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Episode: Are We on the Cusp of a New Political Order?

Author: New York Times Opinion
Duration: 01:28:27

Episode Shownotes

Our politics are increasingly divided on fundamental issues like the legitimacy of elections and the nature and integrity of the basic systems of American government. That’s the most important fact of this election. But strange new zones of agreement have been emerging, too — on China, outsourcing and health care.

What should we make of that?In his book “The Rise and Fall of the Neoliberal Order” the historian Gary Gerstle describes these shifts in consensus in terms of political orders — these eras that stretch for decades, when both parties come to accept a certain set of ideas. In this conversation he walks me through the political, economic and social factors that shaped two political orders in the last century: the New Deal order and the neoliberal order. And we apply this lens to what’s happening in our politics right now.It may seem strange to take a step back in time right before the election. But I think Gerstle’s framework helps uncover an overlooked dimension of the 2024 race and where politics might go next.Book Recommendations:The Kingdom, the Power, and the Glory by Tim AlbertaUnderground Asia by Tim HarperThe Known Citizen by Sarah E. IgoThoughts? Guest suggestions? Email us at [email protected] can find transcripts (posted midday) and more episodes of “The Ezra Klein Show” at nytimes.com/ezra-klein-podcast. Book recommendations from all our guests are listed at https://www.nytimes.com/article/ezra-klein-show-book-recs.This episode of “The Ezra Klein Show” was produced by Annie Galvin. Fact-checking by Kate Sinclair and Mary Marge Locker. Our senior engineer is Jeff Geld, with additional mixing by Aman Sahota. Our supervising editor is Claire Gordon. The show’s production team also includes Rollin Hu, Elias Isquith, Michelle Harris and Kristin Lin. Original music by Isaac Jones. Audience strategy by Kristina Samulewski and Shannon Busta. The executive producer of New York Times Opinion Audio is Annie-Rose Strasser. Unlock full access to New York Times podcasts and explore everything from politics to pop culture. Subscribe today at nytimes.com/podcasts or on Apple Podcasts and Spotify.

Summary

In this episode of 'The Ezra Klein Show,' historian Gary Gerstle discusses the evolving political orders in the U.S., examining the decline of the New Deal coalition and the rise of neoliberalism. He highlights how external threats and socio-economic challenges have shaped political dynamics, revealing fractures within both the Republican and Democratic parties as they confront contemporary issues. The conversation reflects on historical developments influencing the upcoming 2024 elections and the potential for a new political order amidst growing divides over economic and moral issues.

Go to PodExtra AI's episode page (Are We on the Cusp of a New Political Order?) to play and view complete AI-processed content: summary, mindmap, topics, takeaways, transcript, keywords and highlights.

Full Transcript

00:00:03 Speaker_00
From New York Times Opinion, this is The Ezra Klein Show. So back in 2020, this is January of 2020, way before the election actually took place, before COVID for that matter, I published a whole book about political polarization.

00:00:34 Speaker_00
It was called Why We're Polarized. And I've been thinking a lot about how the polarization of this year is different than what I was tracking when I was writing that book. I mean, the divisions are much more fundamental.

00:00:48 Speaker_00
When I was writing that book, so much of the arguments were about Obamacare and taxes. And now the fight is over the very legitimacy of elections, the going after enemies using the power of the federal government, the nature and integrity

00:01:04 Speaker_00
of the basic systems of American government. I think that is the most important fact of politics right now. It has been the subject of many, many of our episodes this year.

00:01:14 Speaker_00
But it is interesting, I think, that the policy issues on which there once seemed so little room for compromise are now so much more open.

00:01:24 Speaker_00
From free trade to antitrust, from healthcare to outsourcing, from China to unions, there is suddenly a lot more overlap in at least the rhetoric of the two parties. Not always the policy, but the rhetoric.

00:01:39 Speaker_00
And sometimes the overlap really is substantive. The Trump administration, it really was a break with the Obama administration on China. But the Biden administration was not a reversion back to where Obama was.

00:01:50 Speaker_00
The Biden administration, they took what Trump did on China and they went a lot further. What does that tell us?

00:01:59 Speaker_00
In his book, The Rise and Fall of the Neoliberal Order, the historian Gary Gerstle introduced me to this concept of political orders, these structures of political consensus that stretch over decades.

00:02:12 Speaker_00
There were two across the 20th century, the New Deal order, which ran from the 1930s to the 1970s, and the neoliberal order, which stretched from the 70s to the financial crisis.

00:02:23 Speaker_00
And I wonder if part of what is unsettling politics right now is that we're in a moment between orders, a moment where you can just begin to see the hazy outline of something new taking shape, and both parties are in internal upheavals as they try to remake themselves to grasp at it and respond to it.

00:02:45 Speaker_00
And I know where we are in the election cycle. I know where everybody's minds are. I got nothing to tell you about the polls. There's nothing I can say that is going to allay your anxiety for a couple days from now.

00:02:57 Speaker_00
And I know that within this feeling of the moment, it feels weird to talk at all about zones of possible agreement or compromise rather than disagreement and danger.

00:03:10 Speaker_00
But I think it's worth doing this episode and this conversation now because I think they're important to understanding why this election has played out the way it has. And I think it's important for thinking about where politics might be going next.

00:03:22 Speaker_00
As always, my email, Ezra Klein Show at NYTimes.com. Gary Gerstle, welcome to the show. Thank you for having me. So let's begin with the big concept here. What is a political order?

00:03:39 Speaker_04
A political order is a way of thinking differently about political time in America. We focus so much on two-, four-, and six-year election cycles. A political order is something that lasts beyond particular elections. It refers to the ability of

00:03:56 Speaker_04
one political party to arrange a constellation of policies, constituencies, think tanks, candidates, individuals who come to dominate politics for extended periods of time.

00:04:11 Speaker_04
And their dominance becomes so strong that the opposition party feels compelled, if they still want to remain real players in American politics, it compels them to acquiesce and to come aboard the other political party's platform.

00:04:26 Speaker_04
They don't get established that often. They usually last 30 or 40 years. Economic crisis is usually involved in the emergence of a new order and the breakup of the old.

00:04:38 Speaker_04
Every political order also has not only an ideology, but a vision of a good life in America. What constitutes a good life?

00:04:45 Speaker_04
Because that becomes really important in terms of selling the virtues of that political order to a mass base, which is something that has to be won and sustained in American politics in order for a political order to exist and thrive.

00:04:59 Speaker_00
Let's talk a bit about the New Deal and then the neoliberal orders, and I want to focus here on the parts of your theory or the parts of your description that I found more revelatory.

00:05:08 Speaker_00
So I think people have a sense of the New Deal, there's a Great Depression, FDR is elected, the sort of New Deal period begins. Something you really focus on, though,

00:05:19 Speaker_00
is that what coheres to the New Deal is that the Republicans eventually submit to it. And that happens when Eisenhower beats Taft. So tell me a bit about the counterfactual there that you think almost happened.

00:05:33 Speaker_00
What led to Taft losing prominence in the Republican Party? And what might have happened if he hadn't?

00:05:39 Speaker_04
It's the Soviet Union and the threat of communism. And he was very slow to grasp the nature of that threat.

00:05:48 Speaker_04
When I teach young people today, it's hard for them to grasp the magnitude and the seriousness of the Cold War and how it shaped every aspect of American life. And the Soviet Union represented an existential threat to the United States.

00:06:03 Speaker_04
It was a revolutionary power that wanted to end capitalism everywhere, not just in the Soviet Union, but all over Asia and Africa, North America, South America. They were gaining a lot of support in the decolonizing societies of Africa and Asia.

00:06:19 Speaker_04
America was not confident in the ability of its economy to have a permanent recovery from the Great Depression. They needed foreign markets. America wasn't sure whether it would have them.

00:06:35 Speaker_04
The capitalist class in America was scared to death by the communist threat, and it had to be met everywhere, and America mobilizes for the Cold War to contain communism everywhere where it appeared.

00:06:49 Speaker_04
And that required a standing army in quasi-peacetime of a sort that America had never experienced before. And Taft was profoundly uncomfortable with this.

00:07:01 Speaker_04
He was a Republican in a classical sense, small central government, devolved power to the states.

00:07:08 Speaker_04
suspicious of foreign entanglements, believing that America was protected by the two vast oceans and thus did not need a strong standing army, did not have to be involved in world affairs. And he was opposed to the New Deal.

00:07:23 Speaker_04
He thought it was a form of tyranny. It was going to lead to collectivism, Soviet style. And he was poised in the 1940s to roll back the New Deal, and he was looking forward to the post-war period after the war emergency had passed.

00:07:38 Speaker_04
Of course, the war emergency would require a very strong state to mobilize armed forces, to mobilize the economy for the sake of fighting a world war.

00:07:47 Speaker_04
And he was slow to get on the bandwagon in terms of the threat of China, the threat of communist expansion. And that opened up an opportunity for another candidate by the name of Dwight D. Eisenhower,

00:08:01 Speaker_04
to enter the presidential race in 1952 and to present a very different vision.

00:08:08 Speaker_04
And my counterfactual is that absent the Cold War, the New Deal, which we now regard as such a juggernaut, would be seen as a momentary blip like so many other progressive moments in American politics.

00:08:22 Speaker_04
And we would see it as a blip and not for what it became, which was a political order that dominated politics for 30 years.

00:08:31 Speaker_00
So there's been this conventional story of the New Deal era, which is that the fear of communism, the fear of being painted as soft on communism or soft on socialism leads progressives to trim their sails, moderates the sort of left flank of New Dealism.

00:08:48 Speaker_00
You argue that that story misses what's happening on the right.

00:08:52 Speaker_00
You say, quote, if we look carefully at the politics of the late 1940s and early 1950s, we could see that the imperative of fighting the communists caused Republicans to make even larger concessions than the Democrats did. What were those concessions?

00:09:07 Speaker_04
Well, the biggest concession was agreeing to an extraordinary system of progressive taxation. The highest marginal tax rate in the 1940s during World War II reached 91 percent, a level that is inconceivable in America of the 21st century.

00:09:26 Speaker_04
Eisenhower wins the election in 1952. He has both houses of Congress. And quite extraordinarily, Eisenhower maintains the 91 percent. taxation rate. One simply can't imagine a Republican Party in the 21st century, anyone in it, doing that today.

00:09:46 Speaker_04
Why did he do it? Well, there were suspicions on the part of some Republicans that he was a closet Democrat. His partisan loyalties weren't that clear, but I think he was a Republican, and I think what mattered to him was the Cold War.

00:10:01 Speaker_04
And the Cold War had to be fought on two fronts. It had to be fought militarily,

00:10:07 Speaker_04
international containment of communism, and that required enormous expenditures on national defense, which meant not simply a conventional army, but the nuclear arms race.

00:10:18 Speaker_04
And the other aspect of that, which he appreciated, was that in the 1950s, it was not clear whether the Soviet Union or the United States could provide a better life for its average citizen. The Soviet Union was still doing quite well in the 1950s.

00:10:34 Speaker_04
There was an extraordinary debate that occurred in Moscow in 1959. Vice President Nixon debated Khrushchev about who could deliver better kitchens to their consumers, and the Americans imported all the

00:10:48 Speaker_04
most recent household appliances from the United States, reassembled them on a stage in Moscow, and Nixon and Khrushchev went at it, including a dishwasher for the first time, when it wasn't a common feature of American homes. What was this about?

00:11:00 Speaker_04
This was the United States admitting that the Soviet Union was a serious rival, not simply militarily, but economically as well, and America had to prove

00:11:10 Speaker_04
that it had the better system, and that meant you could not return to unrestrained American capitalism. You had to regulate it in the public interest.

00:11:17 Speaker_04
And Eisenhower understood that in order to win the ideological struggle of the Cold War, which was not simply an American-Soviet struggle, but it was a global struggle to convince all the peoples of what was then called the Third World to come with the capitalist way, to come with the American way, in order for that to happen,

00:11:35 Speaker_04
America had to demonstrate that it could give its ordinary citizens a good life. And that meant taking money from the rich and redistributing it, narrowing the inequality between rich and poor.

00:11:47 Speaker_04
It meant supporting powerful labor movement and not trying to roll back the Wagner Act, which

00:11:53 Speaker_04
the labor movement regarded as its Magna Carta, a very strong piece of federal legislation that gave it unambiguous rights to organize and obligated employers to bargain collectively with them. He felt that this had to be the way that America went.

00:12:08 Speaker_04
Maintenance of Social Security, really all the key New Deal reforms he ended up maintaining because he thought this would be a critically important instrument

00:12:19 Speaker_04
for convincing not just ordinary Americans, but people around the world, that this would prove the superiority of the American way. That is why he acquiesced to the New Deal order.

00:12:33 Speaker_00
And you describe this as being, of course, more than just Eisenhower. It's a pervasive recognition among America's business class.

00:12:39 Speaker_00
You say, quote, the fear of communism made possible the class compromise between capital and labor that underwrote the New Deal order.

00:12:48 Speaker_00
And you say it wasn't just here, that this was also true in many of the social democracies in Europe after the Second World War. Tell me a bit about that class compromise and the role the Cold War played in it.

00:12:59 Speaker_04
It is often said that socialism was weaker in America than it was elsewhere, and in many respects that has been true.

00:13:07 Speaker_04
The corollary of that is that the American business class historically has been bigger, more powerful, more unencumbered than the business classes of other nations, especially in Western Europe among America's industrial rivals.

00:13:24 Speaker_04
There was no shortage of labor protest in America, but rarely could labor achieve what it wanted to achieve because the resistance was extraordinary. The resistance was legal, it was extra legal.

00:13:36 Speaker_04
The history of industrial relations in America was very violent. The business class in America had a reputation of being very powerful and aggressive and unwilling, unwilling to share its power with its antagonists.

00:13:50 Speaker_04
So what was it that got them to share that power? I argue that it was the fear of the Soviet Union. And what did the fear of the Soviet Union represent? The expropriation of all corporate capital in the world. That was the communist dream.

00:14:09 Speaker_04
And that was deeply felt. And it was felt not simply in a global setting. It was felt within the United States itself. where there was a communist movement, not on the size of the magnitude of what was occurring in Europe, but significant nonetheless.

00:14:24 Speaker_04
And the business class felt that it was in its interests to compromise with organized labor in a way that it had never done before. That was the grand compromise.

00:14:34 Speaker_04
It was symbolized in a treaty in Detroit between the three automobile makers, then among the biggest corporations in America.

00:14:44 Speaker_04
and the United Auto Workers, the Treaty of Detroit, purchasing labor peace by granting unions good wages, good conditions, good pensions, good health care, absent the threat of communism,

00:14:59 Speaker_04
I think that grand compromise either would not have been arrived at or it would have been scuttled much sooner than it was.

00:15:06 Speaker_00
I also find it striking how much this made its way into political language. I feel like it has passed a bit into political cliche.

00:15:15 Speaker_00
that the interstate highway system was labeled in the bill, quote, the National System of Interstate and Defense Highways.

00:15:24 Speaker_00
You write that supporters of it argued that building 41,000 miles of new roads would facilitate both a quick transfer of military units to parts of the United States under attack and rapid evacuation of people from areas threatened by atomic bombs.

00:15:38 Speaker_00
I'm doing work in this book I'm working on that revolves around invention and the rise of the R&D state.

00:15:45 Speaker_00
And it's really remarkable to look at how closely the R&D state was designed and sold in terms of its ability to keep America ahead for national defense. It has its roots in World War II, and it continues building much off of that rhetoric.

00:16:01 Speaker_00
And so there's this interesting way I think we think of the New Deal in terms of the Social Security, we think of it in terms of some of these individual programs.

00:16:09 Speaker_00
But it is this thoroughgoing expansion of the government into all kinds of areas of American life.

00:16:15 Speaker_00
And the thing that allows the Republican Party to get on board with a lot of that is this idea that if you don't do that, well, the Soviets are going to do it.

00:16:24 Speaker_00
And they're going to have the highways or they're going to have the technological or scientific superiority. They're going to make it to the moon, et cetera. And then America is going to be left behind.

00:16:34 Speaker_04
The national security argument is crucial to getting large segments of the Republican Party.

00:16:40 Speaker_04
For them, the greatest threat, both internationally and domestically, was the communist threat, and thus they were willing to extend themselves beyond a point where they otherwise would have gone, and the national highway system is one manifestation of that.

00:16:57 Speaker_04
The vast education bills that are going to propel the tremendous growth of American universities in the 1960s and 1970s, which you mentioned about R&D. has a similar propulsion.

00:17:08 Speaker_04
That doesn't mean that there weren't other forces within the Democratic Party who were doing this for classically progressive reasons. It's the obligation of the government to deliver goods to its citizens.

00:17:18 Speaker_04
But the scale of this would not have reached the point that it did without getting a lot of Republicans on board, and the critical argument for them was national security.

00:17:30 Speaker_04
And a critical event was Sputnik when Soviet Union shocks the United States by putting into orbit a satellite before the United States had done it. And that is a shocking moment. Oh my God, America is falling behind.

00:17:45 Speaker_04
We must bend every muscle to beating the Soviet Union in every way. And that requires tremendous investments because of satellite technology.

00:17:55 Speaker_04
in R&D, and also that becomes the foundation of what is going to become the IT industry and the IT revolution, also a product of the Cold War.

00:18:04 Speaker_00
So I just want to draw out some pieces of the theory here that maybe flesh out the political order.

00:18:09 Speaker_00
So I think people have in their minds, you have the Great Depression, you have a big government response, but then you have the acquiescence of Eisenhower and the Republican Party

00:18:21 Speaker_00
to both the premises of the New Deal, which is a much more expansive government regulating the market, trying to create a better life for workers, and building a stronger national security state.

00:18:32 Speaker_00
And you have the continued pressure of the Soviet Union, which kind of keeps holding this in place. How does that order end?

00:18:41 Speaker_04
There are three factors that pull this order apart. The first is race, the second is Vietnam, and the third is the major economic recession of the 1970s. Every political order has tensions within it in the United States.

00:19:02 Speaker_04
And the great contradiction in the New Deal party of Franklin Roosevelt was the treatment of African Americans. In order to have a new political economy of a big state managing private capital and the public interest,

00:19:16 Speaker_04
Roosevelt had to get the South on board, and the South meant the white South. The South was a one-party state. The Democratic Party was the only party that mattered.

00:19:27 Speaker_04
Congressmen and senators from the South would get elected again and again and again, and they would rise through seniority. They'd be the most powerful figures in Congress.

00:19:34 Speaker_04
And they said, we will support you, Roosevelt, with your broader political economy as long as you leave the racial hierarchies of the South intact. Don't touch Jim Crow. Don't touch segregation.

00:19:48 Speaker_04
don't promote an anti-lynching bill, and Roosevelt assented to that. But this was also a time, especially in the 1940s, when African Americans were migrating in huge numbers to the North, and they were becoming a constituency in the Democratic Party.

00:20:04 Speaker_04
This was the first point of crisis, and the Democratic Party found itself unable to contain the racial conflicts that exploded in the 1960s.

00:20:17 Speaker_04
That was then complicated by Vietnam, a vastly unpopular war inaugurated and presided over by Democratic presidents who were perceived by their own constituents to not be telling the truth about this awful quagmire.

00:20:33 Speaker_04
It swallowed up a president who otherwise would be regarded as a great president in American history, Lyndon Johnson, and it deeply split the Democratic Party. It also

00:20:42 Speaker_04
inaugurated trade-offs between funding a war and funding Johnson's beloved Great Society. Inflation began to take off. And then the third element was profound changes in the international political economy.

00:20:58 Speaker_04
One of the reasons why America was able to enter its grand compromise between capital and labor and pay labor very high wages was that America had no serious industrial competition in the world from the 40s to the 60s.

00:21:10 Speaker_04
Most of the industrialized world had been destroyed. The U.S. is actively helping the recovery of Western European economies, Japan, promoting development in Southeast Asia.

00:21:22 Speaker_04
And in the 1970s, these economies begin to challenge American supremacy economically. The symbol of that is the rise of Japanese car manufacturers who suddenly began competing very seriously with the U.S.

00:21:36 Speaker_04
And the entire promise of Western Europe prosperity and American university had been premised on the flow of unending supplies of very cheap Middle Eastern oil, most of them controlled by U.S. and British

00:21:50 Speaker_04
oil companies and Saudi Arabia and other oil producing nations in the 1970s say no these are our resources we will determine how much is drawn out of the ground and the prices that they will be charged and the quadrupling of oil prices leads to a profound economic crisis along with competition

00:22:12 Speaker_04
from European nations against the United States. And this plunges the United States into a very unexpected and profound and long economic crisis known as stagflation. Inflation and unemployment are going up at the same time.

00:22:27 Speaker_04
None of the textbooks say this should be happening.

00:22:30 Speaker_04
The tools are no longer working, and it's in this moment of crisis, the Democratic Party, this is the third strike against it, opens up an opportunity for alternative politics, an alternative party, an alternative plan for American political economy.

00:22:47 Speaker_00
I want to zoom in on something here that I've become more sensitive to. I think the standard account of what we now call neoliberalism, or we might call conservatism, or the new right,

00:22:59 Speaker_00
is you have Barry Goldwater runs against Lyndon Johnson, gets crushed, then you have Richard Nixon, the sort of turn to the right, and then you have Ronald Reagan, the fruition of the Goldwater-Nixon movement, and then Ronald Reagan leads the way to Bill Clinton.

00:23:15 Speaker_00
And that sort of leaves out something that is happening among Democrats at this time. There's a movement inside of liberalism, right?

00:23:24 Speaker_00
There's the New Deal democratic order, but you develop this new left and there is a movement of liberals against big government. Young liberals for reasons of

00:23:38 Speaker_00
self-expression for reasons of civil rights, for reasons of this feeling that they're being fed into bureaucracy and giant soulless organizations, and eventually into the meat grinder of Vietnam.

00:23:50 Speaker_00
Older liberals who are angry about the sort of reckless growth and the poisoning of streams and the building of highways through their communities, and the sort of ticky-tacky, you know, rise of these suburbs, And this predates Reagan, right?

00:24:06 Speaker_00
It's actually in some way something Ronald Reagan ends up running against. So can you talk a bit about the sort of troubling of the liberal consensus in the run-up to this period?

00:24:15 Speaker_04
Yes. The new left erupts on university campuses in the 1960s, and the two primary issues in the beginning are race and Vietnam. But they also quite quickly develop a critique of the established order.

00:24:33 Speaker_03
There's a time when the operation of the machine becomes so odious, makes you so sick at heart that you can't take part. You can't even passively take part.

00:24:44 Speaker_03
And you've got to put your bodies upon the gears and upon the wheels, upon the levers, upon all the apparatus. And you've got to make it stop.

00:24:52 Speaker_03
And you've got to indicate to the people who run it, to the people who own it, that unless you're free, the machine will be prevented from working at all.

00:25:01 Speaker_04
what was called at the time, the system. It's hard to believe that the system could do so much work, such an anodyne term. but it was a powerful term that was thrown around in the 1960s and 70s. And what was the system?

00:25:14 Speaker_04
The system was large American corporations who were no longer under control.

00:25:18 Speaker_04
And one reason why they were no longer under control is because they were being aided and abetted by a large federal state that was supposed to manage them in the public interest.

00:25:30 Speaker_04
And thus the system was meant to identify not just the corporations who were doing ill in America, but it was meant to identify a federal state that was birthed in the optimism of the New Deal and had been corrupted.

00:25:44 Speaker_04
And so you have this fissure within the Democratic Party itself. The other element of this is this profound search for personal freedom and autonomy that was intensely felt by members of the New Left.

00:26:00 Speaker_04
The battle cry of the free speech movement in Berkeley in 1964 Arguably, the first mass moment of protest on the part of the new left was, I will not be folded, spindled, or mutilated. Where does that phrase come from?

00:26:19 Speaker_04
That was a phrase printed on every IBM card. IBM was the dominant computer maker of the time. The computers were these enormous machines, mainframes, and they were seen as sculptifying to human creativity.

00:26:36 Speaker_04
And the personal computer movement was born on as part of the new left. Steve Jobs, Stuart Brand,

00:26:44 Speaker_04
imagined a personal computer that would be free of the IBM mainframe, free of big corporations, big corporate power, that it would be the authentic voice of only every individual who would be using that machine.

00:27:00 Speaker_04
It was a profound expression of a desire for personal autonomy, individuality, expressiveness, unconstrained by larger structures. This cry or cri de coeur came from the left. It was a very powerful part of

00:27:20 Speaker_04
the new left, but one can see how it might suit the purposes of a rising neoliberal order, because the rising neoliberal order was also intent on deregulating, freeing individuals from the grip of large institutions, and allowing them to go their own way.

00:27:39 Speaker_00
Neoliberalism is a slippery term. It's often just an epithet. How do you define what its tenets are? What do you need to believe to be a neoliberal of the period you're talking about?

00:27:54 Speaker_04
Neoliberals believe that the best economic program is one that frees capitalism from its shackles that allows people to truck, barter, and exchange goods, that gets the government out of economic life.

00:28:11 Speaker_04
And the only role for government is to ensure that markets can function freely and robustly. So it runs opposite to the New Deal. If the core principle of the New Deal was capitalism left to its own devices,

00:28:28 Speaker_04
would destroy itself, the core principle of neoliberalism. Remove the shackles from capitalism. That will bring us the most productive and freest world we can imagine.

00:28:42 Speaker_04
I have a shorthand for describing the neoliberal world that was envisioned by neoliberal thinkers and brought by policymakers into existence. And it's what I sometimes call the four freedoms of neoliberalism. Freedom of movement, people,

00:28:58 Speaker_04
freedom of goods to move across national boundaries, the free flow of information, and the free flow of capital across all boundaries. In a perfect neoliberal world, people, goods, information, and capital are moving freely without constraint.

00:29:23 Speaker_04
If we can imagine a perfect world that the Wall Street Journal wants, This would be pretty close to it.

00:29:30 Speaker_04
I do not want to suggest for a moment that the new left intentionally created neoliberalism, but it turned out that the cries of freedom, personal freedom, personal autonomy that were emanating from them turned out to be very conducive to the economic philosophy of neoliberalism.

00:30:12 Speaker_00
One thing that I'm curious to get your thoughts on though is something that feels like more of a miasma when I read it. So going back to Johnson, you begin having... I don't quite know how to describe it.

00:30:23 Speaker_00
I would sort of describe it in the political memoirs I've read as a... growing allergy to bigness and conformity in a lot of different contexts, right?

00:30:34 Speaker_00
A growing allergy in the context of the government, but also in the way society is organized, right? There's a lot of fear becoming the organization man, right? These like gray faceless cogs in the corporate wheel.

00:30:46 Speaker_00
But you have Lyndon Johnson giving these speeches about the ugliness of America, how it has become a somewhat grotesque society visually.

00:30:56 Speaker_00
You have John Kenneth Galbraith, one of the great economists of the New Deal era, writing The Affluent Society, which is all about the problems of the society where now there is much more plenty, but what makes life worth living has been eroded.

00:31:09 Speaker_00
And then you have Jimmy Carter. And I always think Carter's just a much more ideologically interesting president than people give him credit for. And he really channels a lot of this.

00:31:20 Speaker_00
And I want to play a clip from his 1978 State of the Union that you note in your book.

00:31:26 Speaker_02
Government cannot solve our problems. It can't set our goals. It cannot define our vision. Government cannot eliminate poverty, or provide a bountiful economy, or reduce inflation, or save our cities, or cure illiteracy, or provide energy.

00:31:48 Speaker_02
And government cannot mandate goodness.

00:31:51 Speaker_00
Later on, Bill Clinton will say the era of big government is over. But in some ways, this to me is a much more striking statement, both because it's earlier, but it's so much more specific about what government cannot do. What is he channeling here?

00:32:06 Speaker_00
What do you make of it?

00:32:10 Speaker_04
President Carter, who's 100 years old and seriously ailing, and has had a more successful post-presidency than just about any other president I can imagine. So hats off to him. It matters that he's a Southern governor.

00:32:27 Speaker_04
Southern governors, on the one hand, accepted federal largesse. The U.S. federal government invested a lot of resources in the Southern states to keep

00:32:38 Speaker_04
the Southern Democrats on board, but there was also a deep suspicion of government power, because government power, it was feared, would intrude on race relations in the South. So Jimmy Carter is an heir to suspicion of excessive federal power.

00:32:57 Speaker_04
But I also think he's grasping at this moment a point of transition. in the American economy and a sense that government policy as set forth in the New Deal was not working as well as it should have been.

00:33:17 Speaker_04
I think it mattered that he was an engineer and he was doing a lot of cost-benefit analysis. What kind of yield are we getting for the bucks that we're investing? And so he's open to this fertile moment of dissent. He's channeling new thinkers.

00:33:38 Speaker_04
and imagining a different Democratic Party that you are correct in saying precedes Clinton by 20 years. And the key figure in this movement is a man by the name of Ralph Nader.

00:33:53 Speaker_04
And he was a key influential advisor on Jimmy Carter, which makes Jimmy Carter in some odd ways, what we might say is he may have been accidental, but he's also the first, in a sense, neoliberal

00:34:03 Speaker_04
president, many meetings between Nader's people and Carter's people, to begin a process of scrutinizing the federal state, deregulating where it was necessary to deregulate.

00:34:15 Speaker_04
But it also needs to be said that he's very uncertain about this path for the Democratic Party, and he's very torn. And so one day, as in this speech that we just listened to,

00:34:28 Speaker_04
He's supporting smaller government deregulation, preaching a philosophy that government can't solve people's problems. But that older Democratic Party of unions, federal policy, vast programs, a welfare state, is still there and still present.

00:34:49 Speaker_04
And he'll give another speech a month later where he sounds much more like an old Democrat.

00:34:57 Speaker_04
And I think as I evaluate the Carter presidency, I see a man really caught in the throes of a moment of transition, able to glimpse what is coming, but unable to master what is coming.

00:35:13 Speaker_04
And so what defines his presidency for me is uncertainty, vacillation, and thus failure. He's a classical transitional figure more controlled than in charge of the moment.

00:35:28 Speaker_00
You mentioned Ralph Nader as one of the muses in Carter's ear and of Carter's moment.

00:35:35 Speaker_00
I think to the extent many people think about Nader now, they sort of vaguely know he helped make seatbelts into a major thing in cars and that he helped throw the 2000 election to George W. Bush. But who is Nader then? Not just what he's doing.

00:35:53 Speaker_00
But ideologically, what he's saying and the sort of critique that he's making that is being taken up by so many people and who end up being very important in the Democratic Party.

00:36:03 Speaker_04
Well, on the one hand, Nader is a man of the left. but he doesn't fit in the old left or the new left. We might call him a man of the consumer left. For him, the key figure in American society was the consumer, and he wanted to champion the consumer.

00:36:24 Speaker_04
And his contributions in terms of automobile safety, occupational safety, food safety were immense and attracted a very large following, including among sections of the new left who became known as Nader's Raiders.

00:36:42 Speaker_04
But he also executed a profound shift in ideology, and I'm not even sure how aware he was of the consequences of

00:36:49 Speaker_04
what he was generating, because in the process of making the consumer sovereign, he deflected attention, I would say, from what was and what remains the core relationship in a capitalist economy, and that is in the realm of production and the relations between employers and employees.

00:37:10 Speaker_04
And he was reluctant in some respects to challenge corporate power if corporate power was serving the consumer in a good way. He anticipates in some respects a profound shift in antitrust policy.

00:37:28 Speaker_04
And the key figure in this is gonna be Robert Bork in the 1980s and 1990s. It had been an article of faith

00:37:37 Speaker_04
in American history that no corporation should be allowed to get too large because they would inevitably exercise power in an undemocratic fashion. So antitrust meant breaking up big corporations. Under Robert Bork, the question changed.

00:37:53 Speaker_04
Big corporate power was okay as long as it served the consumer with cheap goods.

00:38:01 Speaker_00
What Ralph Nader is not shy about confronting is the government. I mean the sort of architecture of organizations he helps create that sort of Nader's Raiders staff that I mean generations now of really smart young liberal lawyers have gone into.

00:38:18 Speaker_00
they're built to sue the government.

00:38:19 Speaker_00
And to some degree, I think I'm more sympathetic to Nader as a skeptic of corporations, and it sounds like maybe you are, because I think he understands the government as the entity capable of bringing the corporations to heel. But what he builds is

00:38:35 Speaker_00
this huge set of documents and theorists and movements and institutions devoted to describing the ways in which the government fails and then suing it into acting differently.

00:38:51 Speaker_00
There is a sort of turn on bigness and one kind of bigness is corporations, but the kind of bigness you can really attack is the government and its faceless compromised activities.

00:39:04 Speaker_04
I accept that view of Nader, and he and his supporters and his organizations deserve a lot of credit for holding the government accountable and making vast improvements in a whole host of areas.

00:39:20 Speaker_04
regulating the environment and other matters, regulating food, and compelling government to do the service that it does.

00:39:29 Speaker_04
But it also distracts from understanding part of that which powers the rise of large corporations and gives them the ability to control government and capture regulatory agencies.

00:39:46 Speaker_04
And I think the results of his attacks on government have been ambivalent in terms of their consequences.

00:39:53 Speaker_04
In some respects, really accelerating the process of delivering goods to the American people and American consumers that they want, but on the other hand, contributing to an atmosphere of thinking the government can't really do much that's right.

00:40:12 Speaker_00
We sort of put down the thread of the Soviet Union back with Eisenhower, but now I want to pick it back up. As you move towards Reagan, certainly part of Ronald Reagan's appeal is his anti-communism.

00:40:25 Speaker_00
So how do you describe the role of the Soviet Union in this period of political time?

00:40:29 Speaker_04
The collapse of the Soviet Union between 1989 and 1991 is one of the most stunning events, I think, of the 20th century, and arguably much longer. What were its consequences?

00:40:46 Speaker_04
First, it opened up the whole globe to capitalist penetration to a degree that had not been available to capitalism since prior to World War I. And this generates a tremendous amount of belief.

00:41:02 Speaker_04
and excitement and expansion and a good deal of arrogance and hubris within the capitalist citadel, which is the United States. So that's one major consequence.

00:41:14 Speaker_04
The second major consequence is what does it mean for communism no longer to exist as a threat? And what we begin to see in the 1990s is

00:41:25 Speaker_04
capital in America regaining the power, assurance, authority, belief in its unilateral power that it had across the years of the Cold War, if not sacrificed, then moderated.

00:41:42 Speaker_04
What the Soviet Union had promised, what communism had promised was that private enterprise could be superseded by

00:41:49 Speaker_04
rational planning on the part of an enlightened set of rulers who could manage the economy in a way that benefited the masses in extraordinary ways. That whole project fails, and it fails in a spectacular fashion.

00:42:08 Speaker_04
And in the United States, because the collapse of the Soviet Union happened under Republican presidents,

00:42:17 Speaker_04
because it happened under Ronald Reagan, who was particularly hard on the Soviet Union, because Ronald Reagan had insisted that there was a continuum between Soviet government tyranny and what he regarded as New Deal government tyranny.

00:42:34 Speaker_04
They were on the same spectrum. One inevitably led to another. He and other Republicans, George H.W. Bush, but the party as a whole,

00:42:47 Speaker_04
takes this as a great vindication of their core beliefs, that capitalism, which under the New Deal was sharply constrained, should be freed from constraint. Its animal spirits allowed to soar. Venture capitalists encouraged to go everywhere.

00:43:06 Speaker_04
Investments made easy, lower taxation, let capitalists and capital drive America and the world economy unconstrained by regulation. And these were the core ideas of neoliberals, which have been incubating for decades.

00:43:24 Speaker_04
And now suddenly these ideas seem to be vindicated. This is the moment of free market triumph.

00:43:31 Speaker_04
And it intersects in a very powerful way with the ongoing IT revolution, which is also bound up with the Soviet Union's collapse because the Soviet Union was very hostile to the personal computer because it required a degree at that time of personal freedom that the Soviet Union wasn't willing to allow.

00:43:53 Speaker_04
What the IT revolution represented in the 1990s, and this is one of the reasons that Democrats get on board with it, what it represented was a belief that market perfection was now within human grasp, that there may have been a need for strong government

00:44:10 Speaker_04
in the past because knowledge about markets was imperfect. It was limited. It took time for information about markets to travel. A lot of it was wrong. Not enough of it was available instantaneously.

00:44:23 Speaker_04
Well, suddenly in the 1990s, you have this dream, this vision of all economic knowledge in the world being available at your fingertips instantaneously and with a degree of depth.

00:44:35 Speaker_04
and a range of statistics and figures that had been unimaginable, and a techno-utopianism takes hold.

00:44:42 Speaker_04
And it's the intersection of these two vectors, a sense that the collapse of the Soviet Union vindicates free market thinking, and the IT revolution that allows people to think market perfection is within our grasp in ways it never has been before.

00:45:00 Speaker_04
that pours fuel on the fire of neoliberal free market thinking.

00:45:06 Speaker_00
You described Bill Clinton as the Dwight D. Eisenhower of neoliberalism. What do you mean by that and what are some of the, for you, core examples?

00:45:17 Speaker_04
When Bill Clinton was elected in 1992, no Democratic US president had been elected since 1976. 16 years is an eternity. intellectual politics in the United States.

00:45:33 Speaker_04
And the question becomes, will he roll back the Reagan revolution of the 1980s, massive efforts at deregulation, or will he follow a path that Dwight Eisenhower followed in the early 50s?

00:45:50 Speaker_04
Eisenhower was the first Republican president elected in 20 years, and he has a choice to roll back the New Deal or to acquiesce to it. I think Clinton in the beginning is a little uncertain about what he is going to do.

00:46:06 Speaker_04
And he has some ambitious proposals in his first two years, most notably a vast program of national health insurance, which crashes spectacularly.

00:46:16 Speaker_04
And then he gets punished for that venture severely in the 1994 congressional elections, which bring Newt Gingrich and a very right-wing group of Republicans to power, the first time that Republicans control both houses of Congress since 1952.

00:46:38 Speaker_04
It's a huge achievement for the Republicans. Clinton reads that moment as signifying that the older Democratic Party of the New Deal, Franklin Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson, really had to be reworked and revamped.

00:46:55 Speaker_04
And the only way for him to win reelection, and the only way for the Democrats to hold onto national power and to regain it in Congress in 1996, is for him to acquiesce to some core Reaganite beliefs.

00:47:13 Speaker_04
And at the center of the Reaganite project was deregulation, which is a code word for getting the government out of economic affairs or curtailing government power.

00:47:27 Speaker_01
We know big government does not have all the answers. We know there's not a program for every problem. We know and we have worked to give the American people a smaller, less bureaucratic government in Washington.

00:47:45 Speaker_01
And we have to give the American people one that lives within its means. The era of big government is over.

00:47:57 Speaker_04
And so Clinton signs off on the Telecommunications Act of 1996. which effectively deregulates the burgeoning IT sector of the economy, makes possible an unregulated internet. He signs off on the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999.

00:48:24 Speaker_04
The Glass-Steagall Act had divided investment from commercial banking and had imposed a kind of regulation on Wall Street that brought an end to the crazy speculation that had brought about the Great Depression in the first place.

00:48:40 Speaker_04
It was a core principle of the New Deal. He does not seek to revive the fairness doctrine in terms of regulating public media, which had guided successive democratic administrations, the idea that if

00:48:57 Speaker_04
A news outlet put out one side of a debate on a policy matter. They were obligated to give the other side equal access. He becomes an advocate. of deregulation and in some respects pushes deregulation further than Reagan himself had been able to do.

00:49:18 Speaker_04
And in that sense, he acquiesces to some of the core principles of the Reagan revolution rather than seeking to roll them back. And it is in that respect that I think it's appropriate to think of him as a democratic Eisenhower.

00:49:32 Speaker_00
And this happens at a time of tremendous political conflict and polarization between him and the Republicans.

00:49:41 Speaker_00
One thing I sort of appreciate about your frameworks here is that there's a lot of periods, certainly in my political lifetime, where when you look at them, what you remember

00:49:52 Speaker_00
What stands out is all the disagreement, all the conflict, the impeachment trials, the government shutdowns, but certainly the 90s in the background of this, there are these huge laws being passed on a bipartisan basis with agreements between not always Clinton and Newt Gingrich, but quite often Clinton and Newt Gingrich for all the invective Gingrich is hurling at him elsewhere.

00:50:17 Speaker_04
A huge amount has been written on the 1990s by political historians, political scientists, journalists, and 90% of it focuses on polarization. The bitter

00:50:30 Speaker_04
cultural battles of the 1990s, very close in spirit to the cultural battles going on in America today. And I remember those times well. And what one remembers most about those battles is how much Clinton and Newt Gingrich hated each other's guts.

00:50:52 Speaker_04
And they were seen as being polar opposites. Clinton, the representative of a new left America, cosmopolitan, open to the liberation movements, looking for new ways of creating

00:51:07 Speaker_04
A new and diverse America embracing sexual liberations, his embrace of gay rights was somewhat limited, but still significant.

00:51:18 Speaker_04
Newt Gingrich, on the other hand, representing traditional Victorian America, wanting to reassert the patriarchal heterosexual family, men at work, women in the home, religious. This battle was intense.

00:51:34 Speaker_04
And both men considered their opponent utterly unscrupulous. Newt Gingrich thought that Clinton was the most amoral president ever to sit in the Oval Office.

00:51:49 Speaker_04
So one of the surprises to me in working on this book, because I remember those days very well, was the degree to which they worked together on telecommunication, on reform of Wall Street, on welfare.

00:52:05 Speaker_04
Now, Clinton would claim, and his defenders would claim, that he was triangulating. He was trying to make the best of a bad deal, that popular opinion was running with free markets, was running with the Republicans. And to some extent, that was true.

00:52:22 Speaker_04
But I was surprised the degree to which these two men who loathed each other in public and in private recognized that on political economy,

00:52:32 Speaker_04
they were on a similar mission, and the legislation that they put through has profoundly shaped America in the 21st century. And the lesson that I draw from that moment is that one must refrain from always getting sucked into

00:52:52 Speaker_04
The daily battles over cultural issues, they are important, they are crucial.

00:52:57 Speaker_04
It's not that we shouldn't pay attention to them, but sometimes there's a need to look underneath those battles to see if, in a subterranean sense, something else is going on.

00:53:08 Speaker_00
Let me pick up on a word you used there before we move to the 21st century, which was cosmopolitanism.

00:53:15 Speaker_00
Something that was fresh to me in your book was this argument that in neoliberalism, you're looking at more than just what we typically think of it as, which is an economic theory.

00:53:26 Speaker_00
You argue that there is a moral ethic that came alongside it, that is part of it. You talk about it as, at various times, cosmopolitan, individualistic. Tell me about it.

00:53:40 Speaker_04
Neoliberalism is often defined, as you say, simply as being about markets and freeing them up.

00:53:49 Speaker_04
And neoliberalism is also defined as something that's profoundly elitist in orientation and it's a device and an ideology used by elites to implant market ideology on a society in ways that deepens economic inequality and

00:54:07 Speaker_04
has the ability to strangle the democratic rights of the masses. This is a popular view of neoliberalism. I do not deny those elements of neoliberalism, but I also say that in America it had a profound popular base.

00:54:22 Speaker_04
Reagan was an enormously successful president, and by success I mean he was able to excite the imagination of majorities of American voters, and his core message was freedom.

00:54:39 Speaker_04
And half the time he meant freedom in terms of a free enterprise economy, but the other half of the time he meant freedom in terms of giving individuals the autonomy to go their own way.

00:54:53 Speaker_04
Now, he was not a fan of himself of the liberation movements of the 60s, but when Clinton becomes president, in the 1990s, he has a profound connection to those liberation movements of the 1960s, to feminism, to sexual liberation, to civil rights.

00:55:14 Speaker_04
And he detects in a world in which everyone can travel to wherever they want to go, he valorizes immigrants, he valorizes diversity. These are all values that are profoundly compatible with the neoliberal vision.

00:55:39 Speaker_04
The opportunity to travel anywhere, to seek out personal adventure, to seek out different cultures. This is a world that neoliberalism makes possible. And it's a thrilling moment for many people who have the opportunity either to mix in

00:55:59 Speaker_04
The world of American cities, which have filled up with immigrants or to travel abroad and experience other cultures, a single global marketplace enables and encourages the kind of cosmopolitanism that people on the left center side of the political spectrum in America have so deeply valued.

00:56:51 Speaker_00
So you locate the end of this era in the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009. Why?

00:56:59 Speaker_04
The promise of neoliberalism was that it would lift all boats. There was an acknowledgment about those who were freeing the energies of the market economy that it would probably increase inequality, the distance between the rich and the poor.

00:57:20 Speaker_04
but that the increase in inequality wouldn't matter because the forces of production that would be unleashed on a global scale would be so powerful and so profound that everybody would have more and everybody would have a better life.

00:57:42 Speaker_04
And what the 2008-2009 financial crisis exposed was first

00:57:48 Speaker_04
A lot of the market freedom that neoliberalism had unleashed had led to corrupt banking and financial practices that had brought the world to the edge of financial abyss of unimaginable proportions. We ended up skirting that abyss, but not by a lot.

00:58:14 Speaker_04
And on the other hand, it brought into view a sense of how profoundly unequal the access to power was under the neoliberal regime.

00:58:26 Speaker_04
And here, it's not so much the financial crash itself, but the nature of what governments did to promote recovery from the financial crash. And the object in the U.S. and also in Europe became to save

00:58:43 Speaker_04
the banks first, the culprits of this financial crisis were the ones who were bailed out first. If you were an American in 2009, 2010, 2011, who had assets in the stock market, you had pretty much recovered your position by 2011, 2012.

00:59:04 Speaker_04
If you were not one of those fortunate Americans and you were living week to week on a paycheck, your recovery did not occur. You didn't reach pre-2008 levels to 2016, 2017, 2018. And people understood profoundly the inequality of recovery.

00:59:17 Speaker_04
And it caused them to look with a much more scrutinizing glaze at the inequalities that neoliberalism had generated and how those inequalities have become so embedded in government policy toward the rich and the poor.

00:59:49 Speaker_00
I've always thought that one of the identity crises in the Republican Party, one reason the Republican Party is not held together better, is that the Soviet Union was fundamental to what made its various factions stay in place.

01:00:04 Speaker_00
And it was also, I think, fundamental to what kept the Republican Party, which at its core has a real anti-government streak, committed in any way to real government. And then I think there's a sort of casting about for another enemy.

01:00:17 Speaker_00
I think they end up finding it after 9-11 or think they have in what they try to

01:00:21 Speaker_00
turn into global jihadism, and then it falls apart, both as the antagonist and as a project, and just feels to me like another part of the sort of wreckage of this period that opens the way for something new.

01:00:36 Speaker_00
That new thing, I think, is more Donald Trump than it is anything else.

01:00:39 Speaker_04
So I think it discredits what had been a core project of the Republican Party, which was to spread market freedom everywhere. When I teach the Iraq War, I tell my 20-year-old students that this is the worst foreign policy mistake in U.S.

01:00:58 Speaker_04
history, that it's going to take the U.S. and the world 50 years to recover from. And it's imbued with a neoliberal hubris that everyone in the world is simply waiting for the wonders of a market economy to be unleashed upon them.

01:01:14 Speaker_00
And this is where I want to bring us into the present and this election and ask this question of, okay, if that era ended, what is being born? We spend so much time looking at the way the parties disagree. Their disagreements are very fundamental.

01:01:30 Speaker_00
Some of their disagreements are dangerous when you think about the disagreements over electoral legitimacy, for instance. But there's also new zones of agreement that have emerged.

01:01:40 Speaker_00
When I think about the way I covered politics in 2010, the legitimacy of elections could be taken for granted, and the legitimacy of the Affordable Care Act could not. Now the legitimacy of the Affordable Care Act can be taken for granted.

01:01:52 Speaker_00
In fact, Donald Trump brags falsely about having saved it, and the legitimacy of elections cannot.

01:01:58 Speaker_00
But there are these new zones of agreement, of places where the two parties are working together, where they seem to have come to similar conclusions, like on China. I think China is a huge force here. How do you think about what is emerging here?

01:02:10 Speaker_00
How do you think that Gary Gerstahl, including possibly just you, will tell the story of this period in 15 or 20 years?

01:02:18 Speaker_04
I'm a historian, so not very good at predicting the future, but I think it's useful in this moment of acute polarization. to look at some of what lies beneath the polarization.

01:02:32 Speaker_04
But you're right, on a series of issues, there are intriguing conversations going on between Democrats and Republicans. China and tariffs are one area of agreement.

01:02:46 Speaker_04
Ironically, immigration is becoming another area of agreement, regardless of who wins the election. One can imagine that the bill agreed to in the Senate. late in 2023, could easily be implemented in some form.

01:03:01 Speaker_04
There is a area of convergence on antitrust. Josh Hawley and Lena Kahn seem to like each other and are finding some common ground on that. And the national security hawks in the GOP, people like Rubio and McConnell,

01:03:22 Speaker_04
have converged with what we might call the industrial policy doves in the Democratic Party, people like Bernie Sanders on the importance of reshoring critical sectors of manufacturing and on improving in dramatic ways the nation's infrastructure.

01:03:40 Speaker_04
So we can see here a new political economy taking shape, one that breaks with the central principle of neoliberalism, which is that markets must lead and their only role for a state is to facilitate markets.

01:03:55 Speaker_04
There are multiple outcomes that are still possible and that's a sign that we're living in an interregnum between political orders and no new political order has established itself to the point where we can say with assurance, yes, this will triumph.

01:04:16 Speaker_00
Let's start on the first of those you mentioned, which is China. My view is that over a long period of time now, going back into the Obama administration before Donald Trump, China has been exerting an enormous pressure on American politics.

01:04:33 Speaker_00
Initially, the view is that China is taking low-cost, low-wage manufacturing by undercutting us on how much workers are paid. They have all these people they pay.

01:04:43 Speaker_00
poverty wages that you couldn't get away with in America, and it's just a cost-cutting measure.

01:04:49 Speaker_00
But by the time of the Obama administration, you begin to have this sense that they're doing things we're not doing anymore, building trains, building whole new cities at very rapid paces. They're beginning to move into advanced manufacturing.

01:05:03 Speaker_00
By the time you get to Donald Trump and then to Joe Biden, They're dominating in certain areas, like pulling ahead of us in some ways on the ability to build low-cost electric vehicles. They're dominating the renewable energy supply chain.

01:05:16 Speaker_00
We're worried about their sort of rising up the value chain in semiconductors. For a very long time, I think, there's been this increasing sense that America can come up with ideas, but it can't make things in the real world, and China can.

01:05:32 Speaker_00
And I feel that as actually one of the huge points of conceptual agreement now between the parties. Does that resonate for you?

01:05:40 Speaker_04
Yes, yes. And another element of that, which has been crucial to the ideological reorientation, is a new understanding of the relationship of free markets to democracy.

01:05:51 Speaker_04
And for the longest period of time, Americans and Europeans were willing to give China a blank check on their democracy.

01:06:01 Speaker_04
or on their violations of democracy because of the belief that if market freedom and capitalist practices set down deep enough roots in China, that people with economic freedom would want to add to that political freedom, and that democracy would begin to flourish, and that the Communist Party that rules China would either have to profoundly reform itself or

01:06:24 Speaker_04
see itself ushered from the political stage. It's hard to convince people now of how deeply rooted that belief was. No one in the Democratic or Republican parties believes that anymore.

01:06:36 Speaker_04
And that has intensified the fear along with this, oh my God, sense that China is not simply producing ordinary goods. It's producing very sophisticated goods. It's cornering markets.

01:06:49 Speaker_04
on electrical vehicles and batteries and solar panels that seemed unimaginable 15 or 20 years ago. And it has had the effect of profoundly shocking both parties. Before Trump and Sanders in 2016, Bernie Sanders

01:07:09 Speaker_04
Protectionism was a bad word in American politics. If you were identified as a protectionist, you were out of mainstream politics. You were not being listened to. You were being marginalized as dangerously heterodox.

01:07:21 Speaker_04
Don't you see that the period of protectionism has gone and the period of free trade has triumphed?

01:07:28 Speaker_04
And that has completely transformed, and the word protectionism is not being used because it's such a negative term, but the sentiments that lie behind protectionism

01:07:41 Speaker_04
which might be described more positively as fair trade, are profoundly with us and shape conversation about US economic relations with China every day of the week. So the change has been profound in both parties.

01:07:56 Speaker_04
And one of the surprises of the Biden administration, although in retrospect, it's not so surprising given the Biden administration's commitment to industrial policy, is the continuity we see between Trump tariffs and Biden tariffs.

01:08:10 Speaker_04
There is a big gap between Kamala Harris's proposed tariffs and Trump's big tariffs if he comes back into office. But still, I would say the convergence on the need for tariffs

01:08:22 Speaker_04
for reshoring, for creating a whole different relationship with China, the consensus on that is much more powerful than any divergence between the two political parties. And that was not really imaginable in 2010.

01:08:35 Speaker_00
I think that's right. I mean, there are many places where I think there's continuity between Barack Obama and Joe Biden, but China is really not one of them.

01:08:43 Speaker_00
I think you have to take seriously that Donald Trump changed both parties on China when we're thinking about things where the other party acquiesced to a different view, a different idea.

01:08:53 Speaker_00
That Trump coming and saying we are losing the competition to China, they should be treated as an adversary. much more so than an ally, that has become conventional wisdom in both parties.

01:09:05 Speaker_00
And you said that protectionism had been a dirty word, but then you mentioned another term that has sort of also shifted, which is industrial policy, that China was effective at using the government to protect and encourage and subsidize industries.

01:09:20 Speaker_00
And in doing so, sure, sometimes things ended up being losers and not winners, but they actually were able to bring a bunch of major industries to life. And the same is actually true at this point among Republicans.

01:09:34 Speaker_00
They've also come in many cases to the view that we should have much more industrial policy.

01:09:39 Speaker_00
sense that if you leave it to the market, China might, by using the government to foster and supercharge certain kinds of market pursuits in China, just lap us. I think it's become the dominant view in both parties.

01:09:55 Speaker_04
I would agree with that, although I think the Republican Party is probably more deeply split on this than the Democratic

01:10:03 Speaker_04
party is the Democratic Party arranged another kind of grand compromise between the left represented by Bernie Sanders and the center represented by Joe Biden, which led to a profound commitment symbolized by Build Back Better, a $5 trillion project that was going to insert industrial policy into the heart of government economic relations in a way that

01:10:30 Speaker_04
Mark, the Biden administration is profoundly different from his Democratic predecessors, both Obama and Clinton. I think the Republican Party does not have agreement on that to the same degree.

01:10:43 Speaker_04
And one of the interesting things to watch if Trump wins is how that internal fight in the Republican Party works itself out. On the one hand, you clearly have people in the Republican Party who have become deeply committed to industrial policy.

01:10:58 Speaker_04
I think of Marco Rubio, I think of Tom Cotton, I think of Josh Hawley, I think of J.D. Vance. And also the rhetoric of J.D. Vance almost fell out of my chair when I listened to his VP acceptance speech at the Republican

01:11:18 Speaker_04
Party Convention, which was all about putting Main Street above Wall Street, and insisting that the Republican Party was going to take the steps necessary to restore Main Street to its earlier vibrancy in American life.

01:11:34 Speaker_04
And core to that, Vance believes, is reshoring manufacturing, bringing back to life these abandoned towns. But it's also true that Vance is deeply connected to Peter Thiel,

01:11:47 Speaker_04
to the Silicon Valley tech bros who have a very different vision of the future of the Republican Party and the future of democracy in America. And we don't know where Trump stands on this.

01:12:00 Speaker_04
And I've been thinking about what's the significance of Project 2025, which has been a punching bag for the Democrats. I think part of it is an effort by many people in the Republican Party who knows that Trump's

01:12:17 Speaker_04
ideological commitments don't run very deep to try and hold them to account. But that project is confused on this issue. It's full of radically deregulating measures that promise to bring back neoliberalism with a kind of soft authoritarianism.

01:12:34 Speaker_04
On the other hand, there are strong shoots of industrial policy coming up in that document. And I think it speaks to the internal divisions in the Republican party on this issue, and one of the key questions is, where does J.D.

01:12:50 Speaker_04
Vance really stand on this matter? Is he willing to back up his rhetoric with actual actions. Can we imagine a Republican Party that is putting Main Street above Wall Street?

01:13:02 Speaker_00
Well, when you talk about that J.D. Vance convention speech, one of the ideological shifts it speaks to for me is something that's happened to both parties.

01:13:12 Speaker_00
And it goes, I guess, back to that Carter clip I played, where Jimmy Carter says government cannot solve our problems. It can't set our goals. It cannot define our vision.

01:13:22 Speaker_00
And you can interpret that different ways, maybe saying that society that has to do that.

01:13:26 Speaker_00
But I think both parties have come to a view they didn't hold as strongly before, if they did hold it at all, which is that markets left to their own devices are going to trample over values, goals, visions that they should instead be serving.

01:13:46 Speaker_00
So the sort of ideological strain in the Republican Party that J.D. Vance is part of, this sort of more populist dimension of it, what they see markets and particularly free trade and trade with China and immigration as having violated

01:14:01 Speaker_00
is the strength of communities and families.

01:14:03 Speaker_00
They look around and they see broken communities, hollowed out communities, they see families where the male breadwinners have lost their jobs and lost their earning power and so they're not getting married and they're divorces and there are too many single

01:14:17 Speaker_00
parent families. And on the democratic side, I think there's some of the same views. There's a lot of broken communities.

01:14:23 Speaker_00
And I also think a huge participant in this ideologically is climate change, since that markets would happily make people rich by cooking the planet. The market doesn't know.

01:14:34 Speaker_00
if the money is coming from, the profit is coming from burning oil or laying down solar panels. And so once again, some goal actually does need to be set. Markets can maybe serve our goals, they can serve our vision.

01:14:49 Speaker_00
but they can't be assumed to get what we want right in the world.

01:14:55 Speaker_00
And so the sense on both parties that you actually do need to define goals and define vision, and that ultimately that is going to have to happen through government setting policy and making decisions, the primacy of that kind of dialogue now, the degree to which the first conversation is what are we trying to achieve, that does feel different.

01:15:16 Speaker_04
I would agree with that and that speaks to the decisive nature of the election of 2016, which we will see the longer we get from it as a decisive inflection point as really marking the end of the neoliberal order.

01:15:32 Speaker_04
And marking the end of the neoliberal order doesn't mean that neoliberalism disappears. It doesn't mean that suddenly there are no more advocates of strong free markets.

01:15:42 Speaker_04
I think one of the questions now and one of the key questions for the Republican Party is Can they get serious about this?

01:15:51 Speaker_04
The seriousness that I see among senators, these senators in the Republican Party, I don't see in the House of Representatives among Republicans.

01:16:01 Speaker_04
And I don't have the confidence, you may have more confidence than I do in this, that if the Republicans win or if they control Congress, that they are going to pursue this seriously. It requires them to have a serious program of political economy,

01:16:18 Speaker_04
in a party that has lacked direction on political economy for quite some time.

01:16:26 Speaker_00
To be clear, I have zero confidence that if Donald Trump wins, we're going to see a cohesive ideological agenda in any of these directions.

01:16:34 Speaker_00
I do want to bring up another piece of it that I think Trump represents, though, which gets to that other dimension, that more moral dimension you talked about.

01:16:41 Speaker_00
You describe this sort of neoliberal era as bringing this much more cosmopolitan view of ethics, of morals, and of America's relationship with the world, a more sort of urbanist view.

01:16:52 Speaker_00
There's a lot of connections between what it means to live in New York and to live in London and to live in Tokyo and to live in Hong Kong.

01:17:00 Speaker_00
And Donald Trump does seem to me to be a rejection of a lot of that, certainly a rejection of the value of immigration and diversity, but also the people coming up behind him, and J.D.

01:17:10 Speaker_00
Vance is a good example of this, are much more skeptical of the individualistic moral structure that dominated here and that Republicans, for all the influence of the Christian right, largely left untouched.

01:17:27 Speaker_00
I mean, I always think about Project 2025, Kevin Roberts making a point of saying that pornography should be banned. There is something here that's also a moral turn. I think you see it more clearly. Well, actually, let me say this.

01:17:40 Speaker_00
I think it's actually very complicated in both parties because Donald Trump is himself such a poor

01:17:46 Speaker_00
vehicle for a return of traditionalist virtue, but there is something happening here, a sort of questioning of not just government policy and industrial policy, but did all this individualism work, right?

01:18:00 Speaker_00
Is a world where kids are on their smartphones all the time and families are having this much trouble, and did we get something more fundamental, almost spiritual wrong?

01:18:12 Speaker_04
I think that's right. I think the concern about the moral fiber of the American people is not new in the Republican Party.

01:18:19 Speaker_04
That goes back to Jerry Falwell, to some of the ministers who became popular in the 1990s, and calling America back to moral virtue and identifying enemies of God.

01:18:35 Speaker_04
The new element is a sense that one has to connect that concern for this kind of morality to a serious program of political economy. That it's not enough simply to call on people to be virtuous.

01:18:51 Speaker_04
It's not enough simply to pack churches on a Sunday morning and have them listen to sermons. That serious Christians, that serious conservatives have to find a way

01:19:05 Speaker_04
to rebuild the economic foundation that lies at the root of so much immorality and so much despair in American life.

01:19:17 Speaker_04
If that develops enough of a base in the Republican Party, then there becomes an opportunity to talk with Democrats about that, about family welfare, about the welfare of children.

01:19:31 Speaker_04
about creating institutions, both economic and social, that have the capacity to sustain communities in ways in which they have not been sustained.

01:19:42 Speaker_04
There are some issues that run so deeply on questions of morality between Republicans and Democrats, it's hard to see how they confine common ground. And probably the most important of these is on the question of abortion and reproductive rights.

01:20:05 Speaker_04
And to the extent to which J.D. Vance and his associates take their stand on this issue, the possibilities for developing a conversation about morality with liberals and Democrats are going to be very, very slim indeed.

01:20:27 Speaker_04
So the newest element for me is not simply a recourse to this morality in a sense that individualism and permissiveness and cosmopolitanism has failed, but a recognition that if America is to remoralize, that there has to be an underlying economic program that gives people

01:20:51 Speaker_04
security, good jobs, dignity, and their children a chance for a better future.

01:20:58 Speaker_00
I am very struck on the right at the moment if you look at the kinds of people that young right-wingers read. hilariously the Bronze Age pervert, but the Claremont Review people.

01:21:13 Speaker_00
The things that I think would have once been framed in terms of Christianity are now framed in terms of classical virtue. There's a sort of rediscovery of the Stoics, not the early Christians.

01:21:25 Speaker_00
And so there's something here where obviously efforts to remoralize America are not new. But this idea that we have gone wrong in modernity by becoming so individualistic seems to be gathering a fair amount of force.

01:21:40 Speaker_00
My read of it is that the Christian right is just too weak and not sufficiently appealing to be the vehicle for it. And so these other aesthetic and ancient containers are being searched for, but that there is some kind of pushback happening.

01:21:58 Speaker_00
I think there's an argument that that is reaching throughout society. And so I think you see a lot of interest among people in both parties around some of these tech regulations. But I think of that as sort of fundamentally moralistic.

01:22:10 Speaker_00
One version of it might be to bring in somebody like John Haidt and to say that there is a sense that leaving kids to find their way with smartphones has been just a tremendous moral failure on the part of adults and on the part of government, right?

01:22:25 Speaker_00
That we have just sort of abandoned too many young people to the wilds of the internet and the wilds of technology without taking responsibility for a certain paternalism that certainly parents at the very least are supposed to have.

01:22:40 Speaker_00
But the backlash to a world that seems that we've just let anybody decide anything from, you know, if you're taking the right wing critique of this, you bring in gender ideology, you bring in quite a bit.

01:22:51 Speaker_00
And I think on the left wing critique, it has much more to do with the role of corporations in public life. But there's some sense we've really gone wrong.

01:22:59 Speaker_04
Well, I'm going to disagree with one part of your analysis and agree with another part. The part I'll disagree with is that I think this does go back to the 1990s in one respect.

01:23:11 Speaker_04
One of the few pieces of regulation that Congress imposed on the IT industry in the 1996 Telecommunication Act was kind of an anti-pornography measure that then gets thrown out by the court, so it becomes irrelevant.

01:23:25 Speaker_04
But it was part of the congressional package. It was one of the few elements of an attempt to regulate morality for the general welfare.

01:23:32 Speaker_04
And on the other side, some of the flashpoints of conflicts that we had in the 1990s over trans issues and the like today remind me very much of flashpoints in the 1990s. So I think there's more continuity there.

01:23:48 Speaker_04
But if I am hearing you correctly, I'll rephrase this and you can tell me if I'm wrong.

01:23:54 Speaker_04
that the Christian right has become somewhat contaminated by its blind adherence to Trump and by its too great a willingness to plunge into politics with any messenger, no matter what moral qualities they're exhibiting, that there is a movement among conservatives to step back from that and to ground their morality in something deeper

01:24:25 Speaker_04
more widespread, something that can appeal to a greater cross-section of Americans, regardless of whether they go to church or not.

01:24:32 Speaker_04
If there is a moral awakening underway that is not tied to instrumentalizing churches for strictly partisan purposes, which is one way of describing evangelicalism in the last 20 to 25 years, then that would be new.

01:24:49 Speaker_04
And if that's what you're sensing, a kind of

01:24:52 Speaker_04
search for a different kind of moral foundation, less contaminated by politics, then that would be an interesting development, and it might create a new basis for conversation between the Democrat and Republican parties, especially if it can transcend the religious-nonreligious divide, which doesn't get talked about much in America because anyone wanting to be elected president has to declare their belief in God, but is nevertheless

01:25:21 Speaker_04
If that's what I'm hearing you're saying, then that would be genuinely new and would create the basis for a different kind of conversation than the one we've been having.

01:25:31 Speaker_00
Well, I do think there's some of that, and although which way it goes and what conversation it creates, I guess, is to be seen. I think that's a good place to come to a close here, though.

01:25:40 Speaker_00
So, as our final question, what are three books you'd recommend to the audience?

01:25:44 Speaker_04
Well, interesting that we talked about Christianity and Trump.

01:25:47 Speaker_04
Part of what I've been trying to understand is how sincere Christians have been able to give such incredible support to the man who I regard as the most pagan man ever to inhabit the White House. And he may well inhabit it again.

01:26:03 Speaker_04
And a book that helped me a great deal is Tim Alberta's book, The Kingdom, the Power and the Glory, American Evangelicals in an Age of Extremism.

01:26:13 Speaker_04
He took me into a world that I otherwise didn't have accessibility to, and he helped me to understand a great deal that I did not. So I thank him for that.

01:26:23 Speaker_04
I'm always trying to read something fresh and new on the left, and I found kind of an unconventional place to study this and read about it. Tim Harper, Underground Asia. global revolutionaries and the assault on empire.

01:26:38 Speaker_04
And this is a book about underground radicals in East and South Asia and Southeast Asia, 1900 to 1925, looking to upend empire, looking to upend capitalism, looking to free their countries from colonial shackles.

01:26:55 Speaker_04
And it was a world that Tim Harper recovered that was utterly hidden from view. They weren't that consequential in those years, but these are going to be the figures who bring communist China into the world.

01:27:08 Speaker_04
And finally, Sarah Igoe, The Known Citizen, a very different kind of book, A History of Privacy in Modern America. We're talking about morality. We're talking about community.

01:27:18 Speaker_04
And of course, social media has put the question of privacy and what constitutes privacy and what's private and what's public, such an urgent question in understanding America.

01:27:29 Speaker_04
And she gives us a wonderful hundred-year overview of how Americans in almost every generation have redefined the boundary between private and public. And I found that extremely useful in thinking about where America is at in the 21st century.

01:27:45 Speaker_04
Gary Gerstle, thank you very much. Thank you for having me.

01:27:59 Speaker_00
This episode of The Ezra Klein Show is produced by Annie Galvin. Fact-checking by Keith Sinclair and Mary Marchlocker. Our senior engineer is Jeff Geld, with additional mixing by Amin Sahota. Our supervising editor is Claire Gordon.

01:28:10 Speaker_00
The show's production team also includes Roland Hu, Elias Isquith, Michelle Harris, and Kristen Lynn. We have original music by Isaac Jones, audience strategy by Kristina Siemielewski, and Shannon Busta.

01:28:20 Speaker_00
The executive producer of New York Times Opinion Audio is Annie Rose Strasser.