three main field researches with archives, but mainly interviews with those who were impacted directly, and those who are descendants, and this relation, this alterity through national narrative.
This is the core of the book that we discussed today.
and obviously those interviews were conducted over the course of a very long period of time, so almost 30 years really, 25 years pretty much, spanning the 1990s to a couple of years ago.
Could you just talk about the changes that you observed in the perceptions on both sides with people that you interviewed over the course of that time?
question, an intriguing question, because on the one hand, I say that it changed a lot.The perception changed a lot, globalization, bilateral relations that are getting softer, tourism, television, soft power.
Turkish series are very famous in Greece.The European perspective, young generation are not impacted so much with the national narrative, etc.So I want to say that it changed a lot.But on the other hand,
I noticed here in the 1920s that there are some themes, there are some very core topics, solid topics that remain.The main one is the fact that Turks and Greeks are different people.
which is very interesting, by the way, because the everyday life experience when Turks and Greeks meet in tourism, while traveling, studying somewhere else in a third country, they understand immediately that this alterity is weaker than the sameness.
Actually, they do feel in their everyday life the same, but there we see the strength of the national narrative, the strength of the political discourse, the strength of the national education and the populist media.This alterity remains.
This alternative is still there, even if the idea of enmity is weaker than in the 1990s.If you allow me, I have a parenthesis here.
You know that there are two schools, one saying that people hate other people because they are ignorant, they don't know them. If they knew them better, they could love them.I don't believe to this idea, to this theory.
I think that on the contrary, the alterity of proximity is much sharper than the remote alterity.People hate people who are very similar to them.This is the key to explanation of many tragedies in history.
because without this alterity of proximity, you can't explain the Yugoslavian war, you can't explain the Armenian genocide, you can't explain the Tutsi-Hutu genocide, you can't explain the compulsory exchange of population.
So people actually, they see how they are same, and this sameness is very scary, is very dangerous, because if we are same, we can't exist anymore.So at that point I see a kind of structural discourse since 1990s until today.
My impression, and I've got very limited experience, but my feeling is that Turkey looms larger in the Greek imagination and in the Greek public discourse than vice versa.So in Greece, Turkey is the great other.
It's the single other, really, in the national narrative.Whereas in Turkey, Greece is just one of many countries which is an other.Is that the correct impression, or is that too simplistic?
Yes, you are right.The otherness during the end of the Ottoman Empire was the only way to construct the nation.In this nation-building process, the Greeks' main otherness was Turkocracia.The Ottoman domination was called Turkocracia.
Greeks called Ottomans more Turks than Turks themselves. Turks imported this Turkishness from the West, but this otherness was there for Greeks.It is not the only one, though.In Greek nation-building process, also there are others, if I may say.
Turks is the main one, of course.And there is a confusion between Turkishness and Muslimness.Turkishness often is associated to Muslimness, and other Muslims also are associated to Turkishness.But also, in the Greek nation-building, the Slavic
otherness is very strong, and also the Catholic, so Western European otherness is very strong.But you are right, the Turkish is the strongest one.At the Turkish side, I think that there are very strong at equal level othernesses.
Greek otherness is an important one, because in the national narrative 1919-1920,
1923, these are important breakpoints in the nation-building process, and of course before that, 1821, the Greek revolt and then the independence war are very important dates.But other othernesses are also as strong as the Greek otherness.
You are right, I think, for example, the Arabic otherness, which is a very, very strong otherness in the Turkish nation-building
process, we see the impact of this otherness today, today with these millions of people from Arabic background living in Turkey and facing very strong hate speech.
Slavic-Russian otherness also, maybe Western otherness in the sense of imperialism, etc. But I think that in both cases, Greekness for the Turkish nation-building and Turkishness for the Greek nation-building still are very important.
Don't forget that the Ottoman Empire gained so many nation-states.The first one is the Greek one, starting in 1821, and the last one is the Turkish one, starting in 1920.In 100 years, this huge empire disappeared.
And during the disappearance of this huge empire, Because nations needed territories to build a state, and because these territories were shared territories, they had to apply a process of unmixing of populations, which is a very traumatic process.
Maybe the three main actors of this unmixing of population are Turks, Greeks, and, of course, Armenians.And other actors are Arabs, or Armenians, or Bosnians, et cetera, but the three main
nations in the sense of the Ottoman Empire, of the Ottoman society, were these three main groups, Greeks, Armenians, and Turks.
That is why I think that Greeks played still an important role in the Turkish nation-building process as one of the main alternatives.
Coming on to that, the population exchange of 1923 and 1924 was this very seismic event.It involved the uprooting of close to two million people.Obviously, that had a huge human impact on both sides.
Very interestingly, you talk in the book also about how the perception of this event, a century after it has taken place, is very different, actually, in both countries.
From the word go, really, in Greece they had a very different understanding in terms of the national narrative about what that population exchange meant and the impact it had on society, whereas in Turkey it was a very different impression of that event.
Could you just talk about the different perceptions in both countries of the very seismic population exchange of 1923?
First of all, there is a lack of parallelism.Don't forget that during the Greek-Turkish War of 1919 and 1920, a very important part of the Greeks of the Asia Minor, the western side of the Asia Minor, left.
the territory, left their homes, their gardens, their fields, their workshops, and went to the islands while waiting to come back.The 1923 agreement, January 1923, is mainly to prevent these Greeks who already left the territory to come back.
That is why the trauma for the Greeks who left Anatolia, at least for half of them, is maybe bigger than the Muslims who left after 1923, mainly from Crete, from the islands, and a little bit also from Epirus, from southern Epirus.
So there is a lack of parlance in chronology.There is also a lack of parlance in number.When these one and a half million Greek Orthodox left Anatolia, left Asia Minor, they went to Greece,
built a few decades earlier, in 1830s, with three millions of inhabitants.Please imagine adding to a very young state, half of the population.It was economically, psychologically of course, but also sociologically, a huge trauma.
And there were some difficulties, I mean illness, sickness, hunger, in the streets of Athens, everything.On the other side, these 600,000, 700,000 Muslims who left islands and Anatolia were much less than the number of Greeks.
But also they came in a country with approximately 10 to 12 million people We're living.
Don't forget that the first census of the Turkish Republic is 1927, four years after the foundation of the Republic, and there are 13 million inhabitants in Turkey.It's not like today, where more than 80 million.
But still, there are 500,000-600,000 people who are coming to a country with 12-13 million inhabitants, seen as a heritage of the Ottoman Empire.On the other hand, 1.5 million coming to a country of 3 million inhabitants and recently founded.
You see that there is a lack of priority.And finally, it's very interesting to see that the Greeks who left Anatolia considered Asia Minor, considered Anatolia as home.
And starting by 1924, 1925, immediately after the exchange of population, they started through associations, foundations, research centers, to collect many objects, narratives, songs, clothes, etc., to keep this memory and to transmit this memory.
It wasn't the case, fortunately.
Those who came from Greece, Greek islands, from Greek and from Central Greece, were a little bit lost in the nation-building process, in the very strong nationalist discourse in Turkey, and it's only their descendants in the 1990s, the third generation, who went to see back what happened.
So there's a kind of, there too, lack of chronology.That is why it's interesting to analyze both narratives.They are similar, but they are not at the same moment.
And this difference of moment, we can say, has an impact today on the descendants of exchange people living in Greece and descendants of exchange people living in Turkey, especially in this lack of parlance in two societies.
As you said before, one of the interesting features of the population exchange is the fact that in many ways it wasn't parallel on both sides.
One of the key ways is the fact that in Greece there remains this quite sizeable Turkish minority, largely in western Thrace near the border with Turkey. in northern Greece.
That population is estimated at around 140,000 people, so that makes up around 3% of Greece's population today.That's obviously different from the Turkish side, but this population of this Turkish minority in Greece is a flashpoint issue sometimes.
It sometimes comes into focus whenever there's tension emerging between the two countries.We'll see Turkish officials staging visits there and it comes back into focus.Then when things quieten down, again it falls off the agenda.
So this question of the Turkish minority in Greece is obviously of interest in Turkey.I just wonder if you could talk about the perception of it within Greece, how that's changed over time.
If it's changed over time, where it fits into this broader, longer-term narrative of the impact of the population exchange.How has that changed over time?
First of all, let's go back to the end of 1922-1922, beginning of 1923, where the idea of the League of Nations, President of Namsan, who was the father of this refugee process in the League of Nations, but also from both sides, Inönü in the Turkish side, Benizelos in the Greek side, were all of them convinced that the best,
very best model, the stability is one state, one nation, the homogeneity.This is a utopia.And this homogeneity, they tried to reach it with the compulsory exchange of population.I say it for our listeners, this is the first compulsory exchange.
People were not asked their opinions if they wanted to leave their houses.They were exiled.They were expelled from the countries. As you mentioned, two communities were exempted from this compulsory exchange in some blur conditions.
Actually, the idea first was to exempt from the compulsory exchange the Greek Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople.
The Turkish side resisted to this, then had to accept this concession while asking that this Patriarchate should be a local church.
this local church needed a local community, so the Greek Orthodox living in Istanbul, established, settled in Istanbul before 1918, were exempted from the exchange also.
And in exchange, if I may say, the Muslim minority of Western trace, so from the Turkish-Greek border of Evros River until approximately Kavala city, The Muslim minority were also exempted.This created an idea, the idea of reciprocity.
Well, reciprocity is a dangerous idea.Actually, my colleagues of international law, international relations say that reciprocity is everywhere.The relationship between two states is based on reciprocity.
This is true, but there are two main domains when reciprocity cannot be used.First of all, the framework of human rights.You can't use reciprocity.You can't say that if a country violates human rights by reciprocity,
I have the right to violate human rights, which is not possible, of course.And don't forget that minority rights are a part of human rights.The second point where we can't use reciprocity is for the state's own citizens.
The Muslim minority of Greece are Greek citizens, Hellenic citizens, and the Greek Orthodox minority of Turkey are Turkish citizens, citizens of Turkey.
So all the policy applied by the Turkish state and Turkish society on Greek minority and the Greek state and the Greek minority on the Turkish Muslim minority actually were towards their own citizens.
That is why reciprocity shouldn't work, but worked. These were, at the beginning, the reciprocal commitments of these two states.By Article 45 of the Laws of the City, it was used to punish the minority.
These policies tense relationships between the majority and the minority, and between the state and the minority. was more complicated in Turkey than in Greece.In Greece also it was complicated.
I have to say it wasn't so easy after a period of relative calm with the Greek junta after 1967.Things are becoming very tense until 2000 actually, with a kind of a softening process in the 1990s with the collapse of the bipolar world.
In Turkey, things are a little bit different because the nation-building process and homogenization process in Turkey continued after 1923 towards minorities, Armenian minority, Greek minority, Jewish minority, Assyrian-Chaldean minority who couldn't use the rights from Lozan, etc.
So if at the beginning in 1920s these two communities in number were almost equal, 120,000, 120,000.With some oppressions in Greece, many went to Turkey, where from 120,000 approximately, today we came to 3,000 to 6,000.
Which is nothing, because don't forget that when there were 120,000 Greeks in Istanbul, Istanbul was a city of less than 1 million inhabitants.Today we live in a city of maybe 15-17 million inhabitants.It's nothing, it's zero.
But in both cases, things remain.In Istanbul, but also in two islands, Gokceada and Bozceada, Imbros and Tenedos, at the entrance of the Dardanelles Strait, things, symbols remain.
buildings remain, food remain, music remain, literature remain, people remain.There are people who are working very hard to keep this memory.
I'm thinking to my friend Lachy Wingas, to the newspaper of Appelger-Mazzini, celebrating this year its 100th anniversary.So there are people who are trying to keep this memory.On the other hand, in the Western trades, after this tense period,
of 1960s, 70s, 80s, until 1990s, with the softening and the inclusion in the Greek politics, we may say that we have a more urban population concerning Xanti and Komotsini, and the tensions of 1990s between Turks, Pomaks, and Gypsies, and between the Muslim minority and the Greek Orthodox majority are lesser.
Today in Turkey also, which is very interesting, there is a kind of nostalgia.It started at the end of the 1990s, when Turkish bourgeoisie discovered other alteratives.
First, Kurdish alterative, which the rural exodus from the Kurdish regions of Turkey to Istanbul, Izmir, Ankara, but also then the Arabic alterative since 2010 with Syrians, but also other people who are confused with Syrians living in Turkey today.
So the discourse of 2000s, 2010s, and even 2020s is a very nostalgic discourse with tears, sometimes crocodile tears, saying that, oh, Istanbul was so beautiful, so multicultural when Greeks were here.So there's a kind of nostalgic discourse.
just this week, and I saw in Ayvalik, one of the main cities of exchange of populations, where the population were almost 100% Greek, all these tavernas and restaurants trying to attract clients and customers while saying that they play Greek music to attract tourists and customers.
Obviously the book is focused on these human elements, but there's one issue that has impacted those human interactions over the past few decades, and that's the Cyprus issue.
This Cyprus question obviously has a very strong human element for the people directly impacted, but it's obviously a geopolitical issue and almost entirely politicised and even internationalised now.
Obviously, once upon a time, the Cyprus question was really a flashpoint for very bitter tensions between Turks and Greeks, and between Turkey and Greece as countries.
Specifically on the island itself, it seems like one of the narratives that we're seeing emerge is the fact that a couple of generations ago, there were still these very direct human connections between the two communities.
A couple of generations ago, there were very strong links, so people remembered living alongside each other.Now that seems to be drifting away, and this hardening of the border seems to be emerging, and human
and contact is far less prevalent than it was between people on either side of that divide than it was before.We've just passed the 50th anniversary of the Turkish intervention in Cyprus, so the issue has recently been back on the agenda.
We've seen it in media coverage more than before.I just wonder
terms of your research, where does this question, the Cyprus question, fit into the broader issue of the human side of Turkey-Greece relations and perceptions on both sides, both today and yesterday?
Yes, Cyprus is a headache, is a general headache, and you know that when you have this headache, it has an impact on other organs also.
That is why Cyprus is important for itself, Cyprus, for Cyprus' population, the human dimension in Cyprus, but also it had an impact on the entire general Greek-Turkish relation, and Greeks living in Turkey and Turks living in Greece.
So you see that Cyprus is larger, broader than Cyprus itself.First of all, let's remember that there is a population of Cyprus.These are people who are feeling themselves as Cypriots. And Cyprus, today's map of Cyprus, is an optical error.
We have the impression that there are Turks living in Cyprus in the northern side, Greeks living in Cyprus in the southern side, and there is a line separating them.It wasn't the case until 1960.Cyprus was an Ottoman island,
And as Ottoman did in several regions in Cyprus also, they applied settling Muslims in the island.
So we may say that, yes, at the beginning the Turkish Muslim population of Cyprus is not an autochthonous population, but was so old that they obtained this Cyprus identity.
Then, at the end of the Ottoman Empire, Cyprus went first under the British protection, then it became the British colony with the beginning of the First World War.
When Cyprus was British, the population of Cyprus, Greek Orthodox and Turkish Muslims, but also other communities, especially an Armenian minority, but also a Maronite Christian minority in Cyprus, were living in mixed areas.
Of course, there were some concentrated in some cities, some villages, but through the entirety of the island.It wasn't possible to say that this part was a Turkish part or that part was a Greek part of the island.
Things have started with the decolonization process. When the British Empire tried to get rid of Cyprus, London accepted to include Ankara and Athens in the process.
And in this process, the creation of the Cyprus Republic in 1960 was a kind of compromise.It is a republic with two communities, but not two zones.
The constitution of the Cyprus Republic was so difficult to apply because of the quota question that the first president of the Republic, Makarios, when he tried to amend this constitution with 13 amendments and to create a Unitarian Republic and to give to Turkish group minority rights,
The Turkish side was opposed, mainly because they know what it means to be a minority.So in 1964, when these amendments couldn't pass, the Turkish community of Cyprus started to get concentrated in some areas.
So we may say that the separation, the unmixing of population in Cyprus started in 1964.
And then, during one decade between 1964 and 1974, at the peak point of the tension between Greeks and Turks in the island, but also in both sides of the Aegean, we witnessed the military junta in Greece,
who tried to remove Makarios from the presidency.At that time, Makarios was opposed to getting united to Greece and the Turkish intervention in 1974 that we commemorate, or some celebrate, the 50th anniversary today.
This is the separation point, 1974. You are right.There were some generations who were used to have a relationship in Cyprus, especially the linguistic ones.I mean, the first generation could speak Greek and Turkish, and they lived together.
And then there are the generations who were born in Cyprus without having any contact, and there are some groups who were transferred from Turkey to Cyprus to balance, to augment the population of the Turkish type.
But I must say that since 2004, the Annan plan, which is a failure, as you know, the Turkish side voted yes, the Greek side voted no.The links were, step by step, restarted, reopened.
And today, when I go to Cyprus, I see more links today than 20 years ago.So, of course, both sides, especially the Turkish side, the national discourse saying that, no, it's not possible anymore.
There is no possibility to create a federal or confederal union in Cyprus.There must be two separate states.This discourse still remains.But in the island, I think that things are there.
The main evidence of this is the fact that approximately 100% of Turks living in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, recognized only by Turkey, want to obtain the Cyprus citizenship, which is a European citizenship. So it's very useful for them.
So we may say that tomorrow it is very possible to recreate the Cyprus Republic, federal or confederal one.
Please read the wonderful writings of Niyazi Kızılıyürek, who is a Turkish professor living in Nicosia in the south, and who was the elected MP of the European Parliament from the Cyprus Communist Party during the previous mandate of the European Parliament.
So he wrote a lot of this human dimension.I think that the solution of the Cyprus problem, if there is a problem, is not so complicated.There are some technical issues.Properties, for example.Cemeteries, for example.Tax issues, for example.
But it can be, it can be resolved.I think that if the two communities can say no clearly to Ankara and to Athens, they have the ability to build this new Cyprus-ness of Cyprus identity.
And it will have a very positive impact on minorities, on two nations, on Turkish-European relations, etc. Today I'm more optimistic than yesterday on the Cyprus issue and it will have a very positive impact on the human dimension in both countries.
bringing things right up to date, I wonder if you've been following some of the narratives, at least on the Turkish side.
In recent years, I think last year it was first introduced, it was the lifting of visa requirements on a number of Greek islands for Turkish tourists.
That led, obviously, to a greater number of Turkish tourists visiting those neighbouring Greek islands.One of the impacts of that on the Turkish domestic narrative, at least online, is the fact that
People are observing that the prices there are much more suitable, much more affordable than they are in comparable Turkish tourism centres.
People are comparing the experience of going to these Greek islands and paying less, having a much more relaxing time. has been a very interesting element.
I was thinking about it as I was reading the book, because this is a classic contemporary example of human exchange between these two sides, and how it can develop in ways that people aren't expecting, perhaps, when these political decisions are taken.
I just wonder if you've been following those narratives, and how they made you reflect on the research that you conducted in previous decades.
Well, not only I follow the narrative, but myself, I am doing the same thing.I'm going to Greek islands, and from Greece I'm going to Turkey.So I see I am a part of this process.
First, let's start with a wonderful documentary of Hercules Millas, Hercules Millas, living in Athens, and Nathan Dinch, the filmmaker, called The Other Town.
You can find, I think it's on Daily Motion, Hercules, Hercules Millas, and Nathan Dinch went to two small towns in Turkey and Greece.
former exchange towns, and asked the same questions to the inhabitants of these two towns to see how the responses, answers, were similar.They were similar but against the other one.
This reminds me that when I see these Turks going to Kos, going to Eresos, going to Rhodes Islands, or Vitellini from Ayvalik, they express a crisis related to Turkey.Because those who go to these islands are from the
middle bourgeoisie who spend their vacation in Turkey, who pass for one day or two days to the Greek islands, and they have so much to say about their own country, economic crisis, the authoritarian regime, the rise of Islamism, the rule of law becoming more and more difficult and weaker, that the mirror of these islands is used to talk about Turkey itself.
Turkey itself and Turkish problems.
Prices, you mentioned the prices with the economic crisis, but also more than prices, I read many things on social media, especially on the kindness, on the relationship between restaurants and customers and beaches, I don't know, gentle people trying to help, etc.
that they consider being lost in Turkey. to find this kindness, to find this natural relationship, is used to talk about Turkey.But there is another thing that we hear less.
Actually, for the last two decades, there are more and more Greeks who are coming to spend some time in Turkish vacation towns, just to cross the other side, to go to shopping, to, I don't know, to eat, to swim, but also
a very important tourist population from Greece to Istanbul.Istanbul, which has this very important symbol of the Greek identity, a very important symbol of orthodoxy, and the discourse is not so sharp.
It's similar to these Turks going to Greek islands.So They witnessed the dynamics of Istanbul, the richness of Istanbul, the cultural diversity of Istanbul, how the economy goes fast, etc.
So the similar positive discourse also exists for Istanbul, specifically for Istanbul. from the Greek side.But again, I go to my first answer.There too, the structural otherness alternative remains.It's very solid.
But it is very interesting to see, and it can have, of course, a positive impact if the national narrative changes, because the national narrative is still very strong.
That was Samim Akganul, many thanks to him for joining for episode 228.
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